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Governmentality is the late Michel Foucault's neologism for 
governmental rationality. By rationality Foucault meant the 
particular way in which an object or process is conceived and 
from this the logic by which it is acted upon. The art of 
government is the application of rationality in a specified 
way through practical techniques and principles upon objects 
and process constituted as political by such rationality.
I use these concepts of governmentality and the art of 
government to examine the history of statistical thought and 
practice. From this examination I illustrate the historical 
forms assumed by statistical reason and its interaction and 
relationship with the historical forms assumed by the art of 
government. Through this examination I show statistics to be 
a technology of government.
The goal of this paper is to trace, in a general way, the 
transformations that have occurred in governmental and 
statistical reason. I describe the role of statistics in the 
transition from an essentialist epistemology to a non- 
essentialist, relational or systems based formulation of 
objective rational knowledge. It is my thesis that the 
development of theories of complex dynamic systems understood 
explicitly as cybernetic information processing systems 
constitutes a fundamental shift in how process and change are 
understood. I argue that such theories constitute the basis 
of a new way of conceiving of the objects of government and 
hence is leading to new ways of governing them, a new art of 
government.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality is a useful 
way to analyze phenomena that seem political on their face 
yet prove difficult to specify precisely how they produce 
their political effects. In the late twentieth century, 
information is just such a phenomena. Information is a term 
that elicits numerous definitions and explanations. It is 
widely recognized that information is somehow involved in the 
current political order. Names attempting to capture this new 
order such as "information age," "post-industrialism" or 
"global society" are thrown around with abandon. Such 
conceptions, however, tend to describe information as some 
sort of new commodity or the result of a new social process 
without attempting to delve into what this process might be 
or what sort of exchange system might be implied by this new 
commodity.
I suggest that information constitutes more than just a 
new commodity. It is a new way of conceiving of the dynamics 
of complex processes such as society. It is also a technical 
knowledge which allows what Foucault calls the art of 
government to proceed in new ways according to this new 
conception of society. Further, this new conception and these 
new political practices are intimately linked with 
statistics. In this paper I attempt to illustrate this link 
by showing the intimate relationship between the thought and 
practice of statistics and that of government. Through 
illustrating the history of this relationship I arrive at the
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thesis that a new mode of governing is, in fact, emerging 
that takes as its object a new formulation of society as a 
complex information processing system. This transition can be 
seen through an analysis of the evolution of the art of 
government, especially in terms of the evolution of 
statistical reason.
Foucault's concept of the art of government takes a wide 
view of what constitutes the political. This is because many 
different disciplines with many different objects of analysis 
are involved in elucidating the world and producing knowledge 
about it. Governing is an activity that requires knowledge 
and thus has a close relationship to its production. This is 
perhaps not so controversial. It is Foucault's particular way 
of conceiving the relationship between knowledge and 
governing, however, which has generated intense interest and 
criticism.
Foucault's thought is a product of the post World War II 
emergence of dynamic systems in which the conception of 
things, ideas or processes linked to unchanging and essential 
natures has given way to conceptions of things, ideas and 
processes as relational, contextual and contingent. This 
includes the relationship between government and the 
production of knowledge. For Foucault, the link between 
knowledge and governing is a two way street. The activity of 
governing is implicated in ways of knowing because ways of 
knowing implicate ways of governing. The production of 
rational knowledge, no matter the discipline, is therefore a 
political act.
From a critical point of view this perspective too is 
not so scandalous. But for Foucault, the link between 
governing, knowledge and rationality is not to be understood 
in terms of the ideological uses to which rational knowledge 
may be put, the idea of the illegitimate use of legitimate 
knowledge. The link is much deeper and more complex than 
that. For Foucault, there is no objective ground to judge 
legitimacy. Rather legitimacy is the result of an agonal 
contest. Not only a contest of wills, but a contest of 
evolution an effect of the continuous change in the art of 
government. For legitimacy is linked not only to individual 
thinkers but the larger system of thought within which 
individuals and their own thought processes exist.
By art of government Foucault means the application of 
practical techniques and principles rationally applied to 
rationally understood objects for the purpose of affecting 
this object in a specified way. It also refers to the 
reflection upon the specific strategies and techniques by 
both those who implement them and those who are the targets 
of them.1
The art of government is unique from other historical
forms of rule in its interrelationship with knowledge.
Government as an art began to emerge when knowledge ceased to
be solely the effect of religious interpretation and became
connected to investigation into and experimentation upon the
material world. That is, the art of government emerged
1 Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Foucault Effect; Studies In
Governmentality With Two Lectures By And An Interview With Michel 
Foucault, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991).
roughly simultaneously with the development of an 
epistemology of objectivity and the beginning of empirical 
scientific inquiry. From this point on the objects and 
objectives of government ceased to be subsumed within a 
divine cosmological and theological order. The principles of 
government, the rationality by which it operates and the 
knowledge of its object, became autonomous. The object of 
government and the principles by which they are administered, 
whether the state, society, or individuals, become immanent 
to themselves. It is through investigation into such objects 
of government, how they work and by what means they can be 
made to work better, that the principles of government, and 
its rationality, are determined.
Governing became linked to objectivity and rationalism 
not simply because these outlooks produced useful devices and 
techniques for manipulating and affecting things and 
processes. It also became linked to objectivity and 
rationalism precisely because objectivity and rationalism 
became imbued with moral and ethical overtones or capacities 
especially in terms of the struggle over legitimacy. 
Objectivity replaced divine and cosmological capacities for 
judgment. Moral concerns did not disappear, they became 
invested in rationality, governmental rationality in 
particular.
Governmental practices and activities based on objective 
knowledge were not only effective, they were the morally 
right way to do things. Good government became rational 
government - government that reflected in an objective manor
upon its goals and methods for achieving these goals. And 
rational government became good government - government which 
had as its goal the enhancement of what is good and proper, 
the right order of things, within its domain.
Government is a broad and complex topic. There is one 
particular facet to the art of government that is 
particularly interesting and provides a degree of coherence 
to my story. That is statistics. Statistics emerged as one of 
the primary investigative activities to discover the 
objective facts about the state and to establish what the 
right order was. In 1615 Antoine de Montchrestien in his 
treatise on political economy remarked "One thing alone is 
lacking to you 0 great State, the knowledge of yourself, and 
the image of your strength."2 By 1778 the demand for such 
knowledge had become common: "There can be no well-ordered 
political machine, nor enlightenment administration in a 
country where the state of population is unknown." M. Moheah 
stated.3 He pointed out further that "kings and their 
ministers are not the only ones who may draw knowledge from 
the table of population...The progress or loss of population 
presents a host of truths from which Physics, Medicine and
2 Antoine de Montchrestien L'Economie politique patronale. Traite de 
l'oeconomie politique, dedie en 1615 au roy (Paris, 1889), 34. Quoted in 
Pasquale Pasquino "Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of capital - Police 
and the State of Prosperity," in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller eds. 
Foucault Effect, 114.
3 M. Moheau, Recherches et considerations sur le population de 
France (Paris, 1778), 20. Quoted in Pasquino, "Theatrum Politicum," 115.
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all the sciences which have for their object the health, 
conservation, protection or succor of humanity may profit."4
Statistics and the modern state system in Europe emerge 
together in the seventeenth century. Since its inception in 
the seventeenth century statistics has been at the center of 
the effort to know the makeup and composition of these new 
states. The general goal of the art of government is 
prosperity or the right order of the state. Prosperity and 
the right order of society are familiar themes in the late 
twentieth century. This concern is not unique to the modern 
art of government. Foucault and others refer to this concern 
as the pastoral responsibilities of the state. Such pastoral 
conceptions of the role of political rule goes back at least 
to the Greeks. Through the middle ages this pastoral 
responsibility assumed by political leadership was invested 
with Christianity and religious or cosmological conceptions 
of what constituted the right order of the kingdom.
What distinguishes the art of government from earlier 
forms of rule is the derivation from within the object of 
government itself of knowledge about this object. From this 
knowledge emerges the particular form by which the right 
order of the state is understood and the governments pastoral 
responsibilities are carried out. Governing requires that the 
reality of individuals and groups, their relationships with 
each other and with the processes of life, be made thinkable 
and intelligible. The art of government encompasses the 
"strategies, techniques and procedures through which
4 ibid.
different forces seek to render operable" the various 
rational knowledges of the social relationships of and 
between individuals and groups as well as their interface 
with material resources for the sake of production.5 
Governmental knowledge, in other words, elucidates its object 
in such a way that renders it thinkable, manipulable and 
amenable to government.
The various techniques and principles constituting 
statistics since the seventeenth century have been the 
primary means of obtaining rational objective knowledge about 
the object of government. However, statistical thought and 
practice themselves have a history. They have not been stable 
but have evolved. The need by the emerging states for 
knowledge about themselves provided the impetus for the first 
statistical practices. These practices were themselves 
informed by the emerging conceptions of rational scientific 
method. As the first statistical activities began to produce 
knowledge about the state the perceptions of it began to 
change. As the perceptions of the object of government 
evolved, so did the governmental activities aimed at it.
The history of statistics is unique in its peculiar 
relationship not only to the art of government but also to 
the very conceptions of rationality and objectivity upon 
which the art of government depends. What are the 
implications of rationality having a history? In terms of 
government it means the evolution of the right order of the
5 Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller "Power Beyond the State," British 
Journal of Sociology 42, no. 2 (June 1992): 183.
object of government and hence how it is governed. Though 
statistics began as an explicitly political activity, its 
techniques and methodologies quickly found applications in 
all the disciplines producing rational, scientific knowledge. 
More and more techniques were developed in many different 
disciplines.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century statistics 
had ceased to be understood as political at all. Where once 
statistics had been guarded as secrets of the state, vital 
information about its strength, they became, and remain, 
eminently ubiquitous, dispersed throughout society open to 
all who care to look. This has obscured the political role of 
statistics but has not decreased this role. Statistics has 
been fundamentally involved since its inception in the 
production and definition of rational governmental knowledge. 
It may be that the political value of statistical practices 
has been increased with this spread and ubiquity. In any 
case, the evolution of statistical thought and practice, what 
I shall call statistical reason, has been closely linked to 
the evolution of the art of government. The first discovery 
of statistics was the population, the first object of 
government for the new states in Europe. Continued 
transformations in conceptions of the object of government, 
partly as a result of continuous statistical examination of 
the population led to a reformulation of the object of 
government into society.
By World War II rational knowledge had undergone a 
dramatic yet subtle reformulation, a reformulation that is
beginning to manifest itself as the modern art of government. 
Statistics played a significant role in this transformation. 
When society began to be conceived as a complex system by the 
turn of the century, techniques for governing it began to 
reflect this reformulation. With the development and spread 
of information theory throughout all knowledge producing 
disciplines, this conception of society as a system became 
much more formal and practical. A new form of governmental 
intervention began to be imagined based upon new conceptions 
of the dynamic processes of society.
We are just now beginning to feel the effects of this 
reformulation. They are, I believe, connected to a range of 
new technologies which have statistical monitoring and 
recording capacities built directly into them. These new 
techniques and technologies with their new capacities and 
potentials are in turn altering our perception of what 
society is composed of, what its right order is, and what the 
proper objectives of government should be.
I do not assume that essentialist epistemology has 
disappeared or that practices emanating from this position 
are no longer effective. They are. Analysis of such practices 
are still important to render visible and analyzable such 
practices especially when they take the form of exclusion and 
marginalization documented so well in feminist and cultural 
studies. I believe, however, that the emerging form of 
government does not revolve around the identity/different 
nexus in quite the same way. The difference between these
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forms of analysis and the one presented here are related in 
an obscure way but are not the subject of this paper.
The goal of this paper is to trace, in a general way, 
the transformations that have occurred in statistical reason 
and to link these with the emerging transformations in the 
art of government. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller describe the 
art of government as composed of three mutually constitutive 
aspects; the moral, the discursive, and the epistemological.6 
I focus particular attention upon the epistemological aspect. 
The focus on the epistemological aspect of the art of 
government clearly illustrates the political context of the 
production of knowledge and the evolution of ways of knowing 
the object of government. To understand and participate in 
the politics of the current period it is vital that the way 
the object of government is understood and managed itself be 
understood.
Part One begins with a description and explanation of 
Foucault's concept of governmentality and the art of 
government setting the analytical stage for the subsequent 
narrative of the effects of the transformations in 
statistical reason. The art of government can be usefully 
analyzed by distinguishing between the form taken by 
political practices and thought on the one hand and the 
object of these practices and thought on the other. The two 
are mutually constitutive and irreducible. How the object of 
government is understood affects how it is governed and at 
the same time the practice of governing this object leads to
Rose and Miller, "Power Beyond the State," 178.
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the same time the practice of governing this object leads to 
changes in how it is understood.
Part One continues with a description of the historical 
emergence of the art of government as a form of political 
rule and statistics as a form of rational knowledge 
production. Together they were known as raison d'etat or 
reason of state. Reason of state corresponded with an object 
of government known as a population. Statistics emerged in 
the effort to describe and understand the population. The 
subsequent developments of reason of state leading up to the 
beginning of a new art of government are then described. This 
is characterized by the transformation of the population into 
a new object of government known as society and the new art 
of government known as liberalism.
Part Two explores the continuous developments of early 
modern liberal government and statistics. Liberal government 
is characterized by the refinement of what Foucault calls the 
disciplines. Statistics provided the knowledge of the normal 
that made the disciplines possible. Particular attention in 
Part Two is given to the role of statistical reason in the 
development of various disciplines producing knowledge about 
society. The growth and refinement of knowledge about society 
leads to yet further transformations in how this object of 
government is understood. At the epistemological level, this 
transformation is played out in the decline of essentialist 
determinism and the search for a new principle of order 
centered on functionalism.
12
Part Three describes the continued transformations in 
statistical reason, and the development of equilibrium and 
structure as concepts to accompany functionalism, and the 
replacement of the norm as a determining force. While short 
lived, equilibrium was fundamental for the further 
development of concepts of complex processes and their 
ordering in terms of dominance and hierarchy.
Part four describes the continued transformations in the 
conception of society since World War II. Dominance and 
hierarchy as principles of order quickly gave way to the 
principle of control during what became known as operations 
research during world War II. These transformations led to 
the current state of transition in the liberal art of 
government and, I suggest, is the beginning of a radical 
change in the way the object of government is understood and 
hence how it is governed. Control is intimately linked with 
several concepts such as information, cybernetics and complex 
systems. The conception of society that is emerging, I 
suggest, is one of a cybernetic information processing 
system.
The concluding discussion focuses primarily upon the 
tentative ramifications of the emergence of cybernetic 
information processing systems for how the object of 
government is understood. The development of complex dynamic 
systems as a rational explanation for how many aspects of the 
world works implies a dramatic reformulation of the right 
order of modern society and how its prosperity can be 
enhanced. Dramatic shifts in the art of government are
accompanying this reformulation giving rise to a new form of 
government that Gilles Deleuze has simply called control.7 I 
speculate only briefly on how the actual practices carried 
out upon this new object of government might operate. I 
believe it is necessary to first understand the 
epistemological basis of this new society of control - where 
it came from and how it emerged - before attempting to 
understand the specific activities of government by control. 
A comprehensive analysis of the practices of modern 
government will have to wait.
7 Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control," October
59 (1992): 3-7.
Chapter 2: 
Governmentality 
and the Art of Government
According to Michel Foucault current political theory 
pays too much attention to institutions and not enough 
attention to the practices and activities by which governing 
is carried out. This focus on institutions is based upon a 
reification of categories and constructs such as the true 
nature or essential characteristics of politics, the State, 
Government or Civil Society. The identification of the 
essential characteristics or true nature of these categories 
have long been the mainstays of political theory..For 
Foucault, however, the production and deployment of these 
categories themselves constitute political practices and that 
"[tjhe nature of the institutions of the state... [are] a 
function of changes in the practices of government."1 The 
distinction between theory and practice is not as clear cut 
as traditional political theory assumes.
Foucault's project had been an attempt to "sketch a 
history of the different ways in our culture that humans
1 Colin Gordon "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in
Burchell, Gordon, and Miller eds., Foucault Effect, 4.
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develop knowledge about themselves."8 This historical sketch 
treats knowledge and reason as "truth games" rather than 
truth as universal and fundamental, what George Lakoff calls 
objectivist truth. Lakoff defines objectivism as the 
assumption that "rational thought consists of the 
manipulation of abstract symbols and that these symbols get 
their meaning via a correspondence with the world, 
objectively construed, that is, independent of the 
understanding of any organism."9 The world "objectively 
construed" is understood to be composed, at least partially, 
by things that possess essential properties. These essential 
properties "are those properties that make a thing what it 
is, and without which it would not be that kind of thing."10 
Objectivist assumptions of essential properties are the basis 
of traditional categorization and classification schemes.
Foucault rejects such objectivist theoretical attempts 
to deduce the modern activities of government that begin with
8 Michel Foucault, Technology Of The Self; A Seminar with 
Michel Foucault, ed. Luther H. Martin, Buck Gutman, and Patrick H.
Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p 17-18. 
Foucault has been charged by some of anti-humanism and even conservatism 
for this rejection of universal and essential qualities. The rejection 
of universalisms however does not simply imply relativity where anything 
goes or a rejection of standards of judgment. Foucault's conception of 
modern political reason and forms of governing understood as contingent 
and contextual means it is a domain to be participated in and acted 
upon. Foucault presents a vision of politics that allows full 
participation. It demands recognition of our participation in the 
construction of governmental categories rather than simply the 
rearrangement of already established "essential identities."
9 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, And Dangerous Things: What Categories 
Reveal About The Mind (Chicago: The Chicago University press, 1987; 
paperback edition 1990), XII. Italics in original.
Ibid., 161. Italics in original.
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a priori assumptions of essential properties and propensities
of the State, Civil Society or Government etc.11 Such
theories, however, are instructive - not for their
description of the actual workings of government or society
per se but rather as representations of the theoretical
practices that form past and present modes of the art of
government. Foucault does not focus upon the truth or falsity
of how Government, the State or Civil Society have been
conceived at any given point in history. Instead he asks how
%
such conceptions and their associated practices became 
possible. "These forms of knowledge and these apparatuses of 
power are linked in a constitutive interdependence."12
In Plato's allegory of the cave the philosopher produces 
truth in his pretense to revelation of the good and the just 
by the light of reason and philosophy.13 For Foucault the 
truth whose shadow is cast on the cave walls is not revealed 
by the sun's light during the philosophical ascent out of the 
caves darkness. Even in the sunlight (reason) the truth 
remains enigmatic. We have no privileged access to, or god's 
eye view of, the really real or objectively real that 
characterizes the Platonic ideal of the philosopher king.
Foucault's analysis is not prescriptive. Foucault 
explicitly refrained from constructing a theory of the state
11 Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in 
Burchell, Gordon and Miller eds., Foucault Effect. 4.
12 Colin Gordon, "Afterword," in Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews 
And Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 239.
13 Plato, Republic. Translated with an introduction by Francis 
MacDonald Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941; Twenty 
seventh printing, 1965), book VII.
or good government. He is more interested in how ideas and 
practices came about, what made them possible and what they 
in turn make possible than whether they are "right" or 
"wrong." He prefers to to analyze the development and 
functioning of truth and knowledge rather than engage in 
pronouncements as to the degree of correspondence the object 
of a theory has with the "really real." The governmentality 
critique tries to destabilize the traditional categories of 
political theory and show them to be the effects of, as much 
as the basis for, political theory. Through this 
destabilization governmentality tries to illustrate how our 
essential political truths produce and are produced by 
political reason and political practices in an intimately 
interwoven process.
Foucault refers to this mutually constitutive character 
of theory and practice as an ensemble. It is an "ensemble 
formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the 
exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of 
power."14 The ensemble comprising the art of government is 
not to be thought of as hierarchical with a fixed structure. 
Rather, the relationships within this ensemble are fluid or 
thixatropic in character displaying nonetheless "an overall 
coherence without answering to any determinative principle or
14 Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Burchell, Gordon, and 
Miller eds. Foucault Effect. 102.
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underlying logic."15 The coherence and logic that obtains 
within such ensembles, as well as any fluid disturbances, 
arise from within the ensemble itself. The close relationship 
of these two dimensions leads Foucault to often use these 
terms interchangeably. For clarity's sake I will refer to 
governmentality as denoting Foucault's mode of analysis while 
referring to the art of government as the object of this mode 
of analysis, the practices of governing.
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller have developed a schematic 
for breaking down Foucault's governmental ensemble into a 
form useful for this paper.16 This schematic, or "conceptual 
tool" breaks the art of government into three aspects, again, 
understood as mutually constitutive: the moral, the idiomatic 
and the epistemological.
The moral or ethical aspect refers to the ideals and 
values to which government is thought to be properly directed 
such as freedom, justice, citizenship, etc. This includes the 
relations that are considered proper between ruler and ruled, 
the distribution of tasks and authority whether political, 
spiritual, military, familial, pedagogic etc.
15 Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's 
Methods and historical Sociology (New Yorks Routledge, 1994), 223. 
Thixotropy is "the property of certain gels and emulsions of becoming 
fluid when agitated and then setting again when left at rest." Webster * s 
New World Dictionary 2nd college ed. (1980), s.v. "Thixotropy."
16 Rose and Miller, "Power beyond the state," 178. Rose and Miller's 
delineation is slightly different from the one I use here. They use the 
term political rationality where I use the term art of government. This 
is because they do not distinguish between governmentality and art of 
government in the same way that I do. These two formulations are 
compatible however. They are simply derived from different narrative 
goals.
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The idiomatic or linguistic aspect refers to the 
distinctive language with which governing is articulated. The 
language that constitutes political discourse is more than 
rhetoric, at least in that terms common usage. "It should be 
seen, rather, as a kind of intellectual machinery or 
apparatus for the rendering [of] reality thinkable in such a 
way that it is amenable to political deliberations."17
The epistemological aspect refers to the truth or 
knowledge component of political reason and practice. Each 
historical form of the art of government conceives its object 
in a relatively distinct way. These distinct epistemological 
conceptions of what the object of government is in its 
actuality gives rise to distinct ways of governing them. As 
the epistemological conceptions of society, the state, or the 
individual citizen change there is a corresponding change in 
how they are governed.
These three aspects are identified with the whole 
ensemble of the art of government. They apply to both the 
political reason and political practice dimensions. Just as 
in the latter analytical differentiation between 
governmentality and the art of government, these three 
aspects also can not be arranged hierarchically. They 
interact and mutually constitute one another.
I have utilized this delineation of the art of 
government in this way in order to isolate a narrow and more 
manageable field of inquiry. I focus my attention throughout 
this paper on the epistemological aspect of the art of 
government. Within this relatively narrow confine I shall
17 Rose and Miller, "Power beyond the state," 179.
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trace, in a general way, the history of statistics. I am 
interested primarily in how the practice of statistics, as a 
technology that produces knowledge, is linked to the 
transformations in the epistemological conception of the very 
objects it renders knowable.
The first object of government, which will be described 
in detail in the next section, is the population. The form of 
government exercised viv-a-vis the population became known as 
police. In current usage the derivation policy would be more 
descriptive of this governing art. It was characterized by 
the attempt to arrange the material and processes of the 
territory and the population of the state in such a way to 
bring out the best arrangement of things, their right and 
proper order necessary for a state of prosperity. Police 
became more commonly known as raison d'etat (reason of 
state).
The population was the first target of statistical 
activity, primarily in the form of tabulation of simple facts 
such as births and deaths and the number of inhabitants of 
villages. The success of these practices altered not only the 
perception of the population but also the very practice of 
statistics itself. The population became understood in more 
complex ways and with increasing refinement. At the same time 
the techniques and methodology behind statistical practices 
were refined and became more complex. This process of 
refinement and complexification of the thought and practice 
of statistics played an important role in the evolution of
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how the population was understood and in the development of 
new techniques for influencing it.
As the nature of the population became better understood 
and its interactions and exchanges traced the very conception 
of what constitutes its proper order and how its prosperity 
can be enhanced was altered. This alteration accompanied, and 
perhaps at times motivated, further transformations in the 
the techniques and methodology of statistics. Because both 
government and statistics have a histories and because they 
are so closely linked an analysis of the modern practices of 
government calls for an analysis of statistical reason.
In modern terms this evolving relationship between the 
art of government and its object is described using the 
concept of complex dynamic systems. The historical 
development of this concept is in fact one of the later 
themes of this paper. Complex dynamic systems represents the 
current rational understanding of processes of change. 
Statistics is of central importance to complex systems 
theories and modern evolution. Along with a host of other 
related and epistemologically inseparable theories and 
concepts, such as information, the object of government is 
being transformed once more. Or, rather, it continues to be 
transformed. Statistics is so profoundly involved in the 
reconfiguration of the object of government, and in such 
obscure ways, an analysis of the modern art of government, at 
some point, must examine the effects of statistical reason's 
historical change. Isolating the epistemological level of the 
art of government and statistical reason allows for such an
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examination and reveals at least some of these obscure 
relationships between statistics and government.
It is impossible to effect a clean distinction between 
the moral, idiomatic and epistemological aspects of political 
reason just as it is impossible to clearly distinguish 
political reason from political practice. The delimitation of 
ages or even a clean distinction between the different arts 
and their respective objects is also impossible. Such a clean 
distinction, however, is not my point. My point is rather to 
show their relationships. That the roots of one art may be 
found in the thought and practice of the one before it. It 
should also be mentioned that the transitions described do 
not take the form of a replacement but of reformulation.
Their are many aspects of the early rationality of police 
that get ample play in the modern art of government. Even 
earlier forms of the rationality of sovereignty 
characteristic of feudal periods finds expression in our 
legal system with the important change that each individual 
citizen constitutes a sovereign rather than only the monarch. 
Rationalities do not disappear, they seem to remain useful 
and find application in a number of social processes. But the 
art of government, in general terms and at the 
epistemological level, displays a certain homogeneity that 
can be traced.
Displaying the impossibility of clear distinctions 
between historical processes is one of Foucault's recurring 
themes. The thixatropic and mutually constitutive nature of 
the ensemble making up the arts of government means even a
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careful description of a narrow terrain or line of thought 
will inevitably have some discussion of these other aspects 
and dimensions seeping into it. This seepage will be obvious 
in some places. In others it should be kept in mind that such 
seepage is occurring just under the surface of this 
narrative. My story begins with the Renaissance and the 
emergence of the arts of government as a new form of rule.
The Emergence of the Art of Government
The Renaissance inaugurated a transformation in European 
political, philosophical and spiritual thought. Knowledge 
began to displace faith as the criterion for judgment. In the 
medieval Christian conception of rule, the king served as an 
instrument of God. Thomas Aquinas characterized legitimate 
rule by the king as mirroring God's rule of nature. Political 
rule was linked with concern for human purpose on earth, a 
purpose defined in spiritual terms through various 
representations of God's will.18 The King must rule his 
kingdom as the instrument of God on earth for he was 
responsible for ensuring the salvation of his subjects.
The political philosophy of Niccolo Machiavelli marks a 
break with this spiritual conception of rule. Proper rule for 
Machiavelli was not defined by the divine role of the prince. 
For Machiavelli the prince's power was derived from control
18 See for example Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa 
Theolooica.
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of his territory and its inhabitants. Such power was, 
furthermore, to be focused towards the good of the republic, 
its physical survival and expansion. Machiavelli's advice in 
The Prince (1513) is characteristic of an entirely new 
formulation of the relationship between the ruler and his 
domain. Henceforth increased attention is given to rule in 
terms of the relationship between men and territory.
Fostering what is good for the domain and preparing against 
what is bad - whether in the form of rival kingdoms or the 
caprice of "the winds of fortuna" - becomes the ruler's 
primary objective.19
The increasing attention to secular relationships 
between the prince and his territory was linked to a general 
transformation in philosophical and scientific thought since 
the Renaissance. Truth was becoming linked to reason and the 
sciences with a corresponding disassociation from spiritual 
knowledges. Francis Bacon for example, wrote that "truth 
therefore and utility are here the very same things."20 Rule 
became an activity linked to perpetual inquiry: What was the 
thing to be ruled? How did it work? How can it be made to 
work better? To quote Bacon further: "the glory of God is to
conceal a thing; the glory of the king is to search it out."21
19 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. Chapter XVIII.
20 Ian Hacking, Representing and intervening: Introductory Topics in 
the Philosophy of Natural Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 246.
21 Ibid., 246.
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For Pierre de la Ramee, a logician and teacher at the 
university of Paris in the mid sixteenth century, the central 
problem of knowledge of any kind was its teachability.22 If 
knowledge is true and if it was to be of utility it must be 
able to move between the minds of men. It must be 
communicable and teachable. The problem was to accomplish 
this movement and make knowledge teachable. For Ramee the 
spatial ordering of objects and thoughts into diagrammatic 
form represented the most effective pedagogical method. 
Regardless of the topic - whether poetry, philosophy or 
medicine - organization and display in diagrammatic form on 
the basis of contrast and dichotomization became standard 
pedagogical practice. Faith in reason had replaced faith in 
the divine. Reason became linked to knowledge as topoi. 
Rational explanation in general and scientific explanation in 
particular became predominantly spacio-visual in form.23 
Knowledge as topoi was knowledge manifested in earthly form.
The emergence of secular philosophies of rule did not 
produce a simple wholesale rejection of God's will and divine 
guidance. God ruled the universe and often intervened, 
through miracles, in the affairs of men. But the link between
22 Johannes Fabian, Time and -the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its 
Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 114. Fabian notes 
that Ramee's theories of knowledge and pedagogical method "were 
published in many languages and countless editions...The fact that his 
theories soon became anonymous (precisely because they were thought to 
be synonymous with pedagogical method) only underlines" his importance. 
Ramism has, in other words, achieved the status of Kuhnian Normal 
Science according to Fabian. Ramee's theories of teaching were 
formulated at the same time that Gutenberg began the printing 
revolution. His theories were surely linked to this invention, for mass 
printing required and reinforced the displayability of knowledge.
23 Ibid.
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the sovereign and God became more complex. The secularization 
of political authority and of knowledge emerged together. The 
right order of things was no longer revealed in scripture but 
through investigation of the object of rule itself.
Rational knowledge of the right order and things was to 
be discovered by reading the "Book of Nature," Galileo 
Galilei's theistic concept of God as the 'Author' of nature. 
For Galileo, God wrote down the equations and set the 
fundamental laws of the universe in motion. Investigation 
into the working of the world, God's world, rather than 
devotion and scriptural faith, revealed God's will and the 
right order of things. The right order of things in this 
conception was still God's order but investigation replaced 
faith as the proper mode of divination.
Machiavelli marks the transition in the understanding of 
the proper objectives of rule from those revealed in 
scripture to those revealed in observation of the states 
activities themselves. After Machiavelli much more attention 
was given to the objective nature of the kingdom. A secular 
objective of "national interest" replaced the spiritual 
objective of salvation. Reason of state emerged as the 
predominant political reason. Reason of state was simply the 
rationality by which the state conducted its affairs, that is 
a rationality derived form the actual functioning and the 
requirements for this functioning of the state. This 
political reason was thus linked to the practical activity of 
the king expanding his income and strength.
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This was a period in European history when one of the 
central concerns was war and all that war entails. The State 
became an object of increasing material needs - soldiers, 
food and money. These material‘needs, however, brought with 
them the need for new organizational arrangements which would 
fulfill these needs - household, barracks and agricultural 
practices which would increase production and participation. 
One could not expect the treasury to be continually 
replenished without some measures designed to increase the 
production of wealth and its collection.
The concern for the nature and actuality of that which 
is ruled marks the beginning of a transformation in the very 
concept of rule. The epistemological, moral and even the 
descriptive language of rule changes. The objectives of rule 
ahd governmental knowledge of its object become linked in a 
new way. Governing becomes understood as an art - in the 
sense that it pertains to specific techniques which 
correspond to specific rules as part of a rational knowledge. 
The art of government has as its goal the assurance and 
promotion of the right order of things. Government "is 
rational," Foucault observes, "on the condition that it 
observes the nature of what is governed."24
The rationality behind the sovereign's pastoral 
responsibility under reason of state, represented a 
relatively smooth transition from the earlier spiritual 
responsibilities of the sovereign to lead his subjects to 
salvation. God's will revealed by scripture was replaced by
24 Foucault, Technology of the Self. 149.
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the needs of the State. The art of government thus arose from 
the new relationships between authorities "constituted as 
'political' and the projects, plans, and practices of those 
authorities which attempt to administer individuals and 
society in terms of a prevailing conception of what is good 
healthy right normal, virtuous, profitable, efficient etc."25
George Obrecht, an official in Strassburg, was the first 
to speak of the population - a neologism he invented.26 The 
population is a new social entity, a new concept and a new 
object of government. Previously there had been Stande - 
groups, orders, or estates. These were much smaller 
organizations of people with only loose ties binding them 
together and encouraging cooperation. Along with this new 
object of government there emerges a new concept of authority 
Obrigkeit, which means government or public authority that is 
cognizant of its object. Obrecht called for the gathering of 
information about the resources and capacities of the 
population and territory. He called for the implementation of 
a set of public policies designed to augment these capacities 
and resources. These activities Obrecht summarized by the 
Latin words census and censura.n Census referred to the
t
knowledge on the part of every individual of their
25 Rose and Miller, Power Beyond the State. 175.
26 Pasquale Pasquino, "Theatrum Polititicum: The Genealogy of Capital 
- Police and the State of Prosperity," in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 
eds., Foucault Effect, 114. The full title is actually Bine Sondere 
Policy Ordnunq, und Constitution, durch welch ein ieder Maaistratus. 
vermittels besonderen anqestelten Deputaten. iederzeit in seiner 
Reqierunq, eine gewisse Nachrichtuna haben mag.
27 Ibid., 113.
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responsibility towards the State while censura referred to 
the obligation on the part of the public authority to take 
charge of the public's welfare, gather information and 
educate the population.
Government has not only "to deal with a territory, with 
a domain, and with its subjects, but...it also has to deal 
with a complex and independent reality that has its own laws 
and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its 
possibilities of disturbance."28 Chemnitz, a German author, 
in De Ratione Status (1647) wrote that rule according to 
reason must "ascertain political consideration required for 
all public matters, councils, and projects, whose only aim is 
the state's preservation, expansion, and felicity to which 
end, the easiest and promptest means are to be employed."29 
The transition from scripture to observation as the basis of 
political knowledge was nearly complete. By the end of the 
Thirty Years War the emergence of secular territorial 
organization was codified by the treaty of Westphalia in 
1648, inaugurating the state system in Europe. The 
observation and production of knowledge about this new 
secular territory emerged as a critical topic for natural and 
political philosophy as well as practical administration.
28 Michel Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, Power" interview by Paul 
Rabinow, Trans. Chritian Hubert, The Foucault Reader ed. Paul Rabinow 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 242.
29 Foucault, "Governmentality," 90.
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This was the impetus for statistics. "Statistics began as the 
systematic study of quantitative facts about the state."30
Various records had been kept throughout history.
Births, baptisms and deaths had long been recorded with 
enthusiasm by churches in Europe and Scandinavia. The city of 
London in 1603 began recording weekly tallies of plague 
victims noting age location and other contextual information. 
But it was not until the mid-seventeenth century that such 
record keeping began to be carried out in a systematic way.
In articles on "political arithmetic" and later in Natural 
and Political Observations (1662), John Graunt first 
tabulated statistics in a systematic form.3* These works were 
not mere records of facts as the earlier church records had 
been. These were facts linked and tabulated with other facts. 
Graunt and co-author William Petty drew up tables of facts 
that were linked together in various way. "Signs of 
probability" were tabulated together such as Fracastoro7s 
"signs of contagion": the air, the presence of insects and 
the alignment of planets.32
Graunt's statistical tabulations were displayed in 
proper Ramist schematic form which had by then become simply 
a matter of "undisputed practice of normal science," to use
30 Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A philosophical Study 
of the Early Ideas About Probability, induction and Statistical 
Inference (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 102.
31 Ibid. Shortly thereafter, in 1667, Paris also began keeping 
official statistics.
32 Ibid., 28.
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the term Kuhn would later popularize.33 Statistics became the 
basic factual units of knowledge about the nature of the 
state and its proper order. These practices of counting and 
gathering information are intimately interconnected with the 
practices of rational government. The increased complexity of 
government and the expansion of bureaucracy emerged together 
with the increasing detail and sheer amount of information 
about the state.
The linkage between increasingly elaborate governmental 
practices and increasingly detailed statistical information 
is complex. Political authority's desire to know the facts 
about the State intimately influenced what was counted and 
how the counts were tabulated. Where once the counting of 
hearths, for example, was sufficient for tax collection 
purposes it later became necessary to count the number of 
rooms in a dwelling and the number of animals husbanded by a 
family. Which "signs of probability" were to be linked 
together was itself a form of governmental practice. The mere 
existence of a family evidenced by its hearth preceded the 
assessment of a "flat tax." It was not enough to know of the 
family's existence but. Its state of existence - as indicated 
by the signs of room number and animals husbanded - also 
became necessary and useful knowledge.
Statistical thinking emerges along with a general 
transformation in scientific theory - specifically its 
epistemological aspect. During the plague of 1603, for 
example, swarms of rats, mice or other such creatures were 
understood as both signs as well as causes of contagion or
33 Fabian, Time And The Other. 114.
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corrupt air. Whether or not something acted as a sign or 
cause was part of the theory itself. There was no independent 
epistemological criteria for judging between signs and causes 
and the theory in which they were embedded. Without viewing 
such an epistemological criteria separate from causal theory 
the mass of tabulated facts could only reveal what the 
prevailing theory specified.
Graunt and Petty, however, began to look at their data 
not as signs or causes, dependent upon theory, but as data 
epistemologically independent of theory. Graunt and Petty 
began to look at the tables and see "epistemological 
relationship independent of the particular subject matter."34 
The tables of mortality ceased to be the "signature of the 
plague" and became merely data from which many conclusions 
could be drawn.35 Only after such a separation between sign 
and explanatory theory do controlled experiments become part 
of the scientist's repertoire. This distinction between sign 
and theory made modern inference possible.
The amount of statistical information gathered by 
national governments grew immensely by the end of the 
seventeenth century. All the Western European states had by 
then set up some sort of ministry to collect and tabulate 
Statistical data. What appeared in these statistical tables 
was knowledge about Obrecht's newly conceptualized 
population. The pursuit of rational knowledge was not without 
its effects. Population statistics soon revealed an object of
34 Hacking, Emergence Of Probability, 105.
35 Ibid., 106.
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government much more complex than even Graunt or Petty 
imagined. The population emerged as an entity consisting of 
processes and activities with an order all its own - an order 
that seemed to emanate from the population itself. The 
population, according to Foucault, "is the subject of needs, 
of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the 
government, aware, vis-a-vis the government, of what it 
wants."36 The population, with its own needs and desires, was 
an active entity. The State as a whole came to be understood 
as constituted by the activities of its population and the 
general processes within its territory with the king at its 
head responsible for directing its affairs.
The right order of the State, towards which the art of 
government was directed, came to be understood in terms of 
the Oikos. Oikos was taken from the Greek concept of the 
relations proper to a family and the relationships between 
its members and its resources as overseen by the head of the 
house.37 The family and the population was an object of 
needs. The household was understood to involve a set of 
interwoven processes that had to be carefully managed in 
order to function properly. The family and the population 
thus had needs not only for specific material resources but 
certain general arrangements that had to be continually 
maintained. The king (the head of the house), according to 
this model, was responsible for directing these processes and 
providing for the needs natural to the population. Prosperity
36 Foucault, "Governmentality," 100.
37 Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories; Foucault's 
Methods and historical Sociology 9New York: Routledge, 1994), 184.
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or destitution, within the bounds of fate and God's will, was 
in the hands of the head of the state. For Samuel Von 
Pufendorf "sovereign authority is conferred upon them [the 
rulers] only in order to allow them to use it to attain or 
conserve what is of public utility."38
The Oikos model therefore represented a relatively 
smooth transition from medieval to classic forms of rule. To 
run a household one must know of what it is made as well as 
its propensities and tendencies. The Oikos model provided 
both an impetus for the production of statistical knowledge 
(facts about the state) and a framework (the sovereign's 
pastoral responsibilities under raison d'etat) in which to 
utilize this knowledge. The initial form taken by the art of 
government was directed at the assurance and promotion of the 
orderly activity observed in the familial economy transferred 
to the larger domain of the entire State with the figure of 
the sovereign occupying the familial position of the father.
The early reason of state based on the model of the 
Oikos was not to last however. Preserving and enhancing the 
state proved to be problematic. The population was an 
unstable and shifting entity for which the conservative model 
of the Oikos provided a viable conceptual framework for only 
a short time. Governmental practices based on the sovereign's 
pastoral responsibility failed to deliver the order and
38 Foucault, "Governmentalitv." 94. The metaphor that became common 
in these treaties was that of a ship-the ship of state. As with a ship, 
it was not the material making it up that was the object of the 
captain's (i.e. the sovereign) power, as would be under the medieval 
conception of power, but the whole operation of the crew, the stores and 
the ship itself including its timbre, tar and hemp.
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prosperity that was supposed to result from such rule. By the 
end of the seventeenth century confidence in the sovereign's 
ability to produce the right order of the State had begun to 
erode.39
The processes and needs of the population soon became 
differentiated from the managerial figure of the sovereign.
It became increasingly understood that even the beneficial 
processes within the State proceeded despite the activities 
of the sovereign. There were of course many contributing 
factors to these transformations, both practical and 
theoretical. The political travails in England surrounding 
the attempts at Stuart restoration and the competition 
between rival oligarchic groups after William of Orange's 
death for example, or in France, Louis the XIV's involvement 
in several wars. The peasant uprisings in Quercy and Perigord 
France at the end of the seventeenth century challenged the 
existing order by contesting the payment of taxes to the 
king, tithe to the church, or the provision of free labor for 
the upkeep of roads.40 Such events seemed to call into 
question the notion of the sovereign as in some way 
responsible for what little order did obtained in the 
processes of the state.
The scope of rational scientific knowledge began to 
expand to include not only the idea of reading the "book of 
nature" but also Galileo's conception of constant natural
39 Denis Meuret, "A political genealogy of political economy,"
Economy and Society 17, no. 2 (May 1988): 234.
40 George Rude, The Crowd in History, 1730-1848 (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, Ipc., 1964), 19.
laws operating without the direct guidance of an orderer. 
Galileo, and his friend Thomas Hobbes, both received threats 
from the church and the aristocracy on grounds of heresy. The 
aristocracy eventually warmed to Hobbes' views and later to 
Galileo's. Charles II, who was tutored by Hobbes while in 
exile in Paris, invited him into his court upon the 
restoration of the monarchy in 1660. The new king described 
Hobbes as "a bear, against whom the Church played their young 
dogs, in order to exercise them."41
Isaac Newton expanded Galileo's theory of fundamental 
constants, stating that even 'perturbations' in planetary 
motions were due to specific causes that followed from an as 
yet unrecognized natural law. Order and what appeared to be 
disorderly, and thus the realm of chance, Machiavelli's 
fortuna, had both come to be understood as in fact determined 
by specific causes. Natural law and determinism was the 
immutable cause of order. Knowledge, if it was to count as 
reasonable, eventually reflected this understanding. The 
conception of the right order as the direct consequence of an 
active orderer, a sovereign or God in effect lost its 
rationality.
Statistics revealed the order and processes that 
obtained in the state. This gave rise to the new object of 
the population, an object wholly contained within the state.
41 Isaac Disraeli, Quarrels of Authors (London: John Muray, 1814),
24. Quoted in George Dyson Darwin Among the Machines: The Evolution of 
Global Intelligence (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc., 
1997), 4. n. 12. The Church, in fact, labeled the heresy of Hobbes as 
the cause of the great fires ahd plague of 1660. The Church evidently 
did not notice the discovery of inferential statistics by Graunt and 
Petty.
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The pastoral responsibility of the sovereign carried over 
from medieval formulas of rule made rational thought the 
model of the Oikos. But the order and processes of the 
population revealed by statistics did not allow this holdover 
from earlier forms of rule without substantial renovation.
The sovereign's importance declined and gave way to a much 
more bureaucratic form of rule. As the object of government 
became more complex - composed of its own forces of 
regulation, as revealed by statistics in line with the 
emerging rationality of natural law - the art of government 
also took on a more complex form.
Paul-Henri Holbach was the first to mount an 
"unmitigated defense of atheistic materialism."42 Combining 
Hobbes and Newton, Holbach held that the material universe is 
self-controlled and that nature was the sum of matter and 
motion. The sole role of the state, for Holbach, was to 
"nurture, in every possible way, the virtues of cooperation" 
on which the good of the population and good government 
depends.43 Political reason begins to reflect this emerging 
conception which displays its object in terms making it 
amenable to intervention and government.
The concept of the State as constituted by an Oikos with 
the sovereign at its head begins to change with these 
transformations in the concepts of nature, natural law and 
causal determinism. By the early eighteenth century the Oikos
42 Paul Edwards, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1967), s.v. "Holbach, 
Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron D'" by Aram Vartanian.
43 Ibid.
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model was breaking down. The population and its order became 
separated from the figure of the sovereign as the source of 
order. As causes of order move from a sovereign pastoral 
figure, God, king or father, to internal natural laws, the 
process of the population become differentiated from the 
institutions of political authority. Foucault notes that by 
the mid eighteenth century the "menace" of death in the form 
of plagues and famines had been mitigated and a knowledge of 
and power over life emerged. "Western man was gradually 
learning what it meant to be a living species in a living 
world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities 
of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that 
could be modified, and a space in which they could be 
distributed in an optimal manner."44 After a hundred years of 
increasing collection of statistical data along with the 
inferential possibilities of the epistemological separation 
of cause and sign within theory there emerged new 
formulations of the object of government.
The Physiocrats 
and the End of Reason of State
The transformations in how the population was linked to 
the sovereign and the state was dependent on the 
transformations in the epistemological basis of rational
44 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1; An 
Introduction trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, Pantheon 
Books 1978; reprint, vintage Books, 1990), 142.
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knowledge itself. Early critics of reason of state, such as 
the Physiocrats, emerge with the differentiation of the 
orderly propensities of the population and the figure of the 
sovereign. With this differentiation the economy emerges as a 
distinct object of knowledge constitutive of and yet, at the 
same time, constituted by a new form of political reason. The 
sovereign's direct intervention in the economy actually 
becomes the source of disruption and dysfunction rather than 
order and prosperity.
John Locke (1632-1704) and later David Hume believed the 
inner workings of nature to be unknowable. Abraham De Moivre 
in The Doctrine of Chances (1711) had said that fundamental 
chance was the result of equally possible outcomes of some 
kind of physical s e t - u p . 45 Newton's mechanics led to 
unprecedented precision in astronomical measurement yet the 
implication was that gravity in itself is unknowable. Pierre- 
Simon Laplace in Philosophical Essay on Probability (1795) 
built upon this idea and stated categorically that chance and 
probability was merely the result of ignorance of true 
causes. 46
The Physiocrat's texts are explicit that it is not 
through laws and decrees that the right order of things are 
to be a c h i e v e d . 47 Francois Quesnay suggested that good
45 Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (New Yorks Cambridge University
Press, 1990, reprint, 1991, 1992), 12.
46 Ibid., 11.
47 Foucault, "Governmentalitv." 92.
government simply was economic government.48 That is, good 
government, government according to reason, had to be 
cognizant of the natural laws that determined the economy.
The slogan "laissez Faire et laissez passer, le monde va de 
lui-meme" may be loosely translated as "Don't interfere, the 
world will take care of itself."49 But this also meant 
actively guarding against the disruption of the world's 
taking care of itself through its natural processes. That is, 
it was an active non-interference. Quesnay's Tableau 
Economique, a three columned table of expenditures and 
receipts, displayed money in a whole new light. Money and 
wealth were conceived in terms of a self contained 
circulatory process within the population. The blood within 
the body politic, wealth was the product of exchange rather 
than the zero-sum conception of surplus characteristic of the 
Oikos model.50 This constituted the invention of what is 
today called the national economy.51
The Physiocrats' critiques of sovereign intervention 
into the economy were modern in terms of their distinction 
between political authority and the processes of the economy. 
However, their formulations were also consistent with another 
distinction that has since been erased. What we today call
48 ibid.
49 George Soule, Ideas of the Great Economists (New York: Mentor 
Books, 1955), 36.
50 Susan Buck-Morss "Envisioning Capital: Political Economy on 
Display," Critical Inquiry 21 (Winter 1995): 442-3.
51 Soule, Ideas of the Great Economists. 36.
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"the economy" had been distinguished, until the late 
eighteenth century, between national processes and 
international p r o c e s s e s . 52 internal national processes 
corresponded to the reformulated Oikos model - the economy, 
newly differentiated from the ordering figure of the 
sovereign. The international corresponded generally to what 
is now referred to as commerce or capitalism. Commerce was 
the domain of the market, characterized by free exchange and 
competition. It was the domain of chance and caprice, 
Machiavelli's fortuna, where causal laws were of the 
unknowable Humian type. Commerce was understood as distinct 
from the economy precisely because the model of the Oikos 
could not be applied. There was no providential figure of a 
sovereign to exercise authority to protect the natural 
process of the population.
Quesney and the Physiocrats dismissed the conception of 
orderly economic processes dependent on an orderer but 
maintained the distinction between the economy within the 
State and commerce without. The right order of the economy 
was to be ensured through the sovereign's refraining from 
direct intervention in the economy yet the sovereign was also 
responsible for ensuring that such internationalperturbations 
and other events of unknowable cause characteristic of 
commerce did not disrupt the State's economic processes. Thus 
was the economic logic that propelled imperialism and 
colonialism. The sovereign responsibility was distanced from 
the economy, in other words, but not divorced from it.
52 Meuret, Political Genealogy. 232-3.
Sovereign authority for the Physiocrats thus remained 
the foundation of rational government - either through the 
sovereign's active intervention on the one hand or inaction 
on the other. Physiocratic theory constituted the beginning 
of a general recognition, however, that, in Foucault's words, 
"if one governed too much, one did not govern at all - that 
one provoked results contrary to those one desired."53 The 
Physiocrat's doctrine of laissez faire proposed a limitation 
oh the legitimate exercise of political authority on the 
grounds that the population functioned better - followed its 
natural propensities - if left to its own devices. That is, 
with minimal expense by governing more by governing less - 
providing for the welfare of the population by allowing the 
population to govern itself.54 This positive justification 
for market freedom would, the Physiocrats declared, make the 
State richer and more powerful. The laissez faire criticism 
of the authority and rationality of the sovereign's 
interventionary practices was the beginning of a new 
political rationality.
This new rationality presented new problems however. If 
the natural processes of the economy were disruptable, care 
must be given to protecting and fostering them. This was to 
be the new goal of government. Physiocratic criticisms of the 
rationality of reason of state, however, did not offer an 
alternative knowledge upon which the practice of governing
53 Michel Foucault, Foucault Live ed. Sylvere Lotringer, Trans. John 
Johnston (New York: Semiotext(E): 1989), 260.
54 Burchell, "Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self," in 
Foucault And Political Reason, eds. Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 22.
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could consistently operate. Good government, government 
according to reason, required a tighter link between the 
emerging epistemological conceptions of the population and 
knowledge that could produce rational techniques for acting 
on this object. Quesney and the Physiocrats can be seen as a 
phase in the transition from the political rationality of 
reason of state to a new political reason of liberalism. The 
question of how to arrange and manage all the parts of the 
Oikos gave way to the question of how to govern a natural 
self regulating process. "What is the principle of limitation 
that applies to governmental actions such that things will 
occur for the best, in conformity with the rationality of 
government, and without intervention."55
The State emerged as a dream of an homogeneous entity 
knowable in its earthly reality distinct from the revelations 
of scripture. It sooncame to be conceived in terms of the 
Greek Oikos, an object requiring direct guidance from the 
sovereign lest it fall to the whims of fortuna. The 
Physiocrats then articulated the first major critique of this 
dream by emphasizing the distinction between the population 
and political authority over it. Thus the state had become 
understood as composed of two spheres. The classical 
economists performed yet a further distinction. Building on 
the criticism of the Physiocrats they dividing the population 
into two distinct, yet mutually constitutive spheres; the 
economy and civil community. Taken together these formed the 
new object of a liberal art of government known as society.
55 Foucault, "Space Knowledge Power," 242.
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By the end of the eighteenth century it was the 
responsibility of rational government to know its society in 
order to govern it rationally according to its nature.
Chapter 3: 
Know Your Society
The responsibility of rational government to know its 
society had profound effects. Statistics effected the very 
epistemological level of political rationality. Once the 
impetus to read the book of nature produced the massive 
archiving of facts about the Oikos, the emergent political 
formation that arose from this archive could only be 
understood from within a rationality of statistical reason.
The relationship between statistics, society and early 
liberal political rationality is subtle. The transformation 
from population to society accompanying the transition from 
physiocratic to classical political economic formulations was 
closely linked to the development of statistics. Statistics 
transformed the way the population was understood and at the 
same time was fundamental in the transformation of the very 
perception and practice of rationality itself. It was through 
the technology of statistics that the spaces and processes of 
society were first observed and made legible. The development 
of statistics into a rational mode of analysis and the 
consequent exercise of this form of reason arose from and was 
directed at a new domain that frustrated direct control. Or 
to put it another way, society emerged because of the 
inability of the sovereign to order the population. Such was 
the lesson of the failures of the policies arising from the 
rationality reason of state.
The new liberal rationality of government was aimed at a 
new set of processes - the private, atomistic and egoistic
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exchanges that classical political economists spoke of. The 
individual to be governed was not only a rational, interest- 
motivated economic ego but also part of a biological 
population, a natural member of society. These processes of 
individuals and society were understood as rational because 
they arose from nature itself - the natural and historic 
milieu made up of personal ties, associations and 
communitarian bonds.
Statistics had been understood from the beginning as a 
window into the vital heart of the state, a measure of its 
vital power. This information about the Oikos was thus 
guarded and kept secret. By the late eighteenth century 
information about the state was explicitly made public. The 
United States, in article 1 section 2 of the Constitution, 
was the first to legally mandate the counting of people and 
public access to the results. It was only natural, so to 
speak, that a society governing itself have access to the 
facts about itself. Statistics was no longer a tool for the 
king. It became a tool for self government - a tool for 
knowing the proper order of nature so that one could conduct 
oneself in accordance with this order.
Statistics had emerged in response to the tables drawn 
up of plague victims. Eventually it turned to health matters 
of all kinds, making life itself in all its forms and 
processes inherently political. The rational knowledges 
produced through statistical inquiries such as census, 
medical and police reports on sickness, crime or suicide, 
rendered intelligible and manipulable the political object of
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society that liberal (self) government had to know in order 
to govern (itself) properly. "For the first time in history," 
Foucault notes, "biological existence was reflected in 
political existence....[Life] passed into knowledge's field 
of control and power's sphere of intervention."56
In the cases of disease and society - problems requiring 
some form of collective response - liberal political 
intervention did not take the form of direction from above, 
as did interventions from within the rationality of reason of 
state. Rather, governmental intervention took the form of a 
sort of investment of political rationality into society.
That is, an instillment, at the local level within the 
processes of society itself, of the necessity to know the 
proper order of oneself and ones community in order for the 
community to conduct itself correctly.
In England in 1793, for example, "friendly societies" 
were encouraged by an act of Parliament as a means for 
workers to alleviate some of the negative effects of the 
industrialization process then emerging. These organizations 
begun by the workers themselves and paid for by weekly 
contributions were aimed at providing a certain degree of 
self-insurance against disease, death and support for 
widows.57 They societies also kept records of their 
activities and tables of vital statistics. From these the 
government, the first insurance companies and the individual
56 Foucault, History of Sexuality? 142.
57 Ian Hacking, "Biopower And The Avalanch of Printed Numbers," 
Humanities In Society 5, no. 304 (Summer & Fall 1982): 282.
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"friendly societies" themselves determined how to best 
conduct their affairs. By 1815 there were 925,429 of these 
"friendly societies".58
A New Art of Government: 
The Beginning of Liberalism
By the end of the eighteenth century a new conception 
of the object of government was emerging. This new object was 
characterized as self-organizating and possessing internal 
drives. Yet statistics also revealed a living species - a 
species with specific conditions of existence. The problem 
became one of reconciling the requirement for a space of 
freedom for the play of natural process on the one hand and 
the fact of specific conditions of existence that must be 
protected and even fostered on the other. If government was 
to rule properly and bring about the right order of things, 
it would have to be cognizant of these newly understood 
conditions of life including the need for freedom. Only 
through such knowledge would government be able to foster and 
protect the natural functioning of the population. The 
practice of government becomes linked in a new way to its 
object - through its freedom. For only proper government 
could ensure this freedom. The outlines of this new art of 
government began to emerge with the classical economists. It 
is a liberal art of government with a society as its object.
58 Ibid.
Adam Smith started from a new generalized conception of 
human nature rather than the physiocratic distinction between 
commerce and the economy. Smith's The Wealth of Nations 
(1776) marks the emergence of a conception of the economy 
that integrates the previously distinct internal domestic 
economic order and the external disruptive realm of commerce. 
By combining commerce and the economy the responsibility for 
ensuring order is taken from the sovereign and placed into 
the (invisible) hand of the market and the natural laws of 
the economy. Commerce became understood as a competitive and 
dynamic process within the economy of the State rather than 
the fearsome realm external to it where, in the absence of 
the sovereign, disorder prevailed. The perturbations and 
chance characteristic of commerce are now understood to be 
checked by forces internal to it: the propensity to exchange 
and market competition.
With Smith and the classical economists the separation 
between the sovereign and the population was widened even 
further by distinguishing between the economy of the 
population and civil society. Thus with the synthesis of the 
economy and commerce emerges the wholly new object of 
society, an object which encompasses the economy and civil 
community but taken together form more than the old 
population. As Foucault puts it "What was discovered at that 
time - and this was one of the great discoveries of political 
thought at the end of the eighteenth century - was the idea 
of society."59
59 Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, Power," 242.
Governing was, for Smith, not a question of producing a 
good but of "the prevention of so great a public evil."60 The 
natural functioning of a capitalist economy was not 
understood to promote social good per se but merely 
productivity. By this criterion the "society can demahd that 
the state account for itself."6* Adam Smith and classic 
political economy in general provided a criterion for judging 
political authority and the reasonableness of governmental 
practices that had eluded earlier critics of reason of state. 
Rational government and the right order of a liberal State, 
in other words, was ensured by the natural processes within 
the State itself. This is the culmination of a long process 
resulting in a new form of rule.
By the end of the eighteenth century the "meticulous 
observation of detail, and at the same time a political 
awareness of theses small things, for the control and use of 
men, emerge through the classical age bearing with them a 
whole set of techniques, a whole corpus of methods and 
knowledge, descriptions, plans and data" came together to 
form a "general formula" of managing the self-actuated 
collective of society. 62 This mode of knowing and governing 
the new object of society Foucault calls discipline. The 
emergence of discipline was not sudden but rather the effect 
of many minute movements and events. As a kind of political
60 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. (Oxford, 1976), 342-3. Quoted 
in Meuret, "Political Genealogy," 244.
61 Meuret, "Political Genealogy," 246.
62 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish; The Birth of the Prison 
trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Pantheon, 1977; reprint, New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), 141.
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anatomy, discipline grew out of multiple and continuous 
observations and investigations into the body politic.
Beginning with Petty's and Graunt's "political 
arithmetic" statistics quickly generated massive amounts of 
information about the new states of Europe. But statistics 
also generated new ways of interpreting this information and 
it soon became the primary means by which the early states 
produced the knowledge used to rule the population. 
Interpretation of scripture was replaced by interpretation of 
the book of nature. As the techniques and methods of 
statistics were refined, they became more and more important 
to all other disciplines of inquiry. The very act of inquiry 
became linked to government in a new and intimate way by 
virtue of the various disciplines' power to make visible the 
proper or natural state of things.
Foucault notes that the successful emergence of the 
disciplinary form of political rule was due to three simple 
instruments or characteristic modes of operation.63 These 
are: 1) hierarchical observation; 2) Normalizing judgment; 
and 3) examination.64
1) Hierarchical observation - which took specific forms 
such as the military camp, the prison or the school - was 
observation in which the figures of authority watched over 
their charges and recorded their observed movements and 
behaviors. The general form of hierarchical observation was 
of course objective scientific inquiry which sat above its
63 Ibid., 170.
64 ibid.
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object actively yet dispassionately peeling away the shrouds 
of ignorance and revealing the truth of its nature. It is 
this observation and the production of objective knowledge 
which renders people and things calculable.
2) Normalizing judgment, also known as surveillance, 
takes the knowledge of the natural and proper order of things 
and compares these with the successive observations of 
individual events, phenomena or behavior produced through 
hierarchical observation. The particular instance of an 
observed behavior more or less complied with the natural law 
particular to it. The resulting political arithmetic gives 
rise to measures of correction or encouragement to bring 
about or sustain movement towards the proper, natural state.
3) Examination combines the techniques of the observing 
hierarchy and normalizing judgment. The examination is the 
interface, so to speak, of those in possession of knowledge 
of the natural order produced through hierarchical 
observation and the individual or collective entity - defined 
of course by this very knowledge - to be evaluated and 
treated. Observation provides the basis for classification 
and qualification while the examination carries it out in the 
form of normalizing judgments.
This disciplinary form of government is not uniformly 
hierarchical in the same way that feudal kingdoms or even 
early sovereign states were with their strictly guarded lines 
of authority from God, via the church and/or the sovereign, 
down to the individual peasant. This form of production of 
knowledge was restricted to the few in the privileged
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institutions of the court and the church. Conflict within 
this form of rule generally occurred over ones place in this 
singular line of descent. The hierarchies of liberal 
government, by contrast, are multiple. Knowledge is available 
to anyone following the rules of objectivity. The natural and 
human sciences, the professions and disciplines, the business 
groups and workers societies and on down to the individual 
all assume the responsibility for observing, producing 
normalizing judgments and examinations within their 
respective spheres of influence. Power was dispersed, spread 
out in the vastness of objective knowledge itself.
The openness of knowledge and the multiplicity of 
hierarchies of knowledge/power characteristic of society 
emerged together with liberal government. In this process the 
intimate link between disciplinary rule and reason was 
strengthened. Indeed liberal society and the disciplinary art 
of government mutually constitute one another. The power 
brought to play by the disciplines, Foucault notes "is one of 
analysis."65 The liberal institutions of government that 
arise at the end of the eighteenth century begin to take the 
form of one - albeit perhaps the largest and most extensive - 
observational hierarchy among many. The achievement of self 
government was thus ironically accompanied by the dramatic 
expansion of the institutions of political authority.
65 Ibid., 197.
The Moral Sciences 
and the Natural Laws of Society
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Adam Smith understood the object he was describing to be 
a moral one. He himself thought of his ideas as moral 
philosophy. Indeed, the moral encompassed the political, 
which in turn came to encompass the biological once power 
over it was taken from God's hands and given to science. The 
natural order was, after all, the proper order and therefore 
moral. By the end of the eighteenth century a new discipline 
intimately linked with statistics had emerged to formulate 
knowledge in this way: the moral sciences. Through the moral 
sciences statistics became both an expression of and at the 
same time a necessary condition for reason and liberal 
government.
The moral sciences, the precursor of today's social 
sciences, were the first disciplines specifically concerned 
with the study of the phenomena and processes of society. It 
was the moral sciences that were to identify the laws of 
society and provide liberal government with the rational 
knowledge necessary to bring its right order. Antoine de 
Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet was the preeminent spokesman of 
the moral sciences. He was a friend and student of Anne- 
Robert-Jacques Turgot, the last of the Physiocrats. Condorcet 
understand the moral science to be "all those sciences that
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have as their object either the human mind itself, or the 
relations of men one to another."66
For Condorcet "the moral sciences are founded upon facts 
and reasoning; their certainty will therefore be the same as 
the physical sciences....It is from the more or less constant 
order of facts observed in moral and physical phenomena that 
the kind of certainty that pertains to reality is derived."67 
For Condorcet the natural laws of society were not 
statistical in themselves. Statistics merely revealed the 
social phenomenon ruled by natural laws.
The "friendly societies" did not fare very well for the 
most part. Poor organization and poor information were partly 
to blame. The Select Committee of the House of Commons' first 
meeting in 1825 gave the reason for their failure thus:
"Until a very few years ago no data were collected whereon a 
calculation of the average occurrence of sickness at the 
several ages of men could be formed with tolerable 
accuracy."6s The Committee inquired whether any "tables of 
sickness formed upon actual observation" were available.69 
England's chief actuary, John Finlaison, and the 
administrators of other European states all answered no.
66 Antoine Condorcet "Eloge de M. Buquet" Euvres de Condorcet ed. 
Antoine Condorcet - O'Conner and F. Arago, (Paris, 1847): 2, 410. Quoted 
in Hacking, Chance. 38.
67 Ibid. Condorcet distinguished five categories of moral science: 1) 
The study of compound interests and other time series; 2) Permutations 
and combinations; 3) induction; 4) the calculus of probabilities; 5) the 
theory of mean values.
68 Report of the Select Committee to Consider the Laws respecting 
friendly societies. Quoted in Hacking, "Biopower," 282.
69 Ibid.
Finlaison's response represented the common rational 
belief that no conclusions could be drawn from the reports of 
the "friendly societies." This was not merely because of bad 
record keeping, although this was also the case. It was 
simply thought impossible. Sickness and most undesirable 
things (including heathens and savages) were commonly 
understood to be the result of the absence of order, the 
absence of a determining principle or the breakdown of 
natural law. How could there exist an "average occurrence," 
that is, a regular and orderly appearance of a phenomena 
which was by definition the result of the absence of the very 
source of order and regularity? Sickness and disease could 
not possibly have a discernible regularity of their own from 
which their occurrence could be perceived with any accuracy. 
Disorder could not be rationally linked to an orderly 
process. The problem of sickness was not merely the lack of 
data. The very idea of regularity and order to an unlawful, 
pathological and abnormal phenomena simply made no sense.
Learned opinion in the late eighteenth century held that 
chance and luck were vulgar, even the work of the devil. 
Dicing, games of chance and probability were the domain of 
gamblers and the sure path to atheism and damnation. Chance, 
accident and fortune were, after all, phenomena dangerous to 
the old order of the Oikos. Fortune, since Machiavelli, 
constituted the preeminent antagonistic condition against 
which the sovereign was supposed to guard his population. 
Probability could be useful however. And rational men, by 
this time, did not believe probability to be evil. It was
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merely a subjective frame of mind. While the universe was 
necessarily determined through the operation of natural laws, 
these laws may not always be known directly as in the case of 
gravity.
John Locke, for example, in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1671-89) proposed that the true essence of a 
thing was in their "inner constitution." But this inner 
constitution was inaccessible to man. Natural laws were 
understood to operate upon this essence in order to perform 
their work. But this seemed to produce an impasse between the 
governing according to reason (that is - the rationality of 
reason) and the rationality of natural law - the very 
foundation of reason itself. Government needed to know the 
functioning of the irrational - the pathological and the 
abnormal - in order to govern according to reason. But the 
irrational - the chaotic and disorderly - by definition 
defied reason.
The moral sciences and statistics were rapidly evolving 
disciplines. They soon developed the necessary techniques to 
render even the irrational and disorderly visible and open to 
governmental intervention. The existence and operation of 
natural laws was (and remains) the necessary condition for 
reason itself. There was thus no question that there must be 
laws governing society similar to those governing the rest of 
creation. The problem for the moral sciences was to discover 
these laws of society. This was accomplished by rationalizing 
probability and making the normal visible and measurable.
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Statistics become natural I: 
The Rationalization of Probability
The physicist and mathematician Pierre-Simmon, marquis 
de Laplace, Like Condorcet before him, was interested in 
questions of jurisprudence. There was great concern among 
reform minded men such as Condorcet and Laplace to limit 
irrationality - bias, superstition etc. - from judicial 
proceedings. A rational society, they thought, must have a 
fair and just judicial system. The empirical question in 
jurisprudence was whether or not witnesses could be trusted 
and what majority of jurors would produce a verdict closest 
to the truth.70 Democracy called for equality and jury by 
peers but superstition was widespread. Probability applied to 
the design of the judicial system was, for Laplace, the best 
way of protecting the public from their own unreason.
Laplace, like most educated men of the period, held that 
probability was subjective. Chance was simply the absence of 
knowledge of true causes and the natural law by which they 
operated. Probability at the end of the eighteenth century 
thus meant two things at once. It referred to the subjective 
reasons one may have for thinking that an event will or will 
not take place and, at the same time, probability meant what 
Laplace called facilite, the chance or likelihood that 
various outcomes will obtain in situations where the causes 
are unknown. One was purely of the subjective mind the other
70 According to Laplace's calculations, a tribunal split of 3:2 has a 
probability of 0.59 of deciding correctly, while a jury split of 7:5 has 
a probability of 0.71 of being correct. Hacking, Chance. 230.
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was lack of knowledge of the object and thus still 
subjective.
Laplace articulated the classic rational explanation 
that there existed "petty little causes" for all phenomena. 
Every fact in the universe, according to Laplace, was 
determined by law. He began his Philosophical Essay on 
Probabilities (1814) with the words "[a]11 events, even those 
which on account of their insignificance do not seem to 
follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as 
necessarily as the revolutions of the sun."71 Probabilistic 
statements where merely a means of coping with the lack of 
knowledge of these causes. It was a concept that provided a 
means to aid sound judgment in the absence of direct access 
to the inner constitution and natural law of things. Each 
observation of an objective event was more or less correct or 
incorrect. The problem was to calculate the probability 
(likelihood) that an observation was correct. Laplace 
calculated the conditions of observation by combining many 
linear equations and aggregating the results. From these 
calculations he obtained his probability of the accuracy that 
the observations accorded with the event itself and thus to 
the true causes of the phenomena.
To be sure there were other opinions. Marie-Francois- 
Xaviar Bichat (1771-1802), lecturing in Paris at the same 
time as Laplace, postulated that "there are in nature two 
classes of beings, two classes of properties, and two classes
71 Pierre-Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essav on Probabilities 
(Paris, 1814) trans. F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory (New York, 1951). 
Quoted in Hacking, Chance, 11.
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of sciences. The beings are either organic of inorganic, the 
properties vital or non-vital, and the sciences either 
physiological or physical."72 Both of these conceptions, the 
vitalism of Bichat and the mechanism of Laplace, were 
deterministic and reductionist. But there was no room for
probability in the teleology of Bichat. Arising as it did in
mathematics probability readily lent itself to the
mechanistic concepts of Laplace and it soon began to creep in
at the margins of rational thought.
Statistics become natural II: 
Revealing the Norm
Government requires an object that can be known in 
manipulable terms. The problem of probability and natural law 
for the conduct of science and government preceded a 
transformation in the entire domain of reason. At about the 
same time Laplace was rationalizing probability, a much more 
subtle transformation was underway. Carl Friedrich Gauss, a 
German astronomer, had worked out his "law of errors" for 
measurement in observational astronomy by 1807. Gauss 
produced a graphical representation of the distribution of 
error in measurement. The Gaussian bell shaped curve vividly 
illustrated the two quantities of mean and dispersion about 
the mean. Dispersion has since become fundamental for all 
methods of measurement. A normal distribution is defined by
72 Xaviar Bichat, Anatomie aenerale appliauee a la medecine (Paris, 
1801). Quoted in Hacking, Chance, 14.
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its mean and standard deviation. When the number of 
measurements (or any kind of data) is large enough, and 
plotted graphically, a bell shaped curve, peeked at the mean 
results. Measurements that cluster about the mean, the top of 
the bell shaped curve, are thought to be reliable. That is, 
they have a high probability (likelihood) of being correct. 
Combined with the more popular work of Laplace, the very 
foundations of reason, governmental or otherwise, were to be 
changed for ever.
Gauss focused his calculations and attention on 
measurement as opposed to Laplace's focus on observation. 
Gauss, interested as he was in the position of celestial 
bodies, did not assume each measurement to represent an 
actual quantity or that each measurement had a corresponding 
object. Gauss was concerned with calculating the accuracy of 
multiple measurements of the same entity. For him the curve 
itself was nothing more than a collection of measurements. 
Gauss was essentially calculating the accuracy of the 
astronomers' instruments and the conditions of observation. 
The true position of the star or planet in question was 
understood to lie somewhere within the multiple measurements 
arranged in a curve of error. The curve of error thus 
revealed the most probable location of the celestial object 
to be somewhere in the concentration of points representing 
the majority of individual measurements at the top of the 
curve.
Calculation of the curve of error allowed statistical 
inferences to be made with a high degree of certainty and
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therefore reduced subjective speculation.73 Gauss' 
distribution of error was striking for its representation of 
regularity and order where none had previously been visible 
but merely assumed a priori. Orderly processes, after all, 
should, in principle, be measurable. Being orderly and 
measurable, they must be objective. The orderly and 
calculable had for a long time been associated with the 
normal in terms of the good, the lawful and morally right. 
This sense of the normal remains today. But the objectivity 
of the normal, and thus the proof of its lawfulness, 
rationality and, above all, its usefulness, achieved new 
heights with the invention of Gauss' distribution. Statistics 
- with the addition of the Gaussian curve - became not only a 
lens for viewing the order of things but a lens for viewing 
the right order of things, the things as they should be 
normally. Gauss' bell shaped curve quickly came to be called 
the normal distribution or normal curve.
The Select Committee in England reviewing the "friendly 
societies" reconvened in 1827, the year of Laplace's death. 
One set of reports did show a regularity. Moreover, it came 
from one of the few successful "friendly societies," the 
Highland Society of Scotland. There were a number of reasons 
for the lack of faith in the tables produced by the many 
other societies besides the classic conception of natural
73 Since Graunt and Petty's separation of sign from cause in the 
seventeenth century, statistical inference had remained largely 
unchanged. After Gauss, however, inference was substantially transformed 
into two distinct aspects - estimation and hypothesis testing - giving 
statistics its modern form. John Mueller, Karl Schuessler, and Herbert 
Costner ed. statistical Reasoning in Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1977), 383 and 413.
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law. Many of the ruling elites suspected that the friendly 
societies were a front for combines or trade unions. In 
addition, if the numbers from the Highland Society were 
accepted the actuaries would be forced to lower their 
premiums by one third.74
The numbers and methods of the Highland Society were 
soon adopted by the central government however. Disorder and 
pathology had come under the sway of natural law. In the 
intervening two years it was officially acknowledged that 
sickness did indeed exhibit regularities which could be 
tracked using statistical methods. By the 1830's it was 
perfectly reasonable to speak of the laws of sickness.
By the early eighteenth century the obscure mathematical 
work of Gauss and the high profile work of Laplace came 
together. Probability no longer constituted a subjective 
frame of mind. But the admittance of probability into 
rational thought did not leave objectivity and reason 
unchanged. Laplace's calculations of probability - in terms 
of observation of multiple real events - joined with Gauss' 
calculations - which revealed the normal distribution in a 
graphical way - together combined to make the bell curve an 
actual quantity with objective characteristics.
The Gauss Laplace synthesis, as it has been called, had 
further profound effects.75 Objectivity was, and remains, the 
touchstone of rational thought. The rationalization of
74 Hacking, Chance. 51.
75 Stephen Stigler, The History of Statistics: The measurement of 
Uncertainty Before 1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap 
Press, 1986), 158.
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probability and the reification of the normal curve made the 
laws of society accessible in a way Locke and Smith, for 
example, could not have imagined. The normal curve was 
believed to be the revelation of natural law itself - the 
functioning of natural law made visible in the requisite 
Ramist topological form. It was an objective display of the 
actual functioning of the natural laws governing whatever 
phenomenon the statistical methods were applied to - such as 
sickness or crime of a given community.
Natural Laws Become Statistical
The search for Laplacian petty little causes of social 
phenomena and the gathering of information within the 
administrative framework, established by Farr led not to final 
unveiling of an obscure and intricate causal mechanical 
process but to the transformation of the conception of 
natural law itself. What emerged from this transformation was 
a statistical natural law. The Belgian astronomer Adolphe 
Quetelet was the first practitioner of the mathematical 
methods associated with modern statistics.76 The statistical 
regularity that presented itself in the reams of data 
suggested to Quetelet the operation of a natural law. Turning 
to social matters and the mass of data collected on crime 
Quetelet proposed that the number of criminals was constant 
and that the relative proportion of different sorts of crime
76 Mueller, Schuessler, and Costner eds., Statistical Reasoning. 5.
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remained the same.77 The regularity and order that Quetelet 
observed in the tables of social data he likened to the 
motion and measurement of the heavens.
The Gaussian distribution curve, according to Quetelet, 
represented precisely the type of law regulating the 
distribution of human social behavior and biological traits. 
By virtue of the norm, statistical natural law preserved the 
taxonomic order based on essentialism and universalism. In 
the course of applying the normal curve to social phenomenon 
in the early 1830's through the 1840's, Quetelet came to the 
conclusion that, in social matters, the mean was, in fact, an 
actual quantity, a real entity, a concrete characteristic of 
society. Statistical methods began as descriptive of large 
scale regularities, Quetelet turned them into laws of nature 
with causal power and truth.78
Once the normal distribution became objective and 
measurable the norm took on a fundamental role in government. 
Liberal political rationality, according to Foucault "has to 
qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize.... [I]t affects 
distributions around the norm."79 For it is the 
identification of the normal that allows one to judge whether 
ones conduct and the conduct of society is in accordance with 
its natural law. That is, in accordance with the right and 
proper order of things. The delineation of normality became a 
fundamental technology for social management.
77 Hacking, Chance. 105.
78 Ibid., 108-9.
7 9 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 144.
Quetelet was not the only influence on the early 
development of the social sciences to be sure. The father of 
positivism, Auguste Comte, vehemently disagreed with 
Quetelet's social mathematics. Both Quetelet and Comte were 
the heirs of Condorcet's moral science but they differed 
sharply over the statistical treatment of social phenomena. 
Comte came to a radically different conclusion than Quetelet 
over the concept of normality. Quetelet took normality to be 
the mean, the cluster of data points at the top of the bell 
curve, the prevalent and the common. Comte, on the other 
hand, derived a conception of the normal from the physician 
Francois-Joseph-Victor Broussais. For Comte normality had 
nothing to do with probability. Normality was a matter of 
degrees, a sliding scale so to speak. In his System de 
Politique Positive (1851) Comte wrote "Until Braoussais, the 
pathological state obeyed laws completely different from 
those governing the normal state, so that observation of one 
could decide nothing for the other. Broussais established 
that the phenomena of disease are of essentially the same 
kind as those of health, from which they differ only in 
intensity." 80
For Comte the normal could not be linked to a distinct
statistical law governing the clustering about the top of the
bell curve. The normal was the ideal, the good, the best
possible arrangement. Society was to be studied in terms of
its progress through history towards its ideal full
development. It was to be judged judged by its progress
80 Auguste Comte, System de politique posetive. (Paris, 1851), 1, 
651, 652f. Quoted in Hacking, Chance, 160.
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towards ideal. He was furious over Quetelet's appropriation 
of the terms "social mathematics" and "social physics" for 
his brand of moral science. Comte eventual coined the term 
"sociology" for his historical epistemological approach.8*
When Comte applied his normal/pathological distinctions 
to the political and social sphere the normal ceased to be a 
conception of the normal in terms of ordinary or common. 
Instead normality became inextricably linked with the concept 
of progress, "progress is nothing but the development of 
order: it is an analysis of the normal state."82 The normal 
is what society should strive for. The normal as what was 
essential and therefore the good, the Aristotelian telos, 
rather than what is extrapolated from data revealing an 
average or mean.83
Despite Comte's influence, statistical reason remained 
central to social science and liberal political rationality. 
Charles Babbage, often referred to as the father of the 
computer for his invention of the Analytic Engine, noted that 
"it is the science of calculation - which becomes continually 
more necessary at each step of our progress and must 
ultimately govern the whole of the application of science to
81 Hacking, Chance, 39.
82 Ibid., 168.
83 The normal, to this day, continues to stand for both the typical,
banal average at the same time as it stands for the healthy ideal as in
the use of the Latin norma and the Greek ortho so common to the 
corrective and restorative disciplines. The normal still lingers between 
the is and the ought.
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the arts of life."84 In the mid-1800?s statistical reason and 
the new concept of statistical law retained the classic 
deterministic quality of natural laws characteristic of 
Newton and Laplace. The large scale assignment of numbers to 
all of nature and their subsequent calculation was 
fundamental to the later emergence of the concept of energy 
in physics and biology.85
With the introduction of probability into rational 
thought, however, the natural link between counting and 
classification became problematic. Babbage was aware that 
computation and classification were intimately linked. He 
developed a technique of using punch cards as a 
classification system. He never completed his analytic engine 
however.86 Classification on the basis of essential 
properties or universal constants was becoming more and more 
suspect. Classification was beginning to be seen as 
probabilistic just as precision measurement was - a high 
probability of accuracy relative to the distribution of error 
rather than an a priori essential quality. The relationship 
between the real world and mathematical symbols continued to 
become more complex.
84 Charles Babbage, Econonomv of machinery and manufactures. In 
Charles Babbage: Collected Works, V 8, M. Campbell ed. (London, William 
Pickering, 1989), 266; quoted in Andrew Barry, "Lines of communication 
and spaces of rule" in Barry, Osborne, and Rose eds., Foucault and 
Political Reason, 132.
85 Francois Jacob, The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 194.
86 F. H. George, Automation Cybernetics and Society (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1959), 47.
But Babbage was also of historical importance as one of 
the earliest and most strident advocates for establishing the 
"Constants of Nature and of Art" to be put into tables that 
"ought to contain all those facts which can be expressed by 
numbers in various sciences and arts."87 These should be 
undertaken, Babbage thought, by the eminent scientific 
institutions of the day such as the Royal Society, the 
Institute of France, and the Academy of Berlin. Everything 
had a constant associated with it, it was thought, by which 
it could be calculated and measured. He had a list of 
nineteen categories of constants that should be the initial 
focus of such an effort. These included constants of interest 
to theoretical scientists such as those of the solar system 
and atomic weights to those of interest to industry and 
government such as cultivated crops, their production rates, 
geographical distribution and profitability or the quantity 
of oak or Portland stone a "man laboring ten hours a day will 
saw" and the lengths of rivers, populations, buildings, etc. 
Babbage was a witness for the Select Committee which 
vindicated the numbers of the Highland Society in 1827. He 
along with Quetelet and others, founded the British 
Association's Section F for statistics in 1833.
Statistical facts by the mid-nineteenth century simply 
revealed statistical laws, laws as sure as gravity and the 
movement of the stars. The transformation of statistical laws 
into real objective causes gave rise to a new form of 
teleology: Statistical determinism (or what we might now call
87 Babbage in letter to David Brewster February 22, 1832. Quoted in 
Hacking Chance, 55.
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pre-determinism). The conceptual link of probability to 
contingency and relativism was not made for several more 
decades. When data showed, for example, that 200 to 250 
people committed suicide each year by drowning in the Seine 
this became a fact that was thought unalterable. It was, in 
other words, predetermined by the natural laws of society. 
"Society prepares the crimes and the guilty person is only 
the instrument" wrote Quetelet in 1832.88
Two general consequences of the emergence of statistical 
natural law can be identified: optimistic utilitarianism and 
statistical fatalism. Jean-Pierre Falret for example, 
compiled a list of predisposing, direct and indirect general 
causes of suicide: heredity, temperament, and age; sex, 
education, and reading hovels; music, theatrical 
performances, and climate; as well as the seasons, 
masturbation, and idleness.89
If enough information was collected and if the mechanics 
of social laws was discovered, influences upon society could 
be changed. The optimistic utilitarian determinism of 
statistical natural law maintained the enlightenment 
conception of free will and the dream of human betterment and 
perfection. The optimistic statistical determinism of 
Quetelet and Farr held individual acts of free will to 
themselves constitute petty little causes. These minute free 
causal acts, taken together, balanced each other out. "The
88 Quetelet in letter to vellerme published in 1836. Quoted in 
Hacking, Chance, 116.
89 Hacking, Chance. 68.
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larger the number of individuals, the more individual will 
fades out, and allows the series of general facts to 
predominate, the facts which depend on general causes, and in 
virtue of which society exists and is conserved."90 Human 
progress was to be achieved through altering the conditions 
of mortality and morality. William Farr, compiler of 
abstracts and effective head of the Registrar-General of 
England and Wales wrote in 1860:
Despite the accidents or conflagrations, the 
unstableness of winds, the uncertainties of life and 
the variations in men's minds and circumstances, on 
which fires, wrecks and deaths depend, they are 
subject to laws as invariable as gravitation and 
fluctuate within certain limits, which the calculus of 
probabilities can determine beforehand. This holds for 
crimes, and other acts of will, so that violation 
itself is subject to law. shall a system of fatalism 
be built upon this foundation? No, for statistics has 
revealed also a law of variation. Introduce a system 
of ventilation into unventilated mines, and you 
substitute one law of accidents for another. These 
events are under control. Some races, however, commit 
crimes of violence in greater proportion to others 
races. Some classes are more dangerous. [But] as men 
have the power to modify their race, they have the 
power to change the current of human actions within 
definite limits, which statistics can determine.
Farr conceived of the physical infrastructure of 
ventilation systems in mines or the sewage systems in London, 
for example, as "artificial agencies" acting on an 
individuals free will to alter the material conditions
90 Adolphe Quetelet, Recherches ssur le penchant au crime aux 
differents ages. Nouveaux memoires de l'academie Rovale des Sciences et 
Belles-Lettres de Bruxelles 7 (1832), 81. Quoted in Hacking, Chance. 
123.
91 Hacking, Chance, 115.
influencing moral life.92 The link between probability and 
normality within statistical reason meant that morals, in a 
general way, could be mapped creating a moral geography. The 
disease ridden areas of the Victorian urban landscape were 
easily identified by looking at a map of the city water 
supply. Despite the official historical status of laissez 
faire as the shibboleth of Victorian political values, state 
intervention into the moral boundary conditions of society 
were not only compatible with but required by early liberal 
political rationality. The Health of Town Commission, 
convened in 1837, heard evidence from various sources 
including engineers, commissioners of sewers, parish 
registrars and doctors.93 The general goal of this hearing 
was the improvement of cleanliness and good moral habits. All 
were quite sincere in their faith to affect positive moral 
change. Cleanliness, after all, was (and remains) next to 
Godliness. Governmental intervention, in the form of the 
establishment of specific rational forms of infrastructure by 
experts and professionals, provided a space for and at the 
same time an inducement to the observance of the moral laws 
of health at the individual and societal levels. Furthermore, 
these sewers and drains affected their moral transformations 
and reinforcing the sanitary integrity of the home without 
direct intervention. The effectiveness of scientific and
92 Report into the sanitary conditions of the labouring population of 
greAt Britain, XXVI; quoted in Thomas Osborne, "Security and Vitality" 
in Barry, Osborne, and Rose eds., Foucault and Political Rationality, 
113.
93 Osborne, "Security and Vitality", 102.
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engineering advances within the framework of the Moral 
Sciences lead many to believe society's ills could one day be 
solved.
Statistical Autonomy: 
The Derationalization of Determinism
Condorcet's enlightenment dream of rational moral 
science was short lived however. Optimistic utilitarianism 
gave way more and more to deterministic fatalism. In 1857, 
the year Comte died, Henry Thomas Buckle became instantly 
famous in Britain with the publication of History of 
Civilization in England. Buckle quickly became famous 
throughout Europe though to varying degrees of enthusiasm.94 
Buckle founded his history on QuOtelet's statistical 
determinism. Starting from the mass of studies on crime and 
the ever popular topic of suicide he made the conceptual leap 
and applied the same logic to the entire movement of history. 
For Buckle the climate and other environmental factors rather 
than free will determined the course of society and 
civilization.
94 Karl Marx read the same statistical tables of Quetelet and Farr 
that Buckle did but deduced an entirely nonstatistical necessary 
progress. German intellectual thought rejected, for the most part, the 
'French school' of statistical reason or Queteletismus as it was called. 
George Friedrich Knapp (1842-1926) in a lecture just after the Franco- 
Prussion war noted that Buckle's Queteletismus amounted to "nihilistic 
rejection of the state and its duties, and the release of the individual 
from all bonds of society." Hacking, Chance/ 125.
The identification of constants useful for industry also 
contributed to the air of pessimistic fatalism gaining 
popularity in Europe by mid-century. Inspired by Nicolas 
Leonard Sadi Carnot's study of the efficiency of heat 
engines, Rudolph Clausius began writing of "the new kind of 
motion we call heat."95 Clausius discovered that the 
performance of mechanical work by an engine powered by heat 
was accompanied by a degradation, or lowering of the 
temperature of the initially inputted heat. The conversion of 
heat into energy requiring continual additions of heat was 
not surprising in itself. Arriving at a constant to measure 
this transformation was, hpwever, very suprising and would 
change the way processes were understood forever. The new 
constant was a whole new quality of the universe called 
energy. This new thing called energy was never created or 
destroyed. But the question was how to measure the changes 
that occurred in the world given this new quantity.
In 1854 Clausius coined the term entropy from the Greek 
word for "a transformation."96 But this constant of 
transformation had the peculiar quality of being 
irreversible. Heat, Clausius discovered, only goes 
"downhill." The extraction of mechanical work greater in 
energy than the heat energy put into it was, he discovered, 
impossible. Put another way, performance of transformative 
work degrades energy from "high quality" to "low quality."
95 Lawrence Sklar, Physics And Chance; Philosphical Issues In The 
Foundations Of Statistical Mechanics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993, paperback edition, 1995), 18.
96 Paul Edwards ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy V. 2 (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), s. v. "Entropy," by G. J. Withrow, 526.
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Irreversibility became a natural law. Very soon speculation 
arose about the fate of the universe. If entropy is 
irreversible and there is only a constant amount of energy in 
the universe how much time might be left before all the 
energy degrades into a uniform spread of low quality 
unavailable for productive work? In short, 
universal heat death became a new concern of the growing 
followers of popular science and culture in Europe.
Herbert Spencer articulated a theory of social evolution 
even before Darwin had published his Origin in 1859. After 
the publication of Origin. however, evolutionism gained the 
prestige of a scientifically based theory that came to be 
called Social Darwinism. By the mid-nineteenth century the 
optimistic and utopian utilitarianism of Condorcet and 
Quetelet had given way to two popularly intermingled forms of 
reductionist determinism: the pessimistic statistical 
fatalism characteristic of Buckle's History of Civilization 
on the one hand and the hopeful conception of Social 
Darwinism on the other. It is in this atmosphere that the 
transformative effects of the rationalization of probability 
appear. Effects that are at once hopeful in the face of this 
prevailing fatalism, but also terrifying in its dissolution 
of the comfortable absolutes provided by an iron law of 
determinism.
When probability became rational, through Quetelet's 
adaptation of Gauss and Laplace, statistical reason coexisted 
with taxonomy and classification methods that proceeded on 
the basis of identification of essential and universal
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characteristics. Statistical methods - the new forms of 
probabilistic rationality - were carried out upon data that 
was collected and arranged according to the classic 
rationality of essentialism and natural law. The two form of 
reason operated uneasily side by side. However the admittance 
of probability into the domain of reason, truth and rational 
thought eventually transformed the definition of cause and 
determinism by de-linking them from essentialism.
There had been previous explanations of the 
inconsistency of statistical determinism. John Venn, said to 
be the inventor of the frequency account of regularity in 
statistical phenomena, noted that probability has no meaning 
except in terms of a series "which combines individual 
irregularity with aggregate regularity."97 The probability of 
an event, in other words, was its frequency relative to the 
series in which it occurred. This explanation of the 
confusion of determinism in statistics has since become the 
second basic theory of probability after Gauss's 
distribution. Venn's frequency was not enough to refute the 
committed determinist accounts of the world however.
The theory of heat as internal energy put forth by 
Clausius arose within the dominant scientific consensus 
around the substantive-caloric theory of physical change. 
Considerable speculation arose over just what kind of motion 
energy in the form of heat actually exhibited.98 Early work
97 John Venn, The Logic of Chance (London, 1866), 4. Quoted in 
Hacking, Chance. 126. There were even earlier hints of frequency but 
none spelled out as clearly as Venn's account.
98 Sklar, Physics and Chance. 28.
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in kinetic theory was rejected by the Royal Society. Clausius 
and others eventually won out, however, with the growing 
realization that heat and mechanical work are related and 
that energy is the proper way to conceive of this 
relationship. This led to the emergence of thermodynamics.
Two key concepts emerge with the development of 
thermodynamics and further refined with statistical 
mechanics; that of system and that of equilibrium. These 
concepts have continued to evdlve ever since. The idea of a 
system was not new but the centrality of processes and their 
relationships within thermodynamics gave a new meaning to the 
term. Simply put, the notion of a system was vital for 
understanding the kind of change the new concept of energy 
gave rise to. Thermodynamics allowed the identification of 
systems - arrangements of particles say- and their 
parameters, which further enabled one to accurately 
characterize the transformation from one form of matter to 
another such as ice to liquid to gas through the application 
of energy in the form of heat. The distinction was made 
between systems that came into contact with one another or 
with an indeterminate environment and those energetically 
isolated from one another (adiabatic systems). The concept of 
Conservation of energy and the First Law of Thermodynamics 
arises by rationalizing the definition of heat flow. Heat 
flow is understood to be simply the total energy flow into or 
out of the system divided into those parts of the flow that 
results in directly observable mechanical work as well as the 
remaining (flow of) heat. That is energy is neither created
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or destroyed but merely changes form - that is causes systems 
to change form. Change caused by heat, hence the name 
thermodynamics.
This leads to the second key concept of thermodynamics; 
equilibrium. Since energy can neither be created or destroyed 
nor can it "go uphill," as Clausius showed. The macroscopic 
state of a system can be simply described by three 
parameters; energy, mass and volume (and magnetization for 
magnets). Quantities such as temperature and pressure can 
only be defined for systems in equilibrium. The question 
becomes how to measure the transformation from one 
equilibrial state, with, say, one specific pressure and 
temperature, to another.
Objectivity, by the 1830's, had already required testing 
the validity of beginning assumptions, measurements and 
theories. In physics statistical mechanics emerged to fulfil 
this requirement for the new field of thermodynamics.99 
Maxwell's kinetic theory of gases published in 1860 was the 
first important use of statistical reasoning in physics.100 
He may have been heavily influenced by the recently published
99 It is the addition of field theory and statistical mechanics which 
progressively expanded traditional equilibrial thermodynamics to account 
for non-equilibrium. Any system undergoing transformation, that is doing 
work and transforming energy is said to be increasing in entropy 
eventually, in theory, reaching a state of maximum entropy. Maximum 
entropy is complete equilibrium of the system. Stable equilibrial 
entropy is a system in a state of maximum disorder where no work can be 
done by energy and thus no transformations are possible unless the 
conditions of the system, its fundamental structure, is altered.
100 Paul Edwards ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy V. 5 (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), s. v. "Maxwell, James Clerk," by 
Woodruff, Arthur, 225.
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theory of errors of Gauss and Quetelet. 101 Maxwell posited 
that molecular collisions must be equally likely, that is 
equally distributed, throughout an equilibrial system. The 
trick was to discover precisely what kind of distribution 
this was.i°2
For Maxwell the statistical method was a technique, 
simply a tool. For Ludwig Boltzmann and Josiah Gibbs however 
"statistical analysis and the theory of probability supplied 
the rules for the logic of the whole world."103 Theirs was a 
new kind of statistical law from that of Quetelet or even 
Maxwell. The differentiation between the how and the why was 
a direct result of the possibility of deriving practical laws 
to explain phenomena for which determinate causes were 
unknown. These laws were themselves statistical in nature 
rather than causal. In the process, essentialist causation 
became at worst a metaphysical concept and at best merely 
uninteresting. The focus of rational explanation became how 
things occur rather than why. This constituted the end of 
determinism's link to statistics and represented the 
"perfection of the mathematical tool that made it possible to 
investigate the structure and evolution of any system 
involving large numbers. "1Q4
101 Sklar, Chance. 30.
102 This led to the Maxwell Law but even Maxwell considered it suspect 
and it was later revised. Sklar, Chance, 31.
103 Jacob, Logic of Life. 196.
104 Ibid., 199.
A radical shift occurred in the conception of complex 
objects and processes in the course of the development of 
statistical mechanics. The "concept of the electromagnetic 
field was the decisive turning point."105 The mechanistic 
notion that every whole was the sum of its parts began to 
change. A field is not a concept of things but a concept of 
relationships forming a system. A field is a subset of a 
system and, generally speaking, systems are composed of 
numerous fields. Large numbers were studied not merely 
because it was impractical to study individual particles but 
because it was understood that the individual particles 
themselves could not reveal the behavior of the whole 
system.106 Effective theorizing and exploitable discoveries, 
in other words, could not be gained from analysis of 
individual units.
The structures and behaviors of thermodynamic systems 
that statistical mechanics analyzed, and from which it arose, 
could not be perceived by the senses or grasped intuitively. 
The inability to know the precise characteristics of the 
constituent parts of a system was considered a characteristic 
of the statistical techniques themselves not of the object
105 Ernst Cassirer, The Logic Of The Humanities (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1960, fifth printing, 1974), 166. Field theory and 
statistical mechanics basically arose from the expansion of 
thermodynamic theory.
106 Jacob, Logic Of Life. 196.
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under investigation.107 It was assumed that each particle had 
a definite and determinable state and conditions. Explicit 
probability in the form of statistical techniques was 
implicitly thought to be underwritten by some form of 
necessity or efficient cause. It was simply the sheer 
magnitude of all the particles, in even the simplest systems, 
that limited their detailed study.
Eventually the development of thermodynamics and 
statistical mechanics in the second half of the century 
completely upset the traditional notions of rigid separation 
between process and nature, the transitory and the real. Put 
another way, the concept of the real as process became 
natural and rational. The association of truth and reason 
with the old taxonomic epistemology of essentialism and 
determinism began to erode. Theory formed on the basis of 
essential qualities and universal attributes became
107 Boltzmann suggested that the laws of classical mechanics and 
perhaps even the laws of nature themselves "might be approximate 
expressions for average values, and not differentiable in any strict 
sense." it was not until Erwin Schrodinger, Albert Einstein and John Von 
Neumann in the first half of the twentieth century that it became 
plausible to rationally conceive of individual particles of a system as 
having indefinite properties. The early pioneers of modern physics 
assumed the existence of some sort of deterministic deep structure. 
Boltzmann's H-theorem was in fact an attempt to mathematically retain 
determinism. Paul Edwards ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy V. 1 (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), s. v. "Boltzmann, Ludwig" by Paul 
Feyerabend, 335.
108 Paul Edwards ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy V 7 (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), s. v. "Quantum Mechanics: Philosophical 
Implications of," by Norwood R Hanson, 44.
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increasingly understood as subjective beliefs rather than
objective knowledge.109
Statistical mechanics introduced into physics the idea that 
the aim of a physical theory could be not to provide an 
account of what must happen, but of what might happen.
Phenomena were now to be accounted for in probabilistic 
terms, events being accounted for as 'overwhelmingly 
probable' or even 'as predictable to occur with some 
probability' and macroscopic phenomena as being reflections 
of what happens 'most probably,' or sometimes 'on average,' 
at the microscopic level.*I0
By 1870 the congenial link between statistics and 
determinism had been severed. Determinism became 
probabilistic in terms we would recognize today.m The 
increasing sophistication of statistics since the 
rationalization of probability brought about a new form of 
taxonomy based not on essential characteristics but a 
taxonomy of calculation itself.
109 The relationship between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics 
is complex. This reduction continues to be the source of debate and 
discovery. One of the origins of quantum mechanics, in fact, lies in Max 
Planck's studies of the thermodynamic and statistical mechanics of 
radiation. Some of this complexity is captured in the philosophy of 
science concept of the reduction of laws by subsequent theories. There 
are two general forms of such reduction: Homogeneous and deductive 
subsumption. Galileo's law was reduced to the later principles of 
Newtonian mechanics is an example of Homogeneous subsumption. Deductive 
subsumption refers to to the "subsumption of a law by a theory which 
lacks some of the concepts in which the law is expressed."
Thermodynamics was subsumed by statistical mechanics in just such a 
process. Temperature and entropy are concepts central to thermodynamics 
but are not included among the concepts of statistical mechanics.
Maxwell and Boltzmann were able to deduce the laws of thermodynamics 
concerning the motion of molecules through statistical mechanics. John 
Losee, A Historical Introduction tothe Philosophy of Science (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1972, reprinted 1988), 185.
110 Sklar, Physics and Chance. 347.
111 Determinism has never had a canonical definition. The Oxford 
English Dictionary gives 1876 as the first English use of "determinism" 
in the modern sense of doctrine of necessity. Hacking, chance, 153.
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Any event, object or property that could be enumerated 
and classified in a discontinuous system could be analyzed 
using statistical methods. But the derationalization of 
essentialist determinism had the effect of bringing 
statistical methods to bear on the process of classification 
itself. With the end of determinism, statistics became the 
means of identifying discontinuous units previously 
accomplished through identification of essential properties 
in terms of natural law. The ability to produce discrete 
countable units ceased to be the ability to distinguish 
essential or universal characteristics of a phenomena or 
object and became the ability to apply statistical methods.
To affect the required production or enumeration of 
discontinuous units for the application of statistical 
methods the traditional techniques of observation, 
classification and calculation were carried out. However, 
classification was accomplished through the analysis of 
relationship rather than identities, processes rather than 
traits. These relationships, furthermore, were themselves 
statistical in nature, the function of probabilistic 
calculations. The transformations brought about by 
statistical mechanics constitute what Kuhn called a "change 
in paradigm" of a kind "somewhat smaller, because more 
exclusively professional" than the shifts brought about by 
Copernicus, Newton or later Einstein. 112
What was being measured and calculated at the end of the
nineteenth century was no longer things and their qualities
112 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1962, Pheonix Books, 1965), 66.
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but relationships between probabilities and correlations. 
Things not understood as representative of themselves but 
things in terms of certainty of observation and measurement. 
By 1889 British physicist Sir William Thomson (Lord) Kelvin 
could say that "when you can measure what you are speaking 
about, you know something about it; when you cannot measure 
it...your knowledge is of meager and unsatisfactory kind".113 
According to Thomas Kuhn such sentiments were fairly new at 
the time. The physical sciences gave a central place to 
measurement only after the experimentation within "Baconian 
science" had become mathematicized in the nineteenth 
century.114
The mathematization furthered by thermodynamics and 
statistical mechanics directly transformed the focus of both 
physics and biology and eventually all other rational 
knowledges. The emphasis on "force" in classic Newtonian 
mechanics gave way to "energy." Until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, phenomena were analyzed in terms of 
space, time, mass and force. "Force was introduced as the 
cause of motion, preexisting and independent of it."115 In 
biology the external cause acting on life was vitalism. At
113 Ian Hacking, "How Shouild We Do the History of Statistics?," in 
Burchell, Gordon, and Miller eds., Foucault Effect, 186. The facade of 
the University of Chicago Social Science Research Building bears part of 
this inscription: "If you cannot measure, you're knowledge is of a 
meager and unsatisfactory."
114 Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago: Chicago 
Universtiy Press, 1977), 219-220.
115 Jacob, Logic of Life. 192.
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the start of the nineteenth century, "an organism expended 
its vital force in order to perform its work of synthesis and 
morphogenesis; at the end of the nineteenth century, it 
consumed energy."116
Vital Correlations and Functionalism
Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics did not 
represent the simple triumph of mechanism and measurement.
The effects of these emerging concepts of physics upon those 
within the sgcial and biological sciences is complex. The 
rationalization of probability freed these disciplines from 
the fatalism of Buckle but it created new problems for the 
conceptualization of society and its pathologies. Vitalism, a 
theoretical/spiritual mode of thought gained prominence in 
this atmosphere of receding determinism and emerging 
energetic relational systems. A central aspect of vitalism, 
or holism as it was called, was the necessary interrelation 
of all the parts of an organism which, taken together, formed 
a whole much more intricate than a simple sum of parts. The 
preeminent complex whole was a living organism or population 
of organisms. It is the beginning of what today are called 
complex systems though the term system does not get used in 
this context until the next century.
In 1866 with the publication of Generalle Morpholoqie 
der Orqanismen Ernst Haeckel, coined the term ecology also
116 Ibid., 194-5. The replacement of force with the discovery of 
energy according to Kuhn "offers no more striking instance of the 
phenomena known as simultaneous discovery." Kuhn, Essential Tension, 69.
from the Greek OikOs.117 A German zoologist and Monist 
philosopher, founder of the Monist League, Haeckel used the 
term ecology to refer to "the web that linked organisms and 
their surrounding environment. "i*8 The development of the 
concept of equilibrial systems and energy in physics gave 
credibility to the vitalist or, strictly speaking Monist, 
focus on wholes and dynamic relationships. Holism and fields 
or systems emerged together as rational scientific concepts. 
But the introduction of systems of relations was made 
rational in the form of thermodynamics and its central 
principle of entropy directly contradicted the central 
problem in biology and social science; that of evolution - 
the growth of complex organisms from simple ones in the 
closed system of the world. It provided a measurement of 
systems and thus made them objective but at the same time it 
made the principle feature of the systems biology and the 
social sciences had to explain fundamentally paradoxical. 
Negative entropy was not a rational option in physics yet it 
was essentially what the vitalist insisted upon. Negative 
entropy could be theorized only in vitalist terms verging on 
the mystical.
However, the vitalist life forces were not a concept 
affording government a means of rational management. Point 
mechanics may have been on the way out but government
117 Bramwell, Ecology. pg 39. Darwin gave Haeckel the credit for 
spreading the acceptance of his theory of evolution in Germany. Paul 
Edwards ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy v. 3 (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., 1967), s. v. "Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich" by Rollo Handy,
399.
119 Bramwell, Ecology. 39.
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required specifics. In the 1860's acquired traits were 
thought to be inheritable. Darwin had postulated the theory 
of "pangenesis" to explain the phenomenon of heredity 
suggesting that characteristics were passed on by "gamules" 
circulating in the blood.us Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, 
was an anthropometrist and pioneer of eugenics. He sought to 
explain the phenomena of human heredity using his cousins 
theory of gamules. Instead of finding gamules however Galton 
discovered statistical correlation. At the same moment that 
physics was discovering the field Galton in biology was 
discovering correlation. The petty little causes of Laplace, 
Galton found, could not account for the dispersion about the 
mean of human traits plotted on a normal curve.
In a paper read to the Royal Society in 1888 titled "Co­
relations and their measurement, chiefly from anthropometric 
data" Galton illustrated that if the same statistical scale 
was used on the measurements of two symmetrical lines of 
regression the two lines formed by these regressions had the 
same slope.120 Galton separated statistics forever from 
deterministic epistemology. Karl Pearson, a physicist,
119 Darwin did not include this theory in his book On the Origin of 
Species (1859). Michael Ruse speculates that Darwin may not have been 
very enthusiastic about pangenesis, he did not accord it level of 
importance given to natural selection. Before causal determinism was 
overturned however any self respecting philosopher had to explain the 
causal mechanism behind their theory, hence the idea of gamules. Michael 
Ruse, The Darwinian Revolution; Science Red in Tooth and Claw (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 212-3.
120 Stigler, History of Statistics. 297. Stigler notes that Galton is 
credited for the discovery of correlation but that he never developed it 
fully and that the full idea of correlation remained on the periphery of 
his work.
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historian and in later life a statistician, said that "it was 
Galton who first freed me from the prejudice that sound 
mathematics could only be applied to natural phenomena under 
the category of causation."121 Correlation, like a field, is 
a probabilistic concept. They are concepts of relationships 
rather than identities. Causal determinism was becoming less 
rational in more and more disciplines.
Galton was motivated by the widely held hope that the 
underlying deterministic causes of the Queteletian 
statistically determined traits could be found. Galton was a 
humanist and utilitarian. Finding these, he hoped, would lead 
to techniques for increasing or decreasing the occurrence of 
these traits. Following Quetelet's and Farr's statistical 
determinism Galton sought the keys to human nature by 
measuring the physical characteristics of individuals such as 
foot size and arm length relative to overall height, etc. The 
identification and differentiation of human physical 
characteristics, Galton hoped, would reveal the precise 
operation of the natural laws governing the individual with a 
given set of physical characteristics. In this way Galton 
thought the statistically mapped central tendency of the 
phenomenon in question as well as exceptions could be 
explained.
Galton's approach was unique however. The Gaussian 
normal curve, since Quetelet, was understood as the product 
of many Laplacian "petty little causes." It was thought, 
outside the obscure world of avant garde physics, that the
121 Ibid., 305.
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characteristics of things followed some sort of natural law 
and that this law acted upon the essence of things. Essence 
and law necessarily operated together providing direction and 
order to the processes of the universe. Galton, however, 
observed that "the reason for their doing so is totally 
unexplained. "122
For Galton it was the reason for this law-like 
regularity (revealed by statistical methods) that had to be 
explained, only then could statistical law serve as 
explanations for phenomena. Galton was not satisfied to 
assume statistical laws caused statistical regularity. Galton 
focused on exceptional individuals rather than the mean, the 
central cluster of traits at the apex of the normal curve. He 
focused on geniuses and criminals, the exceptions to the 
norm, the tails of the Gaussian distribution curve produced 
from social statistics.
Galton was the first person to find serious problems 
with the determinist theory of petty little causes to explain 
statistical dispersion.123 Galton's efforts to account for 
exceptions to central tendencies in heredity and his focus on 
the dispersion lead to his formulating correlation 
coefficients and the theory of regression. Galton's theory of 
regression fundamentally transformed the popular conception 
of natural law.324
122 Hacking, Chance. 185.
123 Ibid,, 185-6.
124 Ibid., 181-5.
Galton found that reversion towards the mean in the 
distribution of a large sample of traits was a mathematical 
consequence of the Gaussian curve itself and not the thing 
being measured. That is he explained the dispersion of traits 
without resort to petty little causes. In his example read to 
the Royal Society in 1888 he stated that if the measurement 
of forearms and head lengths "were expressed in units of 
their probable errors, then both regression lines had the 
same slope (r). Hence this number could be taken 
unambiguously as an expression of the "closeness of co­
relation. "125 This along with the developments in 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics constituted the end 
of essentialist causal teleology defined in terms of natural 
law. After Galton, determinism and necessity no longer 
referred to explicit causal relations but to correlations, to 
statistically probable relationships. Correlations became as 
real as causes had b e e n .  * 2 6
The real-ization of correlation did not simply bring 
about an unproblematic Acceptance of probability. Even in the 
physical sciences differences of opinion concerning just what 
probability entailed persisted. And they continue to persist 
to this day. Onq interpretation is that probability applies 
only to collections of unites, aggregates or ensembles 
forming systems. In this view probability does not pertain to
125 Stigler, History Of Statistics, 297.
126 Hacking, Chance, 188.
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the units making up the system themselves.127 The other 
interpretation, initially less widely accepted but 
increasingly difficult to ignore was that probability was not 
simply a feature that came into being when ensembles of units 
were aggregated together but that probability was a real 
feature of every state of systems and their components. That 
probability (non-essentialism) was, so to speak, an essential 
aspect of reality.
Charles Sanders Peirce, father of modern pragmatism, was 
perhaps the most outspoken proponent of this view. Peirce 
denied determinism in all its forms and believed the world to 
be ruled completely by chance. In an intellectual environment 
presided over by the attempt to discover Babbage's constants 
of nature, Peirce insisted there were none. For Peirce there 
were no constants over and above the ones agreed upon for the 
sake of consistancy. It was the statistical stability of the 
highly probable that made inductive learning and rationality 
possible. For Peirce the universe was irreducibly stochastic 
- one state of affairs led to the next most probable state of 
affairs.
Peirce developed these ideas in the course of his work 
for the U.S. Government in the Coast Survey. His attention 
was focused upon measurement and measuring devices for the 
nearly twenty years he worked in the Coast Survey. Peirce 
respected the work of his predecessors in the development of 
measurement noting that the "law of distribution of errors
127 This is of course the view which became especially troublesome in 
the development of quantum mechanics as "individual units" were 
discovered to themselves be systems or points in phase space and 
probability functions within relationships with other systems.
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which Quetelet, Galton, and others, have applied with so much 
success to the study of biological and social matters" but he 
was interested in the relationship between statistics and 
Observation.128 For Peirce the distribution of errors was 
about judgment and the operation of the senses rather than 
the object of the senses as was the concern of biology, 
sociology and physics.
Probability as a matter of judgment did not mean that 
beyond judgment there lay a realm of true facts, universal 
and essential objects whose constants, when found, would 
reveal their truth to the enlightened observer, as it had 
been supposed by the moral scientists in the early part of 
the century. For Peirce, since the universe itself was 
fundamentally chancy, judgments were also explainable in 
statistical terms. The focus on judgment and the senses lead 
to a fundamental innovation in experimental method: 
randomization. Randomization has since become a standard 
practice in experimental science.
Randomization was introduced into the experiment to gain 
a new level of control, not through the elimination of chance 
events but by including them. In 1884 Peirce and the 
Psychology student Joseph Jastrow conducted the first 
experiment in which an artificial randomizer was used to 
decide the sequence of trials and also used in the analysis 
of the data. This experiment was conducted in order to 
determine if the normal distribution applied to judgments 
made about sense perceptions so small that they may be 
considered below the threshold of conscious perception. It
128 Hacking, Chance, 203.
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was commonly held in psychophysics that the curve did not 
apply to the realm beyond consciousness.129 Peirce believed 
that it did, that the observer will make subliminal 
distinctions whose accuracy will decrease according to the 
curve of error.
One can see the importance of randomization in the 
construction of such an experiment. But the subject of the 
experiment was also taken very seriously. Telepathy was a 
popular subject and the late nineteenth century. The tern had 
been coined in 1880 and in 1882 The society for Psychical 
research had been founded with the goal of replacing mediums 
and seances with scientific study.130 In 1884 the American 
Society for Psychical research was established in Boston with 
the same goal. It was believed that below the minimum 
threshold of conscious sensation there occurred the phenomena 
of thought transference between people rather than a mystical 
realm where the dead spoke to the living.
The existence of a threshold below which the curve of 
errors did not operate was necessary for the theory of 
thought transference. Peirce insisted that he had proven 
there to be no minimum threshold. For Peirce this "gives 
reason for believing that we gather what is passing in one 
another's minds in large measure from the sensations so faint 
that we are not fully aware of them, and can give no account 
of how we reach our conclusions from such matters."131 Peirce
129 Ibid., 204.
130 Ibid., 206.
131 Ibid., 206.
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was in no way a spiritually oriented person. His linking of 
probability with subliminal sensations was grounds for his 
rejection of various strains of religion he considered 
deterministic. He refuted the Vatican Council's 1870 
sanctioning of the doctrine of papal infallibility and in a 
1893 paper titled "Reply to the Necessitarians" Peirce noted 
that only Dr. Paul Carus, editor of the Monist, a journal of 
general science published in Chicago linked to the work of 
haeckel, had agreed to respond to his challenge.
For Carus, the validity of ethics and morals were their 
universality, based on the truth of the unity of the 
creation, and their objectivity, based on the truth of 
natural laws.132 The spiritual strain of holism derived in 
part from the replacement of belief in God and the rule of 
Gods law to belief in the oneness of nature and the rule of 
natural laws. Carus, and Monists in general, could not 
imagine a world without determinism and the necessity of 
natural laws. Universalism and determinism were linked at the 
heart of Europeanholistic faith.
In Peirce's pragmatics the indeterminateness of reality 
meant that activity, whether organic or inorganic, human or 
non-human was not the result of the will of a unified wbrld 
enforced by natural law but a probabilistic occurrence.
Peirce was sometimes unclear but generally action could be 
divided between the dynamic processes between two subjects,
"or at any rate is the result of such actions between pairs" 
and the processes occurring as a result of three subjects; a
132 Bramwell, Ecology. 4 7-8.
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sign, its object and its interpretant, a process he called 
semiosis.133
Peirce's theories and concepts remained obscure. His 
experimental methods were rejected by mainstream psychiatry. 
His theory of signs found little initial application. But if 
the particulars of his work had to wait until after his death 
to receive widespread attention, his position on determinism 
was not completely out of the ordinary. The end of the 
nineteenth century was a period of transformation in many 
disciplines in the way objects of rational analysis were 
defined. It is a period in which a new form of classification 
and identification emerges. Through statistical mechanics, 
the discovery of correlation and general statistical methods, 
activities initially embarked upon the quest to identify the 
determining natural laws, produced a transformation in reason 
itself. Probability had become a central rational concept in 
the physical, natural and human sciences. The identification 
and classification that preceded any rational analysis was no 
longer conducted in terms of categorizing the essential 
properties of things linked to their universal natural laws.
In all enterprises producing rational knowledge identity 
became a product not of what something was but of what 
something does in relation to other things. Rational 
knowledge began to take the form of functionalism.
By the end of the nineteenth century functional analysis 
of one form or another had replaced evolutionism and natural 
law, in the social as well as physical sciences. Franz Boas,
133 Charles Morris, Sign. Language and Behavior (New York: Prentice
Hall, 1946), 289.
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"the father of modern anthropology," studied physics and 
geography. He read Galton and integrated it into his work, 
making biometrics a standard procedure of anthropological 
field work. For Boas and those who followed him,, evolutionist 
causal natural law was idealistic and romantic at best and 
unscientific, not to mention racist, at worst. In refuting 
evolutionist concepts of progress and the separation of the 
races Boas pointed out that what appeared to civilized people 
as the irrational behavior of primitive cultures was merely 
the result of a difference in classificatory schema* Simpler 
cultures, according to Boas, merely classified concepts 
differently. 134
Boas insisted on a "thoroughgoing description of all 
cultural data a§ the sole warrantable scientific attitude."135 
Every detail was to be carefully recorded and tabulated. How 
this data fit together to form the whole of the social system 
in question would guide the science of anthropology. It was 
not a matter of identifying which aspects were right or 
wrong, normal or pathological by European culture's 
standards, but how they fit together. Assumptions of progress 
lain on top of the facts would only reveal a distorted 
picture of the truth good, perhaps, for supporting dogma but 
not science* To judge social processes and phenomena on the 
basis of an idealistic concept of higher and lower races and
135 Robert H. Lowie, The History of Ethnological Theory (New York: 
Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1937), 142. Boas and his students have thus been 
called "historical particularists" Marvin Harris Cultural Anthropology 
2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1987), 418.
135 Ibid., 131.
normal and pathological progress precluded attention to the 
complex relationships actualy making up culture. Cultures 
became "not mere arrangements of separate elements but 
integrated wholes."I35 After Boas' best known book "The Mind 
of Man" (1911) taxonomy in anthropology and ethnology was 
henceforth determined through a functional analysis which 
attempted to focus on the whole field of culture and social 
relations. Comparability was first determined by context and 
only then were phenomena to be compared. Henceforth the truth 
of a society was ascertianed through some form of functional 
analysis that paid attention to interrelationship and 
context. The new object displayed by these new methodes were 
accompanied by a new mode of governing appropriate to this 
new truth. Functional analysis replaced the determinism 
charecteristic of Social Darwinism as the dominant 
Governmental rationality. This was not a simple replacement, 
however, for the epistemology of determinism was at the heart 
of nineteenth century conflict between vitalist and 
mechanistic conceptions of life and the body-politic. The 
emergence of context and relationship as objective aspects of 
the real requires a brief discussion of the so called 
"vitalist-mechanist" debate.
136 Ibid., 142.
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Social Darwinism was a vague enough formulation to be 
interpreted in many different ways. While it proved to be an 
antidote for the fatalism of Buckle it remained firmly 
determinist. The determinism of Social Darwinism, however, 
was not simply the determinism of Quetelet. It was a 
determinism linked to the vitalism and holism of Haeckel and 
T. H. Huxley, the outspoken natural scientist who defended 
Darwin and his theories from attacks by the Catholic Church. 
It was a form of vitalism that sprang from the inability of 
purely physical laws, especially the second law of 
thermodynamics, to mesh with observed biological and social 
reality. The vitalist/mechanist debate by the end of the 
nineteenth century had to do with the concept of goal- 
directed progress or some form of life-energy or vital force 
which countered entropy and gave direction to life. Henri 
Bergson, for example, thought that materialist explanations 
of evolution utterly failed. The fact that things evolved in 
the direction of greater complexity, counter to the second 
law of thermodynamics was proof of a mysterious force of 
life, an elan vital as he called it. Quantifiable rationality 
was not enough. The natural sciences, according to Bergson, 
needed to be supplemented with metaphysics.137
137 Paul Edwards ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy V. 1 (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), s. v. "Bergson, Henri" by T.A. Goudge, 
292.
Statistical methods played a role in both vitalist and 
mechanist concepts. Though no physical scientist doubted the 
efficacy of statistics not all vitalists or social Darwinists 
were convinced of their value. In general the later vitalists 
and Social Darwinists can be divided into two political camps 
according to editorial page guidelines; the "right" and the 
"left."i38 Social evolutionism was deployed by the "right" by 
men such as John Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, who stated 
that the richest members of society achieved their wealth 
because they were the fittest and best adapted members of 
society. This was natural and this was morally correct. 
Welfare measures that supported "dependency" and "misfits," 
so it went, would weaken the health of human kind. 
Philanthropic charity organizations accepted Social Darwinism 
as scientific fact.338
On the "left" social reformers found in evolutionism 
scientific evidence for the possibility and in some cases 
inevitability of social change and progress. Karl Marx (1818- 
1883) wanted to dedicate the first volume of Das Kapital 
(1867) to Darwin. Reformers saw evolutionism as a 
demonstration that although existing social, economic and 
political institutions and arrangements may be natural or at 
least determined by, in some cases, identifiable causes, this 
did not preclude their eventual transformation into something
138 Paul Edwards ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy V. 2 (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), s. v. "Darwinism" by Morton 0. Beckner, 
304.
139 June Axinn and Herman Levin, Social Welfare: A History of the 
American Response To Need 2nd ed. (New York, Longman, 1982), 99.
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better. Better, in Comte's terms of ideal and normal, as that 
which society progresses towards.
Pauperism was thought contagious owing to the theory of 
inheritance of acquired traits. Philanthropic responses to 
poverty took the form of scientific charity. Scientific 
charity instituted the careful development of a welfare 
delivery system that would protect the social worker while at 
the same time preventing the inducement and spread of a 
contagious pauperism. A report in 1874 at the first 
Copference of Charities and Corrections in New York advised 
against the then common practice of "out-of-doors" relief in
the form of aid taken to the homes of those wholly unable to
work. These could not be regulated sufficiently to ensure
moral health. Relief, it was advised, was to be connected to
work and carefully monitored as in the case of "indoors" 
relief which was aid given to those in exchange for various 
labors.
Under scientific charity trained "friendly visitors" 
would distribute "out-of-doors" relief and closely monitor 
the situation of poor families. In both situations close 
monitoring was enhanced for the good of the visitors and 
paupers alike.i*o In 1884 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
was created. Its authority was to "collect information upon 
the subject of labor, its relations to capital, the hours of 
labor, and the earnings of laboring men and women, and the
140 Veterans of 'the war of rebellion' who fell on hard times 
constituted another class class all together. Veterans having proved 
their social worth were not considered susceptible to the same 
degenerating effects of pauperism that civilians did. ibid., 90-2.
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means of promoting their material security, individual and 
moral prosperity."141
%
In 1895 George Udny Yule applied Galton's correlation 
hypothesis to data on pauperism and declared "the rise in the 
mean percentage of pauperism, as the proportion of out-relief 
is increased, is as marked as could be desired. "142 Many had 
at first thought that Galton's methods applied only to the 
field of anthropometry. It was Yule who expanded and 
illustrated the applicability of Galton's discovery of 
correlation for all the sciences and, at the same time and by 
means of which, he developed the method of correlation 
coefficient. 143 The regression line hence forth stood as a 
surrogate for what is still called a causal relation.
By the turn of the century Social Darwinism, both in the 
progressive and conservative variety, gave way to the 
Progressive era. At the height of scientific-philanthropic 
forms of poverty managing, the family was to be protected 
from the evils of indigent individuals. By the first decades 
of the twentieth century, however, the family was to be 
protected from the hostilities of the industrial environment. 
Scientific charity based on the science of Spencerian 
evolution gave way to science of a more rigorous statistical 
kind. Society began to be understood as a complex system of 
functional relationships.
141 Ibid., 97.
142 Stigler, History of Statistics. 348.
143 Ibid., 354. What is now called partial correlation coefficient 
Yule called "net coefficient of correlation."
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The end of essentialist determinism played it self out 
in the private sector with the development of Taylorism.
Named after Fredrick W. Taylor, Taylorism, or scientific 
management as he called it was a conscious effort to affect 
the human element of the production process. It was literally 
the application of engineering techniques and principles to 
human activity in the factory. Scientific management was 
basically the attempt to control the human element of 
production at the individual and small group level. It 
initially proceeded with a simple conception of "economic 
man" and sought to manipulate behavior through "incentive- 
pay" or the "shop disciplinarian" to produce the desired 
"voluntary" behavior.144
In the public domain social work took a new form. The 
social policy that emerged from the epistemological 
principles of systems or fields and functional 
interrelationship within society played itself out in an 
immense expansion of federal political authority. Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1901 called on every citizen to help with 
"reform through social work."145 Individuals were responsible 
for their state of affairs and these could be improved with 
hard work. In 1906 the Food and Drug Act was passed. Income 
security and workmans compensation was enacted in many states 
by 1911. In 1913 the 16th Amendment to the Constitution was 
ratified establishing a federal income tax. This same year
144 David F. Noble, America By Design; Science. Technology, and -the 
Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New York, Oxford university Press, 1977, 
paperback ed. Alfred A. Knopf 1979), 264.
145 Axinn and Levin, social welfare, 137.
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the Federal Reserve System was established, drastically 
reforming the banking industry. 1914 saw the enactment of the 
Clayton Anti-Trust Act leading to the Federal Trade 
Commission.
If this may be called a revival of pastoralism it must 
be characterized as a new form, an urbane form, in which the 
rural or village economy is superseded by the economy of the 
factory or industrial space in general. Industrialization and 
the formation of the factory as the preeminent form of 
production was accompanied by and, at the same time 
reproduced, an exceedingly rapid process of technological 
change. By the beginning of the twentieth century industrial 
machinery had become sophisticated and efficient enough that 
"the domestic economy of the factory replaced [this 
machinery] as the limiting factor of production."146 
Industrial machinery, it was discovered, could only be used 
at peak efficiency if the human factors of production were 
organized properly.
By the second decade of the twentieth century the 
reactions against the social engineering and management 
practices of Taylorism grew intense. Taylor's brand of 
scientific management was opposed not only by workers but 
eventually by engineers and managers as well. The initial 
incarnation of Taylorism was supposed to represent the 
application of scientific methods to the organization of the 
increasingly complex sprawling industrial empires. Scientific 
management utilized incentive-pay arrangements to motivate 
workers to cooperate and behave more efficiently. The
146 Noble, America Bv besicrn. 260.
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development of time-motion studies gave Taylorism its claim 
to scientific status but this technique was found to be 
employed as often as not by engineers who knew little about 
the activities and processes they were accountable for. They 
simply guessed at the optimum rates used as base lines for 
their measurements. 147
In 1916 Assistant Navy Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt 
banned Taylor's methods in Navy yards and all other federally 
funded operations after five years of hearings into the 
causds of the strike at Waterton Arsenal.148 The problems 
with Taylorism, from the engineering, management and 
government inspectors perspectives, was not the concept of 
human engineering itself but its actual lack of science. 
Taylor's brand of authoritarian scientific management simply 
introduced the arbitrary authority of owners and managers in 
a new and subtler form. The cure for the problems of industry 
and production understood in terms of labor and social 
arrangements was the application of real science and the 
realization that management and ownership were part of the 
domestic economy that had to be reformed. "The new human 
focus of engineering required that the discipline of 
engineering itself had to expand, to include the new methods 
of the social sciences."149
Magnus Alaxander an electrical engineer for 
Westinghouse, GE and a researcher for the National Bureau of
147 Ibid., 272.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., 274.
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Economic Research as well as co-founder of the National 
Industrial Conference Board, the largest cooperative 
enterprise of American employers ever undertaken, represented 
the post-Taylorism form of scientific management or "liberal 
industrial management" as it was called.150 Before World War 
I Alaxander had conducted statistical research on income 
distribution. In 1916 he began extensive research on 
industrial accidents and authored the first comprehensive 
report on the cost of labor turnover to American industry. 
Joining Alexander in establishing the NBER was Malcolm Rorty, 
an engineer with interest and expertise in statistics and 
economics. In the 1920's before he became president,
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who was himself a 
mining engineer before entering politics, commissioned 
studies on "recent economic changes" and "recent social 
trends" from the NBER.151
The reformulation of scientific management by the 
corporate liberal reformers was consciously motivated by the 
desire to affect stability, understood as the the sin qua non 
of future profits, of the business environment.152 But this 
revisionism within scientific management brought with it many 
changes and not only for labor. It constituted nothing less 
then action upon a new object of industrial governance. The 
transfer of the craftsman's skill to the machine was thus 
soon accompanied by the transfer of authority from the owner
150 Ibid., 52.
151 Ibid., 285.
152 Ibid., 288.
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and manager to the industrial processes themselves, 
industrial processes understood as an economy - a functional 
interaction of human and machine within a production system 
and the factory environment.
An array of governing institutions were erected that 
socialized the individual both as a private citizen and agent 
of economic activity in the name of collective security and 
wellbeing. This was accomplished through the deployment of 
political authority somewhere between liberalism and state 
pastoralism or nascent socialism. It was an intervention or 
reorganization of the space of social negotiation, the locus 
where production and exchange was understood to actually 
occur. This rearrangement maintained the classic liberal 
separation of the civil, economic and political realms. The 
privacy and sanctity of the individual enterprise was 
weakened, but formal autonomy of the market as a whole was 
preserved. This was justified and made acceptable by ensuring 
the security of the economic domain as a whole.
The expansion of the state's role in social work 
dramatically increased the size, number and complexity of 
social research institutions and government agencies. As a 
consequence systematic social surveys and investigations were 
refined and deployed extensively. The Pittsburgh Survey of 
1907-8 was the "first major attempt to survey in depth the 
entire life of a single community."153 As welfare became 
increasingly professionalized and bureaucratized scientific 
philanthropy was transformed into scientific social work. The 
attendants at alms houses and the friendly visitors of the
153 Axinn and Levin, Social welfare. 146.
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early aid societies and charities were replaced by paid 
agents of the state. The proper techniques and methods of the 
professional social worker were first codified in Mary 
Richmond's "Social Diagnosis" published in 1917.154
A new state pastoralism was emerging. Social work and 
reformed scientific management, on the one hand, and social 
security, on the other, constituted two axis of a new 
rationality of government. Social security arose from and at 
the same time reinforced the connections and relationships 
between public or civic activities and the fate of 
individuals in their private economic affairs and personal 
conduct. Social work and scientific management operated 
through investigation by experts who, increasingly with the 
aid of statistical techniques, distilled, identified and 
categorized the range of social norms in individual and 
collective conduct and administered the appropriate treatment 
or regime of reform.
The different forms of governmental intervention into 
society from the last decades of the eighteenth and the first 
decades of the twentieth centuries reflect a shift in the 
very constitution of reason and rational knowledge. This 
change in the constitution of rational nowledge and how it 
was obtained was the result of a transformation in the 
mutualy constitutive relationship between the mdthodes of 
knowing the object of. government and the actual object 
revealed by these new methods. Government, in other words, 
precipitates a transformation in the object of government by 
its very effort to know this object.
154 Ibid., 156.
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Social policy in the United States by the end of the 
last century, for example, was directed at a society no 
longer percieved in strictly mechanistic and unalterable 
terms. Change and transformation became real aspects of 
social reality influenced by context and relationship. This 
is a very different society from the one encountered by the 
first Select Committee investigating rates of sickness and 
the efficacy of "friendly societies" in England. This new 
society was one just beginning to be constituted by internal 
forces apprehendable through statistics. Soon the city 
planning of Farr, with his sewers and vents, marked the 
inception of modern attempts to attend to the needs of 
society and its conditions of existence. That is, to foster 
about the right order of society.
Statistics at this point had been reconceptualized first 
as a real natural phenomina then into a full fledged natural 
law with determinist capabilities. The development of 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics by the second half 
of the century dispensed with determinism in the physical 
sciences. A little later, in the period leading up to the 
invention of correlation, the natural and social sciences 
also came to reject determinism. A reformed mechanistic 
outlook of field and function, one which adopted 
interrelationship and probability, replaced vitalism and whig 
history.
By the end of the nineteenth century society began to 
require attention on new terms. The object of government and 
its conditions of existence had become one of broad social
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relations in which poverty and efficient production became 
some how linked or correlated. The previous emphasis on 
adjusting the moral character of the individual gave way to 
an emphasis on the individual as part of a set of social 
relations. The perceived failures of early nineteenth century 
governing practices were articulated from within this new 
epistemological formation of rational knowledge. Governing 
had to adjust to this new conception of its object.
Government, according to this new rationality, had not 
provided nor fostered the wellbeing and prosperity of society 
that was expected of it. Instead it had allowed, and perhaps 
inadvertently promoted, social and economic disruption such 
as the increasing disturbances among workers and rising rates 
of suicide, employment concerns and oppressive working 
conditibns. Philanthropic responses to such social distress 
in the form of altering the statistically determined 
circumstances under which certain behavior and morality were 
now seen as a failure. The reformed social work of Mary 
Richmond and the scientific managment of Taylor and later the 
National Bureau of Economic Research represent the birth of 
modern attempts to deal with a society composed of 
interacting yet also interdependent social agents.
This was the beginning of a vast effort at inducing 
cooperation and efficiency through socialization. This effort 
was still one centered on the norm and the disciplinary mode 
of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and 
examination. But with the normal no longer tied to an 
essential reality and stripped of determining influence, the
disciplinary mode began to change. In the early twentieth 
century there was not yet a replacement for the disciplinary 
mode of government. But its emergence was not far off.
Chapter 4: 
Decline of the norm and the Rise of Control
The identification of the normal and pathological were 
the precondition but also the effect of the new professions 
of social work and scientific management. Just as it had been 
for the moral scientist and sewer engineers seventy years 
previously. But the normal and the pathological identified in 
the twentieth century began to conform to a new ratipnality 
of functional analysis of roles and relations within a 
system. The normal as a hard and fast point assumed to lie at 
the top of Gauss' curve gave way to the normal as a field, a 
dispersed range of possibilities in a dynamic interrelated 
process. The social worker and the manager-engineer relied on 
ihstrumental rational knowledge of functional interactions to 
devise their interventions. The norm eventualy gave way to a 
new principle appropriate to functioning systems - that of 
structural equilibrium.
Functional explanations in the life and human sciences 
represented an overturning of essentialist accounts that 
sustained the bogeymen of evolutionism and vitalism. With 
Boas, Taylor, Yule and Richmond the grounds were laid for the 
investigation of intricate whole organisms in the newly 
formed rational terms of interrelated functional systems. The 
new objects of the life and social sciences were 
organizations of complex whole organisms. The difference 
between the systems of the physical sciences and those of the 
life and social sciences resided mainly in the means of their 
coordination and transformation.
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However, the objects of the life and social sciences 
seemed to intrinsically defy the second law of thermodynamics 
- energy can only "go downhill," entropy results in a 
decrease of constructive work in an energetically isolated 
system. Rational instrumental explanations were necessarily 
mechanistic. They took the form of a precise description of 
the mechanisms controlling the organization and 
transformation of living matter. Yet such an explanation for 
large scale biological and social phenomena at some point had 
to rely upon the the evolutionist claims of Social Darwinism 
or the metaphysical claims of the vitalists to explain the 
counter entropic phenomena of life. This was soon to change 
and the rational explanations that emerged solidified and 
extended the rationality and affectiveness of the ontology of 
functional systems.
As scientists began to understand these unique 
characteristics of life process, they began to reformulate or 
expand a concept that had remained more or less implicit in 
physics and statistical mechanics; the concept of structure. 
The analysis of nutrition requirements in organisms for 
example, based on the new biochemical knowledge of compounds 
and metabolism, lead to the discovery that some organisms 
could synthesize the compounds necessary for metabolism and 
growth while others could not. This was the discovery of 
vitamins, or rather, the discovery of the presence or absence 
of substances which allowed for certain metabolic processes, 
substances later called vitamins. Mammals, biologists 
discovered, do not produce these necessary substances on
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their own. Such discoveries solidified the belief that the 
functioning of living organisms was unique but also that its 
composition and structure was fundamental to this 
u n i q u e n e s s .  155 The secrets of life's processes had to be 
sought in its structure as well as its functioning.
Jacques Loeb a German born physiologist who immigrated 
to the United states to occupy academic posts at the 
University of Chicago from 1892 to 1902 and later the 
University California from 1902 to 1910 gained an 
international reputation for his experimental skills and 
originality. But he was best known for his insistence on 
mechanistic explanations for living p h e n o m e n a . 155 in his The 
Dynamics of Living Matter (1906) Loeb describes the role of 
biological chemistry as "distinguishing the functions which 
depend on chemical constitution from those that also require 
a particular physical structure of the living substance."157
Structures were no longer understood as completely 
stable material entities but entities whose stability was 
directly linked with its functioning. An important element in 
any system became its structural equilibrium. The particular 
phase or state of an organic structure at any given point in 
time was thus governed by a calculus of probability relative 
to its future equilibrial state. Organic structure in 
biochemistry were born as statements of probability of the
155 Jacob, Logic of Life. 241.
156 Paul Edwards ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy V. 4 (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), s. v. "Bergson, Henri" by T.A. Goudge, 
503.
157 Jacques Loeb, The Dynamics of Living Matter (1906), 29. Quoted in 
Jacob Logic of Life, 236.
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formation, arrangement and reproduction of specific organic 
structures necessary for life sustaining functions.
Biological chemistry and genetics fundamentally changed the 
understanding of the very nature of living bodies. Organisms 
could now be conceived
in a way that did not simply array structures and functions 
around a mysterious life giving force.
This new emphasis on quantitative rigor and the focus on 
composition and structure of living systems had a radical 
effect upon the life sciences, and eventually the social 
sciences. Complex organisms ceased to be understood as layers 
of organs and functional processes surrounding a mysterious 
source of life and form. The uniqueness of life no longer 
resided in the functioning of organisms in defiance of the 
second law of thermodynamics. The secrets of life came to 
reside in the specific material arrangements of organisms and 
unique functions and processes arising from them.
Biological phenomena at the turn of the century were 
understood by scientists to emerge from the storing, 
releasing and exchanging of energy through the formation, 
synthesis and transfer of "energy rich bonds" of specific 
phosphorous c o m p o u n d s . 158 Biologists found that a single 
compound, adenosine triphosphate, was common to all living 
things and constituted the energy storage process in all 
organisms. In both bacteria and mammals, whether in 
respiration or fermentation, the breakdown of sugars lead to 
the same energy rich phosphorous compound. However, the
158 Jacob, Logic of Life. 241.
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rigorous clinical methods used to identify these processes 
strengthened the conceptualization of the unity of function 
or holismin the living world. 159
Most other branches of biology and the human sciences 
focused on living organisms at a much larger scale. Earlier 
concepts in the human sciences, formulated by such theorists 
as Hobbes or Spencer, treated the organism as a large version 
of a single body transferring analogically the functions of 
individual organs to parts of the collective mass of society. 
Where biological chemistry and genetics sought answers in the 
minute mechanisms of tissues and cells other branches of 
biology reformulated their objects in terms of the importance 
of structure on a much larger scale.
Fredric Clements, an American botanist and researcher at 
the Carnegie Institution had read the work of Herbert 
Spencer, whose use of the organism metaphor to describe human 
society may have prompted Clements to respond by using the 
community concept in biology. 16° Clements was not alone in 
this tendency. Anton Kernor Von Marilaun, a professor of 
botany at the University of Vienna also used the community 
concept analogicaly from the social realm in the 1 8 9 0 's. î i 
Another naturalist influenced by Spencer was Stephen Alfred
159 Ibid.
160 Frank Benjamin Golly, A History of The Ecosystem Concept in 
Ecology; ore Than the Sum if the Parts (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1993), 18-25.
161 Ibid., 17.
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Fotbes, founder of the Illinois State Laboratory of Natural
History. In 1887 he described a lake as:
an old and relatively primitive system, isolated 
from its surroundings. Within it matter circulates, 
and controls operate to produce an equilibrium 
comparable with that in a similar area of land. In 
this microcosm nothing can be fully understood 
until its relationship to the whole is clearly 
seen... The lake appears as an organic system, a 
balance between building up and breaking down in 
which the struggle for existence and natural 
Selection have produced an equilibrium, a 
'community of interest,' between predator and 
prey.162
For Clements the community, with its complex of 
relations, was the organism. Every region had a 
characteristic pattern of vegetation that he called a climax. 
Climax communities of plants were the result of selection by 
the specific climate and other factors within a region. Every 
region was made up of a variety of communities each with a 
different trajectory of development or ecological succession 
as he called it. In some communities in the region succession 
was slow and in others it was fast. Clements applied the 
organisms analogy to these climax communities noting that 
they exhibited a kind of social structure. In part this 
distinguished organic communities from the individual 
organism commonly focused on in b i o l o g y .  1̂ 3 These 
communities, Clements postulated, went through a cycle of 
birth, growth and death each characterized by a stage of 
development culminating in what he called climax states. The 
focus for Clements' studies of biological communities and
162 Ibid., 36.
163 Ibid., 24.
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their various stages of development was the interactions 
between the biological elements, or biotic components, and 
the processes controlling community development.164
British botanist Alfred George Tansley was a colleague 
and friend of Clements. It was Tansley who expanded Forbes' 
and Clements' concept of organism giving them a larger 
audience. The spread of these concepts is linked to Tansley's 
efforts to bring greater scientific rigor and quantitative 
methods to botany in particular and biology in general. 
Tansley was made a fellow of the Royal Society in 1915 and 
appointed Sherardian Chair of Botany at Oxford in 1927 where 
he remained until his retirement in 1937. Despite this 
distinguished career Tansley's academic life was marked by an 
intense struggle to open up botany to the concepts of ecology 
and to have ecology accepted as part of the natural 
•sciences.165 Tansley was influenced by many currents of 
thought. In 1920 he published a textbook titled The New 
Psychology and its Relations to Life and in 1922 moved to 
Vienna to study with Freud disgusted with academics.166 In 
Tansley's presentation of Clements' concepts of succession, 
development, quasi-organism, complex organism and climax he 
emphasized the physical character of these processes and 
their relationship within a system.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., 9.
166 Ibid., 10 and 208 n 2. Tansley was characterized as a Bolshevik 
owing to the cooperative nature of interrelationships in much of his 
thought.
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Though Clements was characteristic of the rationalist 
side of ecological thought and followed Haeckel's opposition 
to spiritual interpretations of holism, his conceptual and 
theoretical leanings did not display the practical rigor that 
Tansley sought in trying to make ecology a respectable 
science. Clements grew out of the observational tradition of 
botany in which the researcher rode along in the country side 
compiling lists of the observed plant and animal species 
producing Linnaean taxonomies.167 Clements' concepts of 
complex organisms forming climax communities were not 
researchable given current methods. It thus amounted to an 
idealist concept of mere speculation for Tansley. It was in 
an effort to add conceptual rigor to ecological analysis that 
Tansley expanded the concept of system in the ecologist's 
lexicon.
Concepts of systems appear in scientific thought 
stretching as far back as Heraclitus and his notions of 
universal ebb and flow in the sixth century B.C.168 In 
general terms a system in the twentieth century was 
understood from physics as an ensemble of intersecting parts 
that produce the processes or behavior of the whole unite. In 
reviewing Clements' book Research Methods in Ecology (1905) 
Tansley noted the need for an invigorated conception of 
systems. In 1935 Tansley coined the term ecosystem.169
167 Ibid., 17.
168 Ibid., 33. See also Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General systems
Theory; Foundations. Development. Application revised edition, (New 
York, George Braziller, 1968, fourth printing 1973), 160.
169 Golly, Ecosystem. 8.
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Tansley's ecosystems brought ecology closer to the 
quantitative rigor he had sought by linking it to the 
physical sciences, primarily through the concepts of system 
and equilibrium. Tansley emphasized that the idea of a 
biome's (a term invented by Clements referring to a component 
of an ecological community) interaction with the environment 
to form an ecosystem allowed for a wider use of matter 
cycling and energy theory in ecology.170 The study of 
ecosystems, for Tansley, was the study of physical, chemical 
and biological components in an equilibrial system. Tansley's 
concept of dynamic equilibrial ecosystems were composed of 
four basic elements: first; ecosystems closest to equilibrium 
are most likely to survive. Second; ecosystem equilibrium 
develops slowly as ecosystems become more and more 
integrated. Clements' climax community represented the 
closest state of perfect dynamic equilibrium that an 
ecosystem may approach. Third; since an ecosystems 
equilibrium was measured by its stability its equilibrium can 
never be absolutely perfect. Fourth; Tansley noted that 
though the components of ecosystems may themselves undergo 
constant change the scientific method could isolate the 
specific physical processes of the components involved in any 
particular change.171
The concepts of organism, equilibrium and the 
interrelationship between structure and function were 
developing along various lines in virtually every discipline.
170 Ibid., 24.
171 Ibid., 16.
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By the 1920s the various formulations began to coalesce into 
a widely accepted concept of the equilibrial system. Lawrence 
J. Henderson probably had the greatest impact on the 
development and spread of the concept of equilibrial system, 
especially in the social s c i e n c e s .  172 Henderson's professional 
life was devoted almost entirely to the study of the 
organization of organisms and later to the organization of 
society. Henderson taught at Harvard from 1905 until his 
death in 1942. Initially his interests focused on biology, 
specifically the new field of biological chemistry, but also 
physiology. By the mid twenties Henderson began to pursue 
interests in philosophy and sociology through the concepts of 
self regulating equilibrial systems.
Henderson was introduced to the concept of equilibrium 
in physical chemistry while an undergraduate at Harvard. He 
received an MD from Harvard Medical School in 1902 after 
which he Studied at Strassburg under Franz Hofmeister, a 
pioneer of the application of physical chemistry to 
biological chemistry.173 From his earliest studies Henderson 
focused on the interaction of heterogeneous elements within 
biological organisms especially their modes of self­
regulation. Regulation for Henderson, as for all scientists 
of the time, was a regulation of equilibrium, or neutrality
172 Cynthia Eagle Russett, The concept of Equilibrium In American 
Social Thought (New Haven, Yale university Press, 1966), 141-2.
173 John Parascandola "Organismic and Holistic Concepts in the thought 
of L.J. Henderson" Journal of history of Biology 4 (1971): 67.
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as he sometimes called it.i7̂  His studies of self-regulating 
organic mechanisms, however, lead him to conclude that 
evolution and natural selection alone were not enough to 
explain self-regulating organism. The parameters within which 
this process occurs must be considered. Henderson concluded 
that the environment within which an organism resides must 
also be suited for life. Equilibrium had to be considered in 
terms of the system within its supportive environment.
Henderson considered himself a scientist. He was drawn 
to materialist explanations but recognized that living 
organisms could not be described in purely mechanical terms, 
at least not in the mechanics of Newton. The developments 
occurring in physical theory, however, especially statistical 
mechanics, proffered rigorous explanations and quantitative 
techniques that did not necessarily require the a priori 
elimination of what was peculiar to the subject of biology. 
Henderson had begun to wonder if the focus of evolutionary 
theory on the selection of the individual organism was unduly 
narrow. By 1912 he had come upon the realization that the 
individual organism and its environment were intimately 
interconnected forming a complimentary relational process.
His research into this question led to his first book The
174 See for example L. J. Henderson and 0. F. Black, "A study of the 
equilibrium between Carbonic Acid, Sodium Bicarbonate, Monosodium 
Phosphate, and Di-Sodium Phosphate at body temperature," American 
Journal of Physiology 21 (1908), 420-426. And L. J. Henderson, "The 
Theory of Neutrality Regulation in the Animal Organism" in the same 
issue.
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Fitness of the Environment (1912) which set the tone for the
rest of his career:
Life as we know it is a physico-chemical mechanism, 
and it is probably inconceivable that it should be 
otherwise. As such, it possesses, and, we may well 
conclude, must ever possess, a high degree of 
complexity,-physically, chemically, and 
physiologically; that is to say, structurally and 
functionally... Next, living things, still more the 
community of living things, are durable, but 
complexity and durability of mechanism are only 
possible in internal and external conditions are 
stable. Hence automatic regulations of the 
environment and the possibility of regulations of 
conditions of within the organism are essential tolife. 175
Cosmic and biological evolution must somehow be linked 
in an integrated orderly process. 176 For Henderson this meant 
that the existence of a teleological principle inherent in 
matter and energy, organizing the universe in space and time, 
surely could not be simply the result of chance.177 Henderson 
was acutely aware that this view might lead to the charge of 
vitalism. He stressed that by teleological he did not mean 
purpose or design but rather an evolutionary "harmonious 
unity."178 There was simply no other word to describe the kind 
of adaption he was proposing. In Fitness he had blasted the 
philosophies of Bergson and Driesch, contemporaries who did 
not attempt to explain life in materialistic or utilitarian
175 Henderson Fitness pg 31.
176 Ibid., 278-9.
177 Ibid., 308.
178 Henderson "The Order of Nature: an essay," (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1917), 204-206. Quoted in Parascandola, Orqanismic and 
Holistic Concepts. 76.
123
terms, terms that turn of the century life sciences demanded. 
Yet they were more alike than not owing to the history and 
fundamental holism of the organism concept.
Shortly after the publication of Fitness Henderson 
realized that the statistical mechanics of Gibbs could 
improve his case, not only concerning the integral 
relationship between organism and environment but also the 
improving the rationality and scientific character of an 
organismic argument. Henderson explicitly adopted Gibbs' 
concept of the physio-chemical system noting that Gibbs had 
established scientifically that the world of physical 
chemistry is made up of equilibrial systems.179 Furthermore, 
Gibbs asserted that there was a link between the equilibrium 
of systems and their change over time, their evolution.
The fundamental concept in Gibbs' systemics was that of 
equilibrium. All systems, according to Gibbs and many other 
physicists at the turn of the century, tended towards dynamic 
equilibrium. Equilibrium was a process characteristic of all 
natural phenomena, a law which could be precisely defined and 
in many cases measured. Gibbs emphasized the value of 
calculating the equilibrium quantities from the probability 
distribution method Maxwell and Boltzmann had derived from 
Gauss' original theory of errors.180 For Gibbs, and later 
Henderson, a variation in the phase space of a system 
represented a change in the distribution, or organization of
179 Parascandola, "Organismic and Holistic Concepts," 75.
180 Sklar, Physics and Chance. 48 and 60.
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system components.181 The re-equilibriation (or dissipation) 
of a system to its new environment depended upon many factors 
of change such as temporal, energetic, spatial and the 
material involved.
Henderson believed that the tendency of systems towards 
equilibrium, in the cas6 of living systems, betrayed 
teleological implications. And teleology in turn raised 
questions of origins. He granted that mechanism could not 
account for everything, namely the origins implied by the 
teleological nature of self-regulating equilibrial systems 
but at this point "thought had arrived at one of its natural 
frontiers."182 Organization, on the other hand, was well 
within the bounds of rational thought. The equilibrial 
processes of systems that betrayed some form of teleology did 
so because of the undeniable organization of elements and 
processes that made life possible.188
Henderson, however, did not simply equate organization 
with mechanism. Organization made the very physiol-chemical 
phenomena of life possible. Organization was a concept of 
structural functional relationships between organism and 
ehvironme.nt. The physical elements of a system were 
mechanical while the relationship between them was non­
mechanical. It was the properties of relationships between 
elements that made evolution of the system possible. Dynamic
m  ibid., 58.
182 Parascandola, "Organismic and Holistic Concepts," 78.
183 Henderson was one of the first scientists to insist that modern 
medicine must focus on the whole individual and urged physicians to 
return to a Hippocratic understanding of the patient as a human being 
together with the doctor within a social system. Ibid.
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equilibrium and the organization required for life became 
intimately linked concepts. For if organization was the 
foundation upon which evolution and life depended and 
equilibrium was the form of organization found in nature, 
both physical and biological, the logical conclusion was the 
necessity of equilibrium for life processes. Dynamic 
equilibrium was essential to life and all life acts to 
preserve its delicate equilibrium through some manner of 
regulatory processes. And it was this process which warded 
off entropy.184 How life escaped the second law of 
thermodynamics, Henderson thought, need not be conceived in 
mystical terms. Henderson had come to view the tendency 
towards dynamic equilibrium as a basic fact of nature and the 
law of adaptation of organisms as an established a fact of 
nature.185
By the early 1920s Henderson had begun to take an 
interest in social matters. But until the late 1920s he was 
skeptical that the social sciences could approach its subject 
matter in a scientific manner. His views changed after 
reading Vilfredo Pareto's Trattato di Socioloaia General 
(1916). Pareto's work changed Henderson's view that the 
social sciences could indeed become scientific. For Henderson 
Pareto's concept of the social system so closely mirrored his 
own conception of organic systems that he would latter write 
"equilibrium of a social system is similar to that of a
184 The survival of a single organism was, for Henderson, almost 
infinity improbable. And the continued survival of the flora and fauna 
of the earth was an unacountable miracle, ibid., 101.
185 Ibid., 100.
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living o r g a n i s m . "186 This was primarily due to Pareto's 
application of the equilibrium concept to social problems. In 
a later work Pareto's General Sociology: A Physiologist's 
Interpretation (1935) Henderson utilized a discussion of 
Gibbsian physio-chemical systems as an explanatory device to 
describe Pareto's concept of the equilibrial social system. 
Much of Henderson's latter work was almost entirely focused 
on the social sciences. He became closely involved with the 
Harvard Business school and eventually took an office there. 
Among his students and attendees at a series of lectures on 
"Concrete Sociology: A study of Cases" were George C. Homens 
and Talcot Parsons.
Henderson provided a device that added new scientific
rigor to the central organizing concept of functionalism in
the social sciences. Functional explanations up to this point
had difficulty fully jettisoning evolutionist causality. The
social norm - the point of reference by which social
scientists observed, compared and judged social functioning -
increasingly appeared to rely upon vague and suspicious
notions of survival or maintenance of an essential social
quality. The concept of equilibrium popularized by Henderson
proved a perfect match for the functional theories that had
been developing since Boas. With equilibrium an image of
structural stability between these interrelationships began
to emerge which could account for change without deploying
the unscientific idea of an essential or necessary
186 L. J. Henderson, "Blood and Circulation from the Standpoint of 
Physical Chemistry," in H. H. Dale, J. C. Drummond, L. J. Henderson, and 
A. v. Hill, Lectures on Certain Aspects of biochemistry (London, 
University of London Press, 1926), 201-204. Quoted in Parascondola, 
"Organismic and Holistic Concepts," 104.
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predetermined end state or a vital force compelling progress. 
This is because equilibrium held within it a conception of 
the normal as a field rather than the normal as point. An 
essential vital core grounding the judgment of social 
function gave way to the normal itself as a functional 
element. The normal in fact became the equilibrial. George 
Homens captured the marriage of these disciplinary concepts 
when he pointed out that "the idea of Survival or continuity 
can be made rigorous only if survival is redefined as 
equilibrium. "187
There were, of course, dissenters on the question of 
equilibrium in the social sciences, including Harvard 
sociologist Pitrim Sorokin. Their criticisms centered on the 
problem of quantifiability of social phenomenon. Sorokin 
preferred the term homeostasis introduced by the physiologist 
and Harvard colleague Walter Cannon. Cannon, like Sorokin in 
the case of the social sciences, had misgivings about 
directly importing into biology a Concept from physics and 
statistical mechanics. By the 1930s the anxiety of being 
identified with vitalism had passed but the distinction 
between nature and culture had intensified. Sorokin agreed 
that "a social system, when disturbed, tends to preserve its 
integrity." But he questioned whether a concept that required 
mathematical precision would be confusing or misleading in 
the messy world of social phenomena studied by the human
187 George C. Homens, The Human Group (New York, 1950), 307. Quoted in 
Russeett, Equilibrium. 141.
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sciences.188 Cannon's formulation of homeostasis, however, 
allowed the social sciences to import the logic of 
equilibrium without the quantification.
Cannon's area of interest was the autonomic nervous 
system. Together with the Mexican physiologist Arturo 
Rosenblueth Cannon developed the realm of the nervous system 
as an object that resided in between mechanistic and 
probabilistic explanations. Homeostasis might be called a 
soft version of equilibrium. The hard version from the 
physical sciences propounded by Henderson emphasized 
experimental testability and quantitative measurement of 
closed systems. It was simply understood that "every 
institution, political or otherwise, must necessarily work 
out an equilibrium, if it is to survive."188 in studying this 
"working out," quantification was desirable where possible 
but need not limit the application of explanatory devices by 
the social scientist.
Despite common sentiments such as Sorokin's against the 
quantification of social phenomena there emerged an 
explicitly quantitative approach to social phenomena known as 
sociometry. The focus was primarily upon small groups linked 
to the emerging disciplines of group psychology and 
industrial psychology. Sociometry, however, encompassed a 
more general ambition than the disciplines growing out of the 
reformed scientific management that followed Taylorism. The
188 Pitrim Sorokin, "Le concept d'equilibre est-il necessaire aux 
sciences sociales?," Revue Internationale de Sodioloqie 44 (1936), 521. 
Quoted in Russett, Equilibrium. 134.
189 Eliot D.Chappie and Carlton S. Coon, Principles of Anthropology 
(New York, 1942), 361. Quoted in Russett, Equilibrium. 143.
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concerns were the same but the scope was far more grandiose. 
"Sociometry is an axis with two poles. The arm toward one 
pole is directed toward the discovery of the deeper levels of 
society's structure. The other is directed toward promoting 
change of society based upon the dynamic facts found in its 
structure."190
The basic techniques of sociometry originated in German 
psychology in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These 
techniques were introduced in the U.S by Jacob Moreno in his 
Application of the Group Method to Classification published 
by the National Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor in 
1932. In 1934 Moreno published Who Shall Survive? broadening 
the appeal of sociometric methods to the social sciences 
generally.i9i In anthropology sociometric techniques were 
seen as the realization of Malinowski's" method of cultural 
analysis."i92 Sociometry provided quantitative techniques 
which meshed perfectly with the general principles of
190 J. L. Moreno, "Three Dimensions of Society" (1949); quoted in J. 
Nehenevajsa, "sociometry: Decades of Growth," in Sociometry Reader. J.
L. Moreno and others eds. (Illinois: The free Press, 1960), 707.
191 This text dealt with the question Of natural selection in the 
social realm, it tries to identify the means to discover the social 
laws, if not the laws themselves, governing social evolution and 
survival. "Who shall survive? The question could be asked only in a 
society Which is, as sociometry has proven with overwhelming evidence, 
satisfied with wasting a very considerable part of its human element. In 
contrast, in would lose meaning in a sociometric society where no one 
would be cast out and all be given an opportunity to participate to the 
best of their abilities, in other words, to survive." J.L. Moreno, 
"Social and Organic unity of Mankind," Sociometry Reader, pg 6.
192 Donna Haraway, "Signs of Dominance: From Physiology to a 
Cybernetics of Primate Society, C. R. Carpenter, 1930-1970," Studies in 
history of Biology William Colman and Camille Limoges eds. (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 164.
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structural functionalism. The journal Sociometric Review 
appeared in 1936 followed by Sociometry in 1937.
According to Moreno sociometry represented the furthest 
development of "measurement in the social sciences" with 
"influence beyond its pales, upon all branches of social 
sciences, anthropology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry 
etc."193 The basic focus of sociometry was the comprehension 
and measurement of the socius. This was accomplished through 
the measurement of the social system "down to its social 
atoms."194 The social atom was understood as the nucleus of 
social relations, the smallest social structure in a 
community. "One part of the structure is interdependent with 
another part; a change in position of one individual may 
affect the whole structure."195
Analysis of the geometry of social relations, relations 
through space over time, would reveal the goal or tele around 
which a group was organized. This goal of the group was 
called the group criterion. Once the group criterion was 
identified therapeutic procedures could be implemented to aid 
in better more efficient organization towards the goal. 
Sociometrists fully recognized that interrelationships in 
human society were somewhat obscured by depth-producing 
factors such as language and self-consciousness. These 
factors, however, were not seen as problematic for
193 Moreno, Sociometry Reader, vi.
194 Ibid., 5.
195 Ibid., 20.
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sociometric theory and practice per se other than to make the 
problem of observer interference more difficult.
Though sociometry did not specifically focus on the 
principle of equilibrium its methods were easily adapted to 
such concerns. "Imbalance" between group criterion and the 
structure of social relations easily translated into a 
problem of the "proper equilibrium" of social dynamics from 
which therapeutic procedures to alleviate diseqiulibrial 
social pathologies could be drawn up. The principle of 
equilibrium, whether in its quantitative or heuristic form, 
soon became an essential element of the social object, an 
essential a-priori for any rational discussion of social 
phenomena. This shift in the epistemological nature of the 
object of government had immense practical import. Elton Mayo 
in his well known book The Human Problem of an Industrial 
Civilization notes that workers can function effectively only 
when their relationship with their surroundings is maintained 
in a state of equilibrium: "physiologists have found that 
work can continue to be performed only in a steady state.
The Refinement of Equilibrium
By the mid 1930s the analytical and heuristic principles 
of equilibrium and homeostasis were considerably refined. 
Physical and social scientists understood that a steady state 
must obtain for effective work, whether in a gas, a cell,
196 Elton Mayo, The Human Problem of an Industrial Civilization 
(Cambridge, 1933), 28. Quoted in Russett, Equilibrium. 143.
individual or society. How this equilibrium was enforced 
remained unclear. In scientific management theory after the 
reform of Taylorism the individual ceased to be a machine 
requiring fine tuning and adjustment and became a decision 
maker. Affective authority became an interpersonal process 
rather than a possession. "The individual [became] seen to be 
free to decide for or against acceptance of norms, 
instructions and standards; at the very least they [norms 
were] no longer viewed as unproblematically internalized."197 
The individual as an organizational subject capable of choice 
rendered authority as the source of equilibrial stability 
within the organization very problematic. Authority no longer 
compelled social change. It came to be understood that in the 
firm "decision is in its important aspects a social 
process... [T]he process of decision in individuals is a 
psychological process socially conditioned."198 The new 
problem for the manager of a large organization was the 
alignment of collective goals with those of the individual in 
a way that integrated the individual as decision maker with 
the imperatives of the organization. How such direction and 
management of a collective were to proceed posed a new 
challenge to management theorists. What precisely was an 
organization? How was it related to authority and what form
197 Peter Miller and Ted O'Leary "Accounting and the Construction of 
the Governable Person," Accounting Organizations and Society 12, no. 3, 
(1987); 259.
198 C. Bernard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1938). Quoted in Miller and O'Leary, Accounting. 260.
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must authority take in light of the emerging principles of 
organization?
The introduction of a reformulated equilibrium into the
social sciences spread from Harvard and Chicago into the
wider community of social scientists emerging from premise
"into a carefully defined analytical description."199 The
eventual effect was the convergence of central questions in
both the social and life sciences: explaining the principles,
if not the mechanisms, by which organization and the
direction of collective goals produce and maintain the social
and biological organization of a system. In the social and
life sciences the emergence of organization as an important
concept was accompanied by a reformulation of the old
discourse of authority into a new one of dominance. Processes
were no longer directed but induced.
The physiologist Charles Manning Child pointed out that
[OJnly the simplest sort of integration is possible 
without definite and more or less persistent 
dominance, that is leadership... [Apparently all 
that is necessary for the beginning of orderly 
integration in protoplasm is a quantitative 
difference in the rate of living and the 
possibility of communication. Dominance or 
leadership in its most general physiological form 
apparently originates in the more rapid liberation 
of energy.200
199 Russett, Equilibrium. 125.
200 C. M. Child, "Biological foundations of social Integration," 
Publication of the American Sociological Society 221 (1928): 32. Quoted 
in Haraway, "Signs," 144.
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Organization without dominance and hierarchy would, by 
definition according to Manning, remain simple, characterized 
by the organization of simple "communistic" zooids.201
Higher levels of organization required specialization of 
function and differentiation of parts into a hierarchy and 
division of labor. The sociologist George Lundberg was quite 
clear that the mechanisms of integration and maintenance of 
organization and dominance were not merely a fundamental 
characteristic of social systems. They were also the goal of 
social science. "[If] we follow this [scientific] method as 
faithfully in the social sciences as we have followed it in 
physics it may yield us a corresponding reward in our power 
of control."202 Lundberg's sociological theory often utilized 
analogies from physics. Human behavior, according to 
Lundberg, resembled energy functions understood as the 
"amounts of change in relationships."203
Decline of Equilibrium
Some critics felt that the concept of equilibrium 
applied to the social sciences amounted to nothing more than 
ideology, criticisms which persist today. There were internal 
logical problems with the principle of equilibrium as well
201 ibid., 144.
202 George Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology (New York: 1939), vii. 
Quoted in Russett, Equilibrium. 125-126.
203 Ibid., 127.
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however. During the same period that Henderson was adopting 
Gibb's formulations of equilibrial systems to move biological 
theory away from vitalist cosmology, Gibbs equilibrium was 
coming under intense scrutiny within physics.
In 1912 P. and T. Ehrenfest published a critical review 
of statistical mechanics in the Encyclopedia of Mathematical 
Science titled "The Conceptual Foundation of Statistical 
Mechanics." The general argument of the piece was that the 
development of Gibbsian equilibrial statistical mechanics was 
too general and focused only on special c a s e s . 204 The 
Ehrenfests offered successive expositions and critiques of 
Gibb's approach to both the theory of equilibrium and the 
theory of the irreversible approach to equilibrium and also 
illustrated Gibb's association of statistical mechanical 
quantities with thermodynamic quantities by means of 
"thermodynamic analogies." This amounted to the reliance on a 
large number of "loosely formulated and perhaps even 
inconsistent statements occupy[ing] a central position" 
within his f o r m u l a t i o n s .205 in the case of poly-atomic
molecules, for example, the equilibrium theory gave wrong
results and in the case of radiation patently absurd results. 
For the Ehrenfests and many others these failures in 
predictive reliability potentially cast doubt upon the entire 
theory.
Max Planck's turn of the century research into radiation 
and the absurd results of kinetic equilibrial statistical
204 Sklar, Physics and Chance. 59-76.
205 Ibid., 70.
mechanic predictions of this phenomena was one of the origins 
of quantum mechanics. The development of quantum mechanics 
saved the general concept of equilibrium but totally 
reformulated statistical mechanics.205 In the physical 
sciences at the turn of the century, and especially after the 
1916 publication of Einstein's "The Foundation of of the 
General Theory of Relativity," the underlying dynamic 
behavior of systems and their components began to be 
understood by scientists as fully contingent in nature. The 
laws of quantum mechanics governed nature, at least at the 
micro-level.20? The deterministic laws of classical mechanics 
have since served merely as convenient approximations. At the 
practical level, however, it was not the theoretical problems 
of equilibrium and point mechanics, even in its Gibbsian 
probabalistic-statistical variant, that lead to these 
concepts fading utility. It was the development of much more 
effective social and material technologies that began to 
emerge in the late 1930s.
The discipline of primatology illustrates this well. 
Primatology's object sits comfortably between the life and 
human sciences.208 It was not a matter of naturalization of 
culture or socialization of nature. Rather dominance, 
hierarchy and the division of labor had become fundamental
206 Ibid., 72.
207 Ibid.
208 A focus cm primatology "has the double advantage of highlighting 
the question of the human being's place in nature and the complex 
relations of natural and social sciences." Haraway, "Signs," 135.
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principles of complex systems in both the social and natural 
sciences.
Primate studies developed within the ecological paradigm 
of the physiological c o m m u n i t y . 209 unlike the social 
sciences/ however, primatology developed as an explicitly 
quantitative experimental scientific discipline. There was 
never any dissension over the applicability of such methods 
because primatology's object was understood to be 
unproblematically natural. Yet the questions primatology 
asked were often directed at social questions - the 
mechanisms involved in the maintenance and reproduction of 
complex social structures for example. Thus, primatology 
often asked the same questions as the social sciences. Most 
important, in practical terms, was that primatology offered 
an arena in which social dominance patterns could be studied 
using experimental methods unavailable to the social 
scientist. Methods such as the physiological defect 
experiment in which the dominant male of a primate troop is 
altered or removed and the effects upon troop behavior 
monitored. By the mid 1930s the concepts of organism as a 
community and equilibrial system and that of the relationship 
between function and structure as well as the application of 
quantitative procedures to analyze such complex social 
organization and integration all came together in the 
elaboration of hierarchy and dominance as the primary and 
necessary mechanisms of equilibrial organization.
The functioning and operation of the objects of the life 
and human sciences had become very nearly unified
209 Haraway, "Signs," 143.
138
epistemologicaly by the end of the 1930s. This unification 
was marked at a symposium held in September 1942 as part of 
the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding 
of the University of Chicago. The published volume from this 
symposium was titled "Levels of Integration in Biological and 
Social Science."
The epistemological unification of the social and 
biological objects of study lead not to the discovery of the 
mechanisms of structural equilibrium. Instead the the concept 
of equilibrium receded in importance, surpassed by the 
principles of dominance and hierarchy. Stable systems become 
less a matter of structural equilibrium and more a matter of 
structural control- With the decline of the principle of 
equilibrium the norm receded even further. Equilibrium formed 
a kind of stop-gap measure - it was not quite essentialist in 
point mechanical terms. But it functioned in a pseudo- 
determinist fashion to maintain structural integrity.
The investigations into the workings of systems 
according to the rationality of functionalism gave rise to 
the focus of attention on system structure. The norm having 
slid into disfavor as an explanatory device lead to the 
adoption of the principle of equilibrium as the mechanisms 
maintaining structural integrity. Though the concepts 
themselves had existed for centuries the emergence of 
structure and equilibrium together as an explanatory 
principle for the new rational object of interrelational 
process is surely no accident. The efforts to discover the 
mechanisms of equilibrium - the precise process of structural
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integretiy maintainance - lead to the overturning of this 
principle rather than the discovery of its operation.
Equilibrium and structure ramain important explanatory 
principles. But they are no longer central. The search for 
the mechanisms that control complex processes by the late 
1930s began to look elsewhere. The replacement of the normal 
and equilibrial as rational conception of the object of 
government coencided with the mobilization for World War II. 
The war effert had an immense impact on the continuing 
development of the epistemological aspect of the object of 
government. One aspect of the war effort was particularly 
relevent for this developement - operations research. It is 
with operations research that control as a principle for 
understanding complex processe. At the same time and linked 
to this new epistemology of the object of government control 
emerges as a technology for managing these processes.
Chapter 5: 
The Emergence of Control; 
Operations Research and a New Object of 
Government
The scale of the war effort dramatically increased the 
intellectual cross-fertilization and synergy within the 
social and natural sciences. Indeed, all disciplines worked 
together in one form or another. The combination of huge 
scale and unprecedented cross-disciplinary cooperation had an 
immense transformative effect on the very basis of rational 
thought. This cross-fertilization gave rise to new 
technologies to be deployed upon the new biosocial object of 
government. One of the most important aspects of the war 
effort for our story is that of operations research. 
Operations research was the largest effort ever undertaken to 
bring together every imaginable academic discipline with the 
single-minded goal of producing useful techniques and 
strategies to win the war. "The war effort brought about the 
most radical disciplinary mixing, administrative 
centralization and social reorganization of science and 
engineering ever attempted in the United States."210 
Operations research and the war effert altered forever the 
rational understanding of complex processes and their 
mechanisms of stability and change.
Control represents a drasticly different form of 
knowledge from that of the norm. For control is entirely 
contingent upon the arrangements of relationships within a
210 Edwards, The Closed World. 47.
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system. Control does not operate upon an object but a 
process. It has no identity per se nor does its target. 
Control is fluid. It has no basis in essentialist 
epistemology. After World War II the norm, and its shortlived 
surrogate - equilibrium - were fuly replaced by an 
epistemology of control. Control, like the norm before it, 
requires knowledge to operate. And its exercise also produces 
knowledge. The epistemological transformation from societies 
constituted by the norm to societies constituted by control 
can be seen rather clearly as the following discussion will 
illustrate. It is also clear that control is an activity of 
government just as producing and acting upon the norm had 
been. I shall speculate only briefly about what form 
governmental activity might take vis-a-vis the new societies 
of control. I will restrict myself to illustrating the 
epistemological shift leading to the governing principle of 
contrpl in the hopes that this will lay the groundwork for 
future analysis into governmental practices carried out upon 
an object concieved in terms of control.
The story of operations research is the story of modern 
systems theory and the introduction of contingency, in the 
form of cybernetics and information, into the biological and 
social sciences. It is the story of the replacement of a neo- 
essentialist or proto-probabalistic structural/functionalism
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with a fully probabilistic and fully contingent 
structural/functional ism.211
Operations research remains a specific field of study 
with its own focus. It refers to specific methodologies born 
of the war effort. The methods and techniques which emerged 
during its formation in the theoretical and practical ferment 
of the war effort were, however, much more general in scope 
and effected every discipline at the epistemological level. 
The very perception of reality and thus political rationality 
was greatly effected as well. Machines and their operators 
were reconceived as part of a single system. From the 
beginning, operations research endeavored to incorporate the 
machine operator as seamlessly as possible into the 
development and functioning of the machines "themselves." The 
range of operating conditions and error rates for both 
machine and operator were calculated together by the same 
statistical methods and techniques. The operator became part
211 Haraway calls this "cybernetic functionalism." Haraway, "Signs." 
It should be noted that this contingency is not relativity in the sense 
that any thing goes. Contingency in this context means that everything 
is connected, structure effects function but function also effects 
structure and so on. Moreover this contingent process of transformation 
is not understood to be a linear process simply looped back on itself 
constituting merely a slight revision of deterministic causal analysis. 
Contingency refers to the range of possible choices and thus possible 
effects of function upon structure meaning probabilities are linked 
corolationally rather than causally to other probable effects. Or, to 
put it another way, in the modern conception of the cybernetic system, 
"causes cause causes to cause causes." according to Anthony Wilden. 
without linear relationships causal determinist concepts loose their 
force. Thus the contingency of modern rational epistemology does not 
mean causes disappear allowing for anything goes, as the modernists 
accuse the post-modernists of implying, but when causes point to an 
infinite number of possible effects or other causes, which is what 
happens with the dissolution of linearity, causal reasoning loses its 
objectivity and becomes subjective. See Anthony Wilden, System and 
Structure; Essays in Communication and Exchange 2nd ed. (London: 
Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1972, 1980), 39.
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of the machine while the machine became part of the operator. 
Together they formed a new and larger goal oriented system.
It was not a case of reduction of one to the other or a 
simple prosthetic addition to an inefficient organic system.
It was the construction of a wholly new object.212
The homeostatic goal oriented system ceased to be a 
solely natural or given process whose proper functioning and 
very naturalness was marked by its normal or equilibrial 
behavior. The function or goal of such a system became an 
engineering problem resulting in what is today known as 
control theory. When the normal and the equilibrial became 
the result of engineering decisions it lost its givenness, 
its inherentness. Not because it was no longer natural but 
because nature no longer appeared given. Nature too became an 
engineering decision. The last vestige of nineteenth century 
vitalism was swept away. Not by rational denial but by 
rational acceptance of holism as an object of the 
communications engineer. "The ability to study goal- 
direction, function, and signification entirely without 
necessary reference to living systems has removed a gnawing
212 This is the origin of what Donna Haraway calls the modern cyborg. 
This joining is not quite the same as the traditional view of 
technological extension of human capabilities characteristic of tools 
and technology. The difficulty of the distinction between prosthesis and 
self , however, is very old. In book 18 of Homer's Iliad Thetis, mother 
of Achilles, requests a shield of Hephaestus for her son. The scene of 
Hephaestus' workshop suggests that for the prosthetic devices to work, 
whether those for his own frail legs or for Achilles' shield, they must 
be imbued with, or inhabited by wearer. They must become part of the 
person, not merely an addition. See Elaine Scarry "The Merging of Bodies 
and Artifacts in the Social Contract" Culture on the Brink: Ideologies 
of Technology Gretchen Bender and Timothy Druckery, eds. (Seattle: Bay 
Press, 1994).
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irrationality from the heart of organicist biology."213 
Operations research represented the formation of a new 
rationality of government. It signals the end of disciplinary 
government centered on the identification and production of 
the norm and the birth of government by control through 
modulation and the identification of system structures and 
production of knowledge about how to alter succesive 
sequences of system states. Equilibrium was the last 
manifestation of the norm and the last rational knowledge of 
disciplinary political rationality.
During the 1930s Vannevar Bush, an electrical engineer 
at MIT, worked on the new problems involving large electric 
power networks. To aid in this work he had invented an 
electric powered mechanical device he called a differential 
analyzer. It was designed to calculate differential equations 
related to switching and transmission capacities. Immediately 
after it was shown to work in 1935 the Ballistics Research 
Laboratory (BRL) at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground 
ordered one. Another differential analyzer was ordered by the 
University of Pennsylvania's Moore School of Engineering. The 
construction of both of these machines was personally 
supervised by Bush.214
During World War II Bush was in charge of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). The OSRD was a
213 Haraway, "Signs," 180.
214 After 1935 such "computers" worked alongside mechanical 
counterparts and were eventually completely replaced by them in both 
name and purpose. The Moore School and the BRL later collaborated to 
produce the ENIAC during World war II, the first full-scale electronic 
computer.
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huge and unparalleled effort of over 6,000 scientists and 
engineers which produced both material and logistic 
technologies for the war department. Technologies such as 
computer controlled anti-aircraft guns, radar, the industrial 
production of penicillin and antimalarial drugs as well as 
methods of resource allocation, antisubmarine warfare and 
material transport operations. 215 These successes were the 
result of an unprecedented level of interdisciplinary 
collaboration. MIT's Radiation Laboratory, for example, 
employed about 4,000 people from 69 different institutions.
In 1945 the OSRD budget exceeded $100 million compared to the 
prewar total for Military research and development had been 
$23 million. This was the birth of what Eisenhower later 
called the military-industrial complex.
During World War I mathematicians such as Norbert Weiner 
worked on ballistics tables at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. 
Their job was to calculate the ranges of various combinations 
of projectile materials and charges for the Army's various 
artillery pieces. Wiener and the other mathematicians were 
called "computers." In the 1930s, when computers were still 
wholly biological, Wiener closely followed the work of Cannon 
and Rosenblueth on autonomic nervous systems.216 For Wiener 
the organicism of Cannon's homeostatic self regulating 
nervous system was more than metaphysically linked to the 
purely mechanical and mathematically precise servomechanisms
215 Haraway "Signs," 179. And Paul Edwards The Closed World; Computers 
and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 1996), 115.
216 Haraway, "Signs," 179.
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being produced for a wide variety of industrial processes. 
They were variations of the same processes.
At the beginning of World War II Wiener once again 
applied his immense mathematical skills to the problem of 
weapons targeting. This time, however, Wiener included the 
human element into his calculations: artillery, projectile, 
target and fire crew. Wiener contacted Bush, his old 
colleague at MIT now with the OSRD, about the relevance of 
his prewar computation research work both for Bush's 
difference analyzer as well as, and more importantly, for 
operations research and the war in general. Bush referred the 
matter to Warren Weaver of the Fire Control Section of OSRD. 
Weaver put Wiener to work on the problem of gunnery control.
The physiologist Rosenblueth accompanied Wiener to Fire 
Control and together they tackled the problem of gun control 
in terms of the human operator together and complex weapons 
as part of a single unified system. Initially their task was 
the improvement of anti-aircraft weapons. Wiener started with 
the idea of building machines that would approximate the 
behavior of human gunners but without the "breakdowns" or 
"wild oscillations" humans experienced when faced with 
bringing down modern aircraft.217 in short, the human 
component of a whole system performed efficiently up to point 
but after a certain threshold of sensory input had been 
reached their efficiency dropped considerably and the system 
as a whole failed. The problem was a traditional engineering 
one; the refinement of system capabilities beyond their 
current range.
217 Haraway, "Signs," 180.
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Human and machine capabilities, like any other form of 
behavior from an engineering point of view, was understood in 
terms of statistics. Performance was plotted on a curve which 
revealed, among other things, the range of efficient 
behavior, the boundaries of useful performance which could be 
expected for that environment. Optimal performance as it was 
traditionally understood was linked to equilibrial system 
behavior. The problem for the engineer was to maintain 
equilibrium within an environment, but in this case the 
environment presented radically changing conditions.
Wiener and Rosenblueth sought to discover precisely how 
the "mechanism" of homeostasis operated in order to enhance 
this operation and expand the boundaries of efficient 
organismic behavior. The "mechanism" turned out to be very 
unmechanistic however. And it was this discovery that quickly 
displaced equilibrium as a fundamental explanatory principle. 
The mechanism and new explanatory principle they discovered 
was feedback. The initial model was the early steam engine 
governor and the later more complex servomechanisms derived 
from that governor. The product of these mechanisms, their 
output - the mechanical or electrical substance which caused 
the change when reintroduced back into the larger machine to 
which they were attached - came to be called feedback. Though 
it was mathematically implied in the equations behind their 
design, the feedback produced by these devices was not 
initially considered a substance of which measurements could 
be obtained. There was not anything between the machine and 
its governor to be measured.
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By the late 1930s the space between the machines had 
become something more than empty space. Early researchers 
such as Cannon, Rosenblueth and Weiner had come to view 
feedback as the key to understanding the processes of 
equilibrial self regulation in both machines and biological 
organisms. Feedback was more than an instantaneous effect or 
automatic response characteristic of classical mechanical 
reactions. Feedback was intimately linked to system 
maintenance, survival and even expansion. It verged on the 
teleological or goal directedness because it was so closely 
related to the continuation of systemic processes. Knowledge 
of feedback implied the ability to affect the very 
equilibrial processes of life (or machine) itself. As the 
concept of self regulation became more highly defined 
feedback was distinguished between negative and positive. 
Negative feedback refers to the circular process of self 
corrective cycles in which information from the effects of a 
previous adjustment is returned, or fed back, to the system 
further adjusting the process away from oscillatory and 
erratic behavior. Positive feedback reinforces oscillatory 
behavior and leads to system breakdown.
Wiener and Rosenblueth proposed the radical idea that 
the space between the governor and the machine, or the brain 
and the body, was occupied by the process/mechanism of 
feedback. Feedback was not simply a cause in the classic 
sense but it was responsible for the regulation and governing 
process of homeostasis that made governors work. If feedback 
could be isolated and manipulated the process of homeostatic
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regulation could be made more efficient. The trick was 
measuring this element or quantity called they called 
feedback.
In the early 1920s the mysterious element that passed 
between two machines, such as a governor and steam engine, 
had become important for practical work in electric 
communication. Research in telegraphic communications and 
electronics focused the attention of a very few 
mathematicians on isolating precisely what it was that was 
being sent over the wires crisscrossing the globe. The 
question was how substance being sent was related to how it 
was sent. In communications engineering this substance had 
previously been called intelligence even in the civilian 
arena. It referred simply to the speech of the sender 
distinguished from distortions caused by the sending 
apparatus which was called, simply enough, noise. But it was 
clear that this substance was not simply the voice of the 
sender that was carried over the wires. But it was not clear 
to communications researchers precisely what this substance 
really was, what it was composed of.
In 1928 R.V.L. Hartly showed that a mathematical 
relationship existed between the medium of transmission and 
the substance being transmitted. This substance was 
henceforth called "information." Hartly found that the 
logarithm of the number of possible states of a transmission 
channel, such as the various conditions of wear and tear of a
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telegraph cable, provided a measure of the information 
handling capacity of such a channel.218
However, attaining precise measurements of the condition 
of every inch of telegraphic cable was not feasible. The 
mathematical techniques of statistical mechanics common in 
physics were precisely the kind of equations electrical 
engineers required for the identification of the probable 
states of the system as well as the transition of a system 
from one probable state to another. The substance of 
information became quantitatively knowable by statistical 
analysis of its conditions of transmission. Information, it 
turned out, was not a substance at all but a relationship. A 
relationship, moreover, between processes rather than parts.
The process of feedback, linked to the concept of 
information, made feedback a communication process. Radar 
technology was closely associated with radio. The 
conceptualization of feedback as a communication process thus 
came quite easily. But it was a unique sort of communication 
that was also linked to the goal-directedness associated with 
feedback mechanisms. For the problem of anti-aircraft guns 
communication meant a radar's observation of the position of 
an aircraft communicated to the gun pointer, whether a 
machine or a person. The gun and the pointer's position was 
then calculated relative to the aircraft's position. Since
218 A. R Meetham ed. Encyclopedia of Linguistics Information and 
Control (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969) s. v. "Communication Theory" by 
P. M. Woodward, 46. I was unable to determine whether Hartly was the 
first to use this term or not. After Hartly, however, the term 
information replaced intelligence as a general term while intelligence 
has been reserved exclusively for the contextual sense of knowledge tied 
to meaning, especialy in the military.
the aircraft is moving of course, this process of 
communication is repeated over and over until the two 
positions are closely aligned. This is a process of 
communication between (or about) one state of a system and 
another. In this way mechanisms of communication was realized 
to be closely linked, if not identical, to to process of 
control and control was recognized to be a two way process
between controlling and controlled aspects or functions of a
system. Homeostasis and equilibrium became understood as the 
general process of information processing, one which 
regulated or controlled the changes between system states 
ensuring that they did not vary greatly. Control, in this its 
most basic sense, is the selection of feedback inputs into
current states of a system to alter - in a predictable way -
the system's transition into future states. Information, in 
other words, is the key to system behavior.
The mechanism or process of feedback Wiener and 
Rosenblueth were looking for was that of homeostatic control. 
Information processing thus referred to the taking in of 
information from one state to the next and the calculation of 
this data to produce an output which was fed back into the 
system as a form of control. Information processing became 
understood as the process that complex systems performed - 
whether biological or mechanical - in order to adapt to a 
changing environment. If this control process of homeostatic 
systems could be manipulated the behavior of the whole system 
could be controlled.
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Wartime operations research revolutionized all aspects 
Of war fighting from managerial concerns centered on 
logistics to weapons design, production and mode of 
deployment. The key was the use of statistical methods in the 
identification of optimum performance for a given set of 
condition with given tools towards a pre-specified end. Like 
the communications engineers before them operations 
researchers began from the premise that all states of the 
transmission medium could not practically be known in 
advance. In this purely practical engineering setting 
probability was understood to refer to states that were in 
principle measurable but in practice extremely difficult. All 
processes had to be understood in probabilistic terms based 
on incomplete data.
The human operator, understood as a complex information 
processor, could be inserted into a larger system together 
with other information processors -both machines and humans - 
to achieve a predefined goal. To develop integrated weapons 
systems the human/machine engineer specified the conditions 
of maximum and minimum performance of the given systems in a 
given setting and combined this with the specification of the 
goals of the weapons system linked with feedback.
Optimization was never considered in isolation. Optimization 
of performance in relation to the goal was a characteristic 
of the whole system whether anti-aircraft gun, gunners and 
spotters or naval vessels, their cargo and the methods of 
moving them. Operations research was itself a new technology 
essential in the allied victory. More convoys survived, anti-
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aircraft hits per thousand rounds fired increased, 
destruction per pound of munitions in aerial bombardment 
increased, and so forth. In virtually every case of increased 
effectiveness in the war effort the new technique or tool 
directly responsible was developed in terms of an information 
processing system composed of many interconnected parts.
Any system whose states could be adequately specified 
and formalized could be controlled. The problem was how to 
precisely specify these parts and how they interacted so as 
to streamline their interaction, their communication, in a 
desired way and steer the process in a desired direction.
That is, the problem was one of understanding the precise 
operation of communication and control in complex 
multidimensional processes. Engineers at OSRD quickly began 
working from the premise of feedback as communication and 
information processing developed by Wiener and Rosenblueth. 
The human sciences soon adopted these principles as well, 
also stimulated by the requirements of war.
The machines of World War II were incredibly noisy and 
incredibly fast. They were also incredibly complex. The new 
challenges of communication and coordination were fundamental 
to the war effort. Such challenges were the specific domain 
of the Psycho-Acoustics Laboratory (PAL) set up at Harvard 
under the direction of the experimental psychologist S.S. 
Stevens within the jurisdiction of the OSRD. PAL was composed 
primarily of communications engineers and psychologists 
focusing on "those problems arising from the fact that a
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human being is part of the total circuit."219 PAL was the 
largest university based program conducting psychological 
research during the war.220 Researchers at PAL considered 
their work to be a form of language engineering. Thus was 
born the discipline of psycholinguistics. The PAL researchers 
made no distinction between the technology of hardware and 
the technology of language and listening. The din of battle 
made communication a psychological and psychophysical 
problem.221
One of the first PAL experiments established that the 
problem of noise was relevant not so much at the individual 
level of the soldier but at the level of coordination between 
soldiers and especially between soldiers and commanders.
Noise was a command and control problem, a systemic problem. 
The individual tialgunner for example could withstand a 
considerable amount of fatigue and perform relatively well.
But coordination between a tail-gunner and a waist-gunner, 
for example - the organized response of the plane's entire 
defense system against enemy attack - suffered enormously.
The problem grew exponentially when larger systems such as 
aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious landings were
219 George Miller, F.M. Wiener, and S.S. Stevens, "Transmission and 
Reception of Sounds Under Combat Conditions," Summery technical Report 
of Division 17. Section 3. NDRC (Washington, DC: NDRC, 1946), 2. Quoted 
in Edwards, Closed World. 212. One of the most practical products of PAL 
were vinyl ear plugs - called Ear Wardens - which cut background noise 
yet allowed voice commands to be heard thus maintaining the chain of 
command.
220 James Capshew, Psychology on the March (unpublished PhD
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1986) 127. Quoted in Edwards, 
Closed World. 212.
221 Ibid., 214.
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considered. The research at PAL and in linguistics in general 
was closely connected with the developments of Shannon's 
communication theory. At a Symposium on Information Theory at 
MIT in 1956 "nearly every aspect of cognitive science was 
represented."222 Noam Chomsky delivered a paper on an early 
version of his theory of Transformational Generative grammar. 
PAL's last military contract expired in 1961 but its work 
continued with support from National Science Foundation and 
National Institute of Health grants.
Information
During the war, research focused primarily upon received 
signals. The "extraction of signals of a given ensemble from
noise of a known type" such as that of radar tracking a
p l a n e . 223 Electronic communications and the sending of signals 
received comparably less resources. The improvement of 
communications could be achieved relatively easily by simply 
boosting power to the transmitter. After the War considerably 
more effort went into the sending aspect of communication.
What emerged was a means of formalizing and quantifying the 
entirely non-essential, non-corpuscular substance of 
information and feedback. With this development, statistics 
has completed its three hundred year journey from the 
counting and enumeration of things, first by their essential
222 Edwards, Closed World. 229.
223 J R. Pierce, Symbols. Signals and Noise; The Nature and Process of 
communication (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961), 42.
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qualities then to reveal their essential qualities, through 
probability and the first questioning of essences and 
determinism, to the enumeration of relationships and the 
contingent assemblages of complex systems with no essential 
quality at all.
In 1948 Claude Shannon, an engineer for Bell , 
Laboratories, published "The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication" in the Bell Systems Technical Journal. This 
has become the seminal work in what has come to be called 
information theory or statistical information theory.
Wiener's work in tracking systems provided much of the 
mathematical background for this w o r k . 224 The problems were 
similar in that for both sending and receiving of information 
one is faced with the problem of distortion and error, or 
noise. In any transmission of a signal, whether that received 
from the radar readings of a planes location or voice over a 
phone line "it is unfortunately characteristic that certain 
things are added to the signal which were not intended by the 
information source."225 Shannon had basically done what had 
previously been considered undoable. He decreased the number 
of errors in a transmission over a noisy channel without 
recourse to increased transmitter power or larger bandwidth. 
This was achieved through a reconceptualization of what the 
communications process actually entailed. A communications
224 Shannon emphasized his debt to Wiener but Wiener pointed out that 
much of Shannon's early work, following Hartly and Nyquist - also of
Bell Labs, proceeded his own work in this field. Claude E. Shannon and 
Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1949, Illni Books, 1963), 3.
225 Ibid., 7.
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system, according to Shannon, should be understood in terms 
of the information it can transmit rather than the symbols 
that might represent what is transmitted. That is, 
communication is a problem of coding.
Shannon discovered that for the discrete signal, such as 
words made from an alphabet as in the Teletype, proper coding 
would maximize the rate of transmission and decrease the 
amount of distortion and errors in the received message. In 
the 1940s the machines partly determined the simplest coding 
algorithm of base 2, the binary digit or bit. This became the 
standard unit of measure for information and the most basic 
level of of coding. The binary digit conveniently matches the 
simplest division of process states into on or off, 
electrical current flowing or not flowing. Any symbol can be 
coded using the binary digit.226 The coded message simply had 
to be within the limits established by Hartly's probability 
algorithm for channel capacity. However, channel capacity was 
now understood in terms of amount of information transmitted 
rather than number of symbols.
For continuous message sources, such as a spoken voice 
or the reflected signal from radar, the equations are much 
more complicated but the same theory holds. The difference is 
that a range of band limited frequencies is specified to
226 The bit may be most commonly recognized today in the form of the 
ASCII text coding scheme, it becomes apparent here how Shannon could 
avoid concern for semantics. The contextual of a symbol, its meaning, is 
irrelevant to the symbols efficient transmission. There are ways in 
which these areas of coding and semantics overlap and cannot be fully 
separated. This was pointed out early on By warren weaver who introduces 
Shannon's theory of communication in the 1949 book reprinting Shannon's 
original article. Such linkages were the basis for subsequent artificial 
intelligence work.
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which the coding must comply. Continuous messages, understood 
in terms of a curve, had previously been approximated through 
the assignment of a finite number of points through which 
such a curve passed. Exact prediction with this method would 
require knowledge of all the infinite possible points through 
which any given message curve might pass. Instead of 
assigning a finite number of points Shannon divided the curve 
into a set of frequencies. This method of specifying a 
message encompassed the entire curve and all its possible 
points within a finite set of parameters. This reduces the 
number of variables from the infinite to the finite.
Each frequency and its parameters were assigned, through 
calculations of its probable state, in a manner similar to 
the standard methods used in astronomy for identifying the 
(probable) position of a star. Within the range of possible 
points in each frequency Shannon used the statistical 
techniques developed by Gibbs to specify the probable state 
of a portion of a given volume of gas.227 with these 
probability distribution formulas describing the maximum 
message transmission capacity of a given channel, along with 
a given power and a given frequency range could be specified. 
This capacity thus specified the proper coding of the message 
for the most efficient transmission. That is, a transmission 
whose sent message maximally corresponded with the received
22/ Gibbs called this state a micro-cannonical ensemble, a state 
characterized by a uniform distribution of probability. This probability 
itself refers to the average values of the phase quantities of molecules 
in what is called the overwhelmingly most probable Maxwell-Boltzmann 
distribution. Such an evenly spread probability distribution is itself 
called ergodic. See Sklar, Physics and Chance. 67.
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message. These frequencies and their corresponding maximally 
efficient coding schemes do not eliminate error. This was 
shown to be impossible. But such errors, or rather the 
frequency of errors, could be calculated.
"The fundamental problem of communication" Shannon 
writes "is that of reproducing at one point, either exactly 
or approximately, a message selected at another p o i n t . "228 
Information in Shannon's theory is not to be confused with 
meaning. He explicitly avoided equating his theory of 
communication with a theory of meaning. The "semantic aspects 
of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. 
The significant aspect is that the actual message is one 
selected from a set of possible m e s s a g e s ."229 Proceeding from 
the work of Hartly Shannon understood the amount of 
information to be the measured by the logarithm of the amount 
of available states of the transmission system. But it was 
Shannon's focus on the role of probability or uncertainty in 
the actual generation of the message within such a 
transmission system which brought the full significance of 
probability into view.
Shannon proceeded with the application of Gibbsian 
statistical mechanics, routine in communications engineering. 
The use of these equations in communications engineering had 
been driven primarily by practical concerns not philosophical
228 Shannon, Mathematical Theory. 31.
229 Ibid., 31. Italics in original.
160
exploration.230 jn reducing uncertainty "information turns 
out to be exactly that which is known in thermodynamics as 
entropy."23i it is here that Shannon's work provided 
communications engineering with one of its most valuable 
practical applications.
As Hartly pointed out information was linked to the many 
possible states of the communication system. Information must 
then be a purely relational quantity. As a concept 
information applies to the communication system as a whole 
rather than to individual messages (the realm of semantics). 
Unqualified, pure information is a meaningless abstraction.
It exists only as a relationship at a given time. Thus, 
Shannon found, the correlation of input to output in a 
communications system the similarity between message sent and 
message received, would be strengthened if uncertainty were 
reduced. Within a communication system, Shannon discovered, 
information was precisely what reduced uncertainty and 
therefore strengthened the correlation between input and 
output.
The place of equilibrium in Shannon's theory is that it 
describes the characteristic of the distribution of 
probability within a frequency defined by certain statistical 
parameters. These parameters are themselves derived from the 
curve of errors produced in measuring the frequency itself. A 
frequency and its parameters refer to each other in an
230 In 1925 L. Szilard produced the first extended discussion of 
information in physics, begun by Boltzmann's initial observation of the 
entropy - information link that emerged in thermodynamics. Von Neumann 
later explored information in the context of quantum mechanics.
231 Weaver, Mathematical Theory. 12.
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irreducible way. They determine each other without having 
characteristics unconnected one to the other. Until this 
point, outside of physics, the concept of equilibrium was 
applied to the exact point through which a statistical curve 
passed. It was, in other words, a mixture of probabilistic 
equilibrium and the equilibrium of atomistic classical 
mechanics for which the second law of thermodynamics 
specified the ultimate equilibrium; the universal heat death 
of maximum entropy.
Shannon discovered that entropy was not such a scary 
thing. It could be quite useful to the communications 
engineer - not because engineers were nihilists or happy 
conspirators in the production of instrumental rationality 
designed to alienate the worker from his labor or the 
individual from his soul but because entropy, understood in 
terms of information could be constructive. Information 
turned out to be the measurement of the different 
organization of a system from one state to the next. Entropy, 
or information, was actually a measure by which organization 
could be increased. Increasing organization, the reduction of 
randomness is, of course, negative entropy. In 
communications engineering proper coding is a form of message 
construction and thus a form of increasing organization.
Entropy in information theory, like equilibrium, is not 
to be conceived as a deterministic force. Early equilibrium 
expanded the scales of explanation in limited cases, such as 
cell division and the discovery of vitamins, and it succeeded 
in making biology a rigorous science, as Henderson had hoped.
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But as an explanation for heredity and evolution, equilibrium 
maintained the old characteristics of a deterministic life 
force sucking living organisms to its center rather than 
explaining their historical movement. Grand explanations in 
terms of equilibrium before the 1940s sounded not much 
different from the "evolutionism" that had been rejected as 
unscientific and tainted with vitalism and superstition. 
Entropy had even gained deterministic powers.
Information provided the conceptual tools to account for 
equilibrial, and for that matter entropic, processes in a 
non-deterministic manner freeing rational thought from the 
clutches of determinism once and for all. The life sciences 
have since become a very special kind of communications 
science. Recall from the discussion of physics in part three 
that entropy refers to the degree of randomness or 
disorganization in a state or phase of a dynamic process. The 
second law of thermodynamics states that systems, in 
isolation from all but the influences internal to it, will 
become increasingly less organized and more and more 
perfectly randomly distributed. Such a random distribution 
was the opposite of organization. Information and entropy are 
thus said to be high when organization is low.
Organization was precisely what Shannon, and all his 
predecessors, were trying to specify with probabilistic 
descriptions of the state of a transmission channel. When 
Shannon devised his equations for the specification of 
frequency parameters of a transmission channel he was 
measuring the (probable) level of organization of such a
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channel at any given state (time). When the probable 
organization of a channel's state is calculated one is left 
with the parameters or constraints within which a message may 
be transmitted. Thus the parameters specify the proper coding 
necessary for efficiency. Information (or entropy) is thus a 
measure of the level of constraint or freedom of choice in 
the construction (coding) of a message.
Complete freedom would be an instance of complete lack 
of structure to constrain one's choices - i.e. complete 
randomness. In the English language the letter "U" has a very 
high probability of following "Q." In the visible spectrum 
orange has an even higher probability of following yellow. 
Because a reasonably large sample size tends to be 
representative of the whole, a probability equation can be 
made for any sequence, relative to other variables acting on 
such a sequence. The statistical regularities arising from 
the organizational of such a sequential phenomena is known as 
an ergodic process.
Shannon found that in any information source that is not 
completely random there exists a statistically determinable 
parameter of that source. Within these parameters there is a 
necessary amount of extra information. This extra information 
in a message was known as redundancy. Nyquist had previously 
referred to this redundant component of the signal as 
useless, conveying no intelligence.232 Efficient transmission 
before Shannon consisted largely of trying to eliminate this 
redundancy. Information as a measure of organization however 
meant that noise (errors in received message) could be
232 Pierce, Symbols. Signals and Noise. 39.
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accounted for by inserting extra bits into the coded message. 
That is, adding redundancy specifically tailored to the 
communication channel's capacities (parameter) increased the 
correspondence between sent and received messages. These 
extra bits acted as checks against errors caused by noise in 
the transmission process. Redundancy turned out to be a 
"predictable departure from the random."233
This is an important point. At first glance it appears 
that Shannon is suggesting that entropy counteracts entropy. 
What it actually amounts to is that organization "itself" is 
a source of counter-entropic or negentropic effects.
Shannon called this relative entropy. Shannon's relative 
entropy is derived by comparing the actual degree of entropy 
of an information source at the time of transmission (by 
calculating its statistically probable organizational state 
in Gibbsian statistical mechanical fashion) and comparing 
this entropy with the maximum entropy the same message source 
could possibly have independent of ergodicity. For example in 
the English alphabet a completely random selection would 
produce an "A" 1 in 26 times - the same frequency as "X." In 
actual usage of the English language, however, constrained by 
the parameters of grammar, its organization or relative 
entropy, "A"
233 James Gleick, Chaos; Making A New Science (New York; Vicking 
Penguine Books, 1987, Penguine Books, 1988), 256.
165
occurs much more frequently than "x."234 it has been said 
that these effects of entropy are what Ogives time its 
arrow. "235
The effect of this distinction between absolute and 
relative redundancy reduced the concept of entropy, and, as a 
result, also the concept of equilibrium from an all powerful 
force acting on every thing in a uniform way to a much more 
complex process in which the effects of entropy at one time 
and place can "counteract" the effects of entropy at another 
time and place.
234 Shannon calculated that the redundancy of English is about 50%. 
Weaver, Mathematical Theory. 13.
235 See Ilya Prigogine and Isabella Stengers Order out of Chaosi Mans 
Mew Dialogue With Nature, with a forward by Alvin Toffler (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1984). This is actually a matter of great dispute within 
physics. Einstein's relativity made time a matter of illusion i.e. 
relative, in classic and quantum mechanics time is, in principle, 
reversible. See Sklar Physics and Chance for a complex treatment of 
statistical mechanics which illustrates the problems with the
"objectivist" view. The two views of time are intimately bound up with 
the question of whether probability is an objective feature of reality, 
as Pierce insisted, or is merely a reflection of our lack of complete 
knowledge, as indicated by Einstein and later David Bohm's contention 
that "God does not play dice with the universe." Note the irony of 
"objectivism" as a form of "irrationality" in the post-quantum age, an 
irony not widely acknowledge outside of theoretical physics save for its 
compartmentalized form as a "social" phenomenon relative only to 
feminist theory and literary criticism and not to the "real world." it 
is basically a continuation of the "vitalism - mechanism debate", 
sometimes infused with spirituality, as in the writings of Fritjof 
Capra's The Tao of Phvsics or versions of the Gaia principle, and 
sometimes "objective" as in modern systems theory and the new science of 
chaos, in physics, such as Murray Gell-Mann's The Quark and the Jaguar, 
or complexity and emergence, in the life and human sciences illustrated 
by Brian Goodwin's How the Leopard Chanced its Spots, in any case, 
probability - objective or relative — has demolished the essentialist 
determinism of the classical paradigm of an atomistic point mechanical 
system as a form of rational explanation.
Cybernetics
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Shannon's formalization of information had dramatic 
ramifications for virtually every discipline. In conjunction 
with feedback and information processing a new paradigm for 
understanding the world emerged. Cybernetics replaced the 
epistemological basis of affectiveness from a one-way command 
with that of a two-way message sending and receiving system. 
Wiener and Rosenblueth were explicit in their view of the 
unity of the set of problems centered on statistical 
mechanics, communications and control in both the machine and 
living organisms. 236 it was soon realized that social 
organization also fell within the purview of cybernetic 
epistemology. This is because cybernetics does not generaly 
distinguish between the material involved in a system. The 
focus is upon organization of relationships. The importance 
of structure lies with analyzing specific material 
manifestations of systems and the nature of interactions. A 
system is defined by its organization, however, not its 
structure. Shannon's specification of a formal mathematical 
methode of conceptualizing information makes the transitions 
between system states, that is, the organization of 
relationships within a system, thinkable and manipulable. 
Systems became governable.
In 1942 Rosenblueth gave a presentation of the research 
he and Wiener were conducting to the Cerebral Inhibition 
Meeting organized under the auspices of the Macy Foundation. 
The concept of feedback was introduced to a wide variety of
236 Haraway, "S igns," 180.
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disciplines including engineering, psychoanalysis, 
mathematics neurophysiology, philosophy, sociology and 
anthropology, notably including Gregory Bateson and Margerate 
Mead. Rosenblueth, Wiener and Julian Bigelow, a fellow 
engineer in the Fire Control section, published "Behavior, 
Purpose and Teleology" in the journal Philosophy of Science. 
They described goal oriented behavior in both the machine and 
human as a process of negative feedback. Henceforth, 
cognition, group dynamics, social organization in ant, monkey 
and human populations as well as the successful tracking and 
targeting of enemy missiles or human genes was linked with 
the new formulation of communication as a cybernetic control 
system.
The Macy Foundation sponsored numerous conferences 
spreading the concept of feedback and control. The first 
regular meeting held in 1946 was titled "Feedback Mechanisms 
and Circular Causal Systems in Biology and the Social 
Sciences Meeting." In 1947 Wiener coined the term cybernetics 
to give a name to the newly unified set of concepts and the 
methodologies of investigation of systems according to these 
concepts. Wiener summarized the themes of cybernetics as:
"(1) The Gibbsian point of view has revolutionized modern 
life; (2) society can only be understood through the study of 
messages and communication facilities; and (3) physical 
functioning of the living individual and the operation of new 
communication machines are parallel in their attempts to 
control entropy through feedback."237
237 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics and Society; Human use of Human Beings 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950). Quoted in Haraway, "Signs," 180.
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A few years later, an introduction by Wiener and others
to an Academy of Sciences conference illustrates the radical
epistemological shift being wrought by cybernetics:
The concepts of purposive behavior and teleology 
have long been associated with a mysterious, self- 
perfecting or goal seeking capacity or final cause, 
usually of a super-natural origin. To move forward 
to the study of events, scientific thinking had to 
reject these beliefs in purpose and these concepts 
of teleological operations for a strictly 
mechanistic and deterministic view of nature... The 
unchallenged success of these concepts and methods 
in physics and astronomy, and later in chemistry 
gave biology and physiology their major 
orientation. This approach to problems of organisms 
was reinforced by the analytical preoccupation of 
Western European culture and languages. The basic 
assumptions of our traditions and persistent 
implications of the language we use almost compel 
us to approach everything we study as composed of 
separate, discrete parts or factors which we must 
try to isolate and identify as potent causes.
Hence/ we derive our preoccupation with the study 
of the relation of two variables. We are witnessing 
today a search for new approaches, for new and more 
comprehensive concepts and for methods capable of 
dealing with the large wholes of organisms and 
personalities.238
The authors thought that these new concepts, even if
"expressed in different terms" represented "an attempt to
escape from these older mechanistic formulations that now
appear inadequate, and to provide new and more fruitful
conceptions and more effective methodologies for studying
self-regulating processes, self-orienting systems and
organisms and self-directing personalities."239
238 L. Frank and others, "Teleological Mechanism," Ann. N.Y. Acad.
Sci., 50 (1948). Quoted in Bertalanffy, Systems. 16.
239 Ibid.
Systems Reformulated
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Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics made points and 
identities much more complex, but reality until the 1940s 
remained firmly corpuscular. The growing importance of 
probability and statistics and its fundamental importance for 
statistical mechanics existed uneasily within the 
epistemology of point mechanical systems. The development of 
a formal theory of information and its circulation in terms 
of cybernetic feedback loops also radically transformed the 
concept of systems. The reemergence of the system concept as 
a general explanatory device focused attention upon dynamic 
relationships. The basic schema of a Gibbsian interconnected 
and dynamic system, adapted by Henderson into biology and 
Parsons in the social sciences, was transformed by the 
continued evolution in the statistical reasoning that had 
given it its earlier form.
Ludwig Von Bertalanffy first articulated the modern form 
of the system concept. Bertalanffy explicitly rejected the 
mechanistic interpretation of interaction yet he was not 
satisfied with metaphysical and materially ineffective 
explanations. He attempted to grasp the specific operations 
by which systems functioned, were maintained, transformed, 
expanded or destroyed in a relational non-point mechanical 
way. Bertalanffy made the fundamental distinction between 
open and closed systems to move beyond the vitalism-mechanism 
controversy.
Bertalanffy, an Austrian biologist, published his first 
book Theories of Development in 1928 (translated into English
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in 1933) in which he stressed that the task of the biological 
sciences was to discover the laws specific to biological 
systems, what was needed was a "system theory of the 
organism."240 His goal was no less then the settlement of the 
vitalism-mechanism antithesis. Bertalanffy was well aware 
that his biological theories constituted a natural philosophy 
and as such would not be widely received.241 Bertalanffy 
first presented his ideas of a general systems theory in the 
United States to, one of the few forums in which such non­
mechanical ideas found acceptance outside of spiritualism: 
Charles Morris' semiotics seminar at the University of 
Chicago in 1937.242
For Bertalanffy the adoption of closed equilibrial 
systems explanations in the life sciences constituted an 
unwarranted abstraction. An abstraction which obscured rather 
than clarified the behavior of such systems, especially 
complex highly organized systems such as those of concern to 
the life and human sciences* Bertalanffy was aware, however, 
that in biology a holistic theory such as his was too close 
to the vitalism that the lacuna of early twentieth century 
biology had worked so hard to exercise.242 When the
240 Ervin Laszlo, "Origins of General Systems Theory in the Work of 
Von Bertalanffy" in Ervin Laszlo ed., The Relevance of General Systems 
Theory; Papers Presented to Ludwig von Bertalanffy on His Seventieth 
Birthday (New York: George Braziller, 1972), 3.
241 Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory. 11.
242 Thomas Sebeok, The Sian & Its Masters (Austin; University of Texas 
Press, 1979), 66.
243 Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory. 12-13.
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theoretical was discussed, system remained in the background 
and relationships were understood in mechanical terms. All 
that was necessary was to assume an eguilibrial arrangement 
and the important work of clinical research could proceed. 
Equilibrium, after all, was an established fact of science. 
"Excessive" attention to natural philosophy, Bertalanffy 
thought, revealed that the equilibrium concept in the life 
sciences necessarily occupied an explanatory position very 
similar to Bergson's elan Vital in vitalist epistemology. But
Bertalanffy did not reenter the vitalism mechanism debate. He
*
merely pointed out that the closed system concept of physics 
applied to living organisms would require such a vital force. 
But he proposed that an expanded conception of systems 
appropriate to the life sciences, one that attempted to 
explain change rather than stability, would not require an 
epiphenominal force to propel it through time and space 
foiling entropy.
The concept of open systems brought to the fore two 
fundamental issues in the analysis of complex processes - 
statics and dynamics.244 statics refers to the homeostatic 
maintenance of a systems organization relative to its 
environment while dynamics refers to changes in this 
organization. Neither is reducible to the other but both 
require the other for their existence (as well as their 
differentiation on the part of the observer). In 
informational terms both are ways of identifying the states 
of a system and the transition processes between such states.
244 Ibid., 158.
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In other words, statistics and dynamics are two general 
categories of system organization.
The distinction between open and closed systems and 
statics and dynamics had the effect of erasing the lingering 
differences between organic and inorganic systems and 
process. The distinction between biological, chemical, 
electronic and mechanical systems since World War II has 
become the level of complexity of organization rather than a 
qualitative distinction. Generally speaking, the more complex 
an organizational structure the greater the distance the 
system may be from a source of energy. Simpler systems 
require a closer proximity to an energy source.
As a form of organization homeostasis and equilibrium 
became one possible state among many. They are an important 
states but have been stripped of their causal properties 
laying unmentioned at the heart of prewar biology and social 
science. After the war homeostasis became one of four general 
categories or descriptions of states of system organization; 
homeostasis, homeorhesis, morphostasis and morphogenesis. In 
this new context homeostasis refers to an entropic process in 
which the level of organization is maintained by the 
importation of negative entropy. Homeorhesis concerns an 
increase in complexity of organization but in terms of 
development rather than evolution; Morphostasis is a neutral 
entropic phase of transition; And morphogenesis is an 
unpredictable change in organization to a higher order of 
complexity associated with evolution.
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In 1954 the Society for General System Theory was 
organized by Kenneth Boulding, an economist with the Center 
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto 
California, and many others at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science.245 
System, information and cybernetics came together to form the 
epistemological basis of rational explanation and the 
production of rational techniques of management where change 
and transformation was not caused but constrained, not 
authorized but modulated.
It was precisely these epistemological transformations 
brought about by the development of general systems theory, 
information theory and cybernetics that allowed Francis Crick 
and James Watson to discover the double helix of DNA and the 
nature of the hereditary material in 1956. This material was 
conceived entirely as an information processing, code 
generation and transmission system. This system produces the 
dual functions of self-replication and message transmission 
via messenger RNA that controls protein synthesis. DNA does 
not cause or determine growth or evolution. Rather, it 
constrains or organizes the possible states the evolutionary
245 The name was later changed to Society for General Systems 
Research. The term "theory" in the name was considered "too 
pretentious." Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, 15. Boulding 
formulated what he called a rough "skeleton" of ascending levels of 
systems organization: Frameworks, understood as arrangements, structures 
or maps; Clockworks, simple predetermined dynamic systems; Thermostats, 
self-regulating systems, closed loop cybernetic systems; Cells, self- 
maintaining structures and self-reproducing open systems; Plants, 
multiplicative ensembles of cells; Animals, teleological open systems 
characterized by an image or knowledge structure which mediates between 
stimulus and response; Human, self-conscious open systems; Social 
organization, in which the unit of functional element is not the 
individual but the role; and Transcendental system, which is knowledge 
itself. Quoted in wilden, System and Structure, 357.
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process may occupy. DNA is a code that mediates between 
different states of a system. The environment is a necessary 
set of parameters (or constraints) upon genetic code 
transmission. Without the environment providing noise and 
random mutation evolution would not take place. Only 
transformation in the form of non-adaptive mutation would 
occur due to random mutations of self replication. Evolution 
is a process characteristic only of open systems interacting 
with an environment. Evolution is now considered to be ba a 
dynamic process operating principly by selection. Selection 
is now understood in statistical terms as transition 
probabilities.
It should be noted that these epistemlogical 
transformations in complex processes and systems occurred 
accros the board. The application of methodes emerging from 
this epistemological reformulation have been applied to all 
sectors of society. The practical application and efficeincy 
of these new methodes have not always, perhaps even rarely 
been analyzed except in terms of refinement of methodes. 
there has been little critical analysis of purpose. Managment 
science has been particularly interested in the new 
technologies of system organization. In this sense systems 
analysis can be distinguished from systems theory. Systems 
analysis applies the principles durived from the new 
epistemology of non-deterministic and open cybernetic 
information processing systems for the narrow purpose of 
aiding decision makers by identifying central componants of 
complex systems and producing optimized ruitines to guide the
175
transition of systems from state to state. This is in fact a 
definition of control. It is the attemtp to influence state 
transition by taking into account the multiple objectives 
within a system and manipulating boundary and resource 
constraints in order to affect change towards the desired and 
predefined, yet constantly refined, goal. This is the source 
of the modern fetish o£ real-time. This is slightly different 
from the wider concern of systems theory wih the 
epistemological aspect of complex processes.
The developments of information theory and cybernetics 
made it clear that relationships and organization were 
fundamental aspects of all processes. Perhaps more 
importantly, they showed that systems could be approached 
empirically and technical knowledge could be produced about 
the regulatory process and thus control techniques could be 
devised to affect system behavior. Such knowledge had immense 
practical applications.
Innumerable techniques have been developed for the 
identification and construction of parameters or boundaries 
for the implementation of control techniques. In engineering 
and business management one of the most common techniques is 
systems analysis. Systems analysis is not to be confused with 
general systems theory though they are very closely related. 
Systems analysis is a technique developed at RAND in the late 
1940's to Consider problems of a more speculative nature than 
those of operations research. Emerging out of operations 
research systems analysis retained the feature of optimizing 
communication and the inter linking of every aspect of the
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system into a functioning whole. But it differs in that it 
attempts to identify "a range of problems to which there 
[could] be no 'solution' in the strict sense because there 
[were] no clearly defined objectives that [could] be 
optimized o r  m a x i m i z e d ."246 That is, systems analysis is 
future oriented. Optimally efficient organization can be 
constructed with an optimum capacity to adapt to probable 
short term changes in system organization.247 In 1946 the Air 
Force and Douglas Aircraft formed RAND and in 1948 separated 
into a non-profit corporation.
Other techniques for generating knowledge of complex 
systems were also developed shortly after the war. Game 
theory was developed at RAND by Von Neumann and the economist 
Oskar Morgenstern. Queuing theory, decision theory and 
ergonomics also emerged directly from the war effort. In one 
form or another, techniques and technologies arising from the 
three linked concepts of system, cybernetics and information 
began to permeate nearly every other discipline.
In 1946 the Psychology Department at Harvard split apart 
with the social and clinical psychologists joining the new 
Department of Social Relations under Talcot Parsons. The 
remaining members of the Psychology Department joined Stevens 
in at PAL. Parsons was not opposed to the approach of PAL, in 
fact he was strongly "predisposed" to "conceptions of
246 L. Bruce and R. Smith, The RAND Corporation (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), 9. Quoted in Edwards, Closed World. 117.
247 This is undoubtedly the source of the current cliches about 
perpetual training and constant evolution in the popular (business) 
press. Systems analysis has become a basic management tool taught in 
business and engineering programs at the undergraduate level generaly 
going by the name cost-benefit analysis.
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cybernetic control, not only in living systems but also in 
many other kinds of systems."248 He developed, along with 
Edward Shils, what he called the "pattern-variable" scheme as 
the theoretical framework for the analysis of social systems. 
With a reformulated concept of system explicitly understood 
as arising not from "variation in terms of a single variable, 
but also as a resultant of a plurality of independent 
variables." The existing sociological theories arising from 
the capitalism-socialism dichotomy, according to Parsons, did 
not provide the basis for "a rigorous non-deterministic 
analysis" of individual action or social behavior.249
From this pattern-variable principle arose what Parsons 
refers to as the "primary reference point of all [his] 
theoretical work," that of the "four-function paradigm."25° 
These four functions, or "elementary pattern variables of a 
social system," are 1) adaptation, 2) system goal-attainment 
(not unit or individual), 3) integration, and 4) pattern- 
maintenance and tension-managment. This four-function 
paradigm was Parson's attempt to deal with the "empirical- 
theoretical problems that have entered prominently into the 
critical discussions of this type of theory."251 That is, the 
theoretical problem of the neo-deterministic equilibrial 
systems inherited from Henderson and, later, the homeostasis
248 Talcot Parsons, "On Building a Social Systems Theory," Daedalus 99 
(Fall 1970): 831.
249 Ibid., 843.
250 Ibid., 844.
251 Ibid., 849.
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of Cannon. The problem of "consensus vs. conflict" rendered
the concept of function itself problematic. For Parsons this
came down to a problem of control:
Clarification of the problem of control, however, 
was immensely promoted by the emergence, at a most 
strategic time for me, of a new development in 
general science-namely, cybernetics in close 
relation to information theory. It could now be 
plausibly argued that the basic form of control in 
action systems was of the cybernetic type and not 
primarily, as has been generally argued, the 
analogy of the coercive-compulsive aspects of the 
process in which political power is involved.
Furthermore, it could be argued that functions in 
systems of of action were not necessarily "born 
free and equal", but had, along with the 
structures and process implementing functional 
needs of the system, differential hierarchical 
relations on the axis of control.252
For Parsons the continuities in the social and
biological conceptions of stability and change to evolve
together. In 1955 a Harvard graduate student from the
Department of Medical Zoology named Stuart Altmann was one of
the first to use the term sociobiology to refer to this new
way of conceptualizing the social system as a cybernetic
communication systems or information processing. Altmann
explicitly viewed primate society as a communication system
based on the statistical characteristics of information.
Cybernetic functionalism permeated his research questions:
What are the roles of the various sensory 
modalities in communication? What is the function 
of the communicative signals in the integration of 
the society? For every signal: what are the 
necessary, sufficient and contributory stimuli; 
what members of of the society respond; and what is 
their response? What is the relation between 
communicative feedback and social homeostasis? Are 
there any social communicative networks that are 
"self-damping"? Does metacommunication exist? Are
252 Ibid., 850.
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there (a) signals whose only function would be the 
"acknowledgement" of a signal emitted by another,
(b) signals "asking" for a signal to be repeated, 
or (c) signals "indicating" failure to receive a 
signal?253
In 1956 the sociobiological section of the Ecological 
Society of America was formally founded. 254 Altmann's work 
later became the primary material on primates used by Edward 
0. Wilson in his 1975 book Sociobioloqy.255 David Hamburg, a 
psychiatrist from Stanford University's Medical School, was 
interested in the implications of communications theory and 
sociobiology for the study of emotions. As Hamburg conceived 
of them, emotions were some sort of adaptive complex linked 
to social evolution.256 While chairman of the Department of 
Psychology Hamburg was instrumental in arranging Jane 
Goodall's chimpanzee studies in the Gombe in Zaire.
In management science the problem of the organizational 
subject perplexing the discipline in the 1930s was finally 
resolved. Some management specialists were quite explicit in 
the source of their ideas. B.G. Schumacher wrote, though
253 Stuart Altmann, rough draft of research, CRC papers (March 22, 
1956) "Monkeys and Other Animal Studies" folder. Quoted in Haraway, 
"Signs," 183.
254 Haraway, "Signs," 214 n 153.
255 Haraway, "Signs," 183. What is interesting in the ensuing debate 
over sociobiology is that the criticisms focused attention on what was
seen as biological reductionism and a renewed Spencerian social 
evolution. The epistemological foundations of sociobiology was ignored, 
namely information processing and communication which theoretically 
erased the distinction between living and non-living systems and 
replaced it with a distinction between simple and complex systems.
256 Haraway, "Signs," 182 n 159.
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never published, A Sociobioloqical Approach to Post- 
Industrial Management.257 In business management the process 
of evolution had to be synthesized and the system provided 
with direction. The goals and choices of individuals within 
an organization could be considered, in Shannon's 
informational terms, as combinations and permutations within 
roughly identifiable parameters. Control-systems theory 
provided the principles and technologies needed for the 
identification and shaping of these organizational goals. In 
the business world and increasingly in the public sector 
"such a control system was the b u d g e t ."258 Control of the 
budget, understood not only in terms of money but also time, 
cost and scheduling as well. The budget allowed for the 
modulation of organizational behavior. Money plays the role 
of the bit in information theory. Value does not lie in the 
coinage itself. Coinage is merely the measuring device of 
currency.
The budget in a modern large-scale corporation 
plays two basic roles. On the one hand, it is used 
as a management control device to implement 
policies on which executives have decided and to 
check achievement against established criteria. On 
the other hand, a budget is a device to determine 
feasible programs. In either case, it tends to 
define-in advance-a set of fixed commitments and 
(perhaps more important) fixed expectations.
Although budgets can be flexible, they cannot help
257 B.G. Schumacher, On the Origin and Nature of Management (Eugnosis: 
Norman 1984), 172. There was a considerable stink raised over 
sociobiology at this time.
258 Miller and O'Leary, "Accounting,". 260.
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but result in the specification of a framework 
within which the firm will operate, evaluate its 
success, and alter its program.259
This focus upon the budget should not imply some form of
crude economic determinism however. Rather, capitalism has
undergone a general transformed along with the art of
government. Capitalism is just as much an effect of the
transformations of the object of government as other spheres
of rational thought and political practice. Deleuze noted
that "[t]he operation of markets is now the instrument of
social control."260 To quote Deleuze further:
nineteenth century capitalism is a capitalism of of 
concentration, for production and for property. It 
therefore erects the factory as a space of 
enclosure, the capitalist being the owner of the 
means of production but also the, progressively, 
the owner of other spaces conceived through analogy 
(the workers familial house, the school). As for 
markets, they are conquered sometimes by 
specialization, sometimes by colonization, 
sometimes by lowering the costs of production. But 
in the present situation, capitalism is no longer 
involved in in production, which it relegates to 
the Third World, even for complex forms of 
textiles, metallurgy, or oil production. It's a 
capitalism of higher-order production. What it 
wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy 
is stocks. Thus it is essentially dispersive and 
the factory has given way to the corporation. The 
family, the school, the army, the factory are no 
longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge 
towards an owner - state or private power - but 
coded figures - deformable and transformable - of a 
single corporation that now has only 
stockholders.261
259 R. Cyert and J. March, The Behavioral Theory of the Firm (New 
Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1963), 110-111. Quoted in 
Miller and O'Leary, "Accounting," 260.
260 Deleuze, "Postscript," 6.
261 Ibid.
The irony of societies of control is that the logic of 
cybernetic information processing systems denies the 
possibility of certainty - the dream of determinism. 
Determinism and certainty were the ideals of point mechanical 
systems based on essential identity. In societies of control 
determinism and certainty have been replaced by highest 
probability and correlation. But probability always leaves 
room for error, signal distortion and the possibility of 
mutation. Increased manipulatory affectiveness arising from 
the mastery of probability has thus also been accompanied by 
the realization of constant potential hazard. The 
impossibility of determinism and certainty has therefore lead 
to a state of perpetual crisis and crisis management. Control 
is always on the verge of panic. In an attempt to head off 
potential disaster, crisis management in societies of control 
brings with it a new form of observation.
The reconfiguration of all dynamic processes into 
cybernetic information processing systems brought with it the 
discovery (and invention) of the control mechanisms of these 
system - the program or coding scheme. Though the cause of 
this reconfiguration is linked to the logic of observation 
and the responsibility to know the object of government (a 
logic common to all the arts of government since the late 
sixteenth century), the effect of this latest reconfiguration 
was an unprecedented expansion of this logic of observation 
bringing it to a wholly new level. The will to knowledge
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operates in (and by) a radical new mode. This new mode of 
observation we will call profiling.262
Observation within the disciplinary mode sought to 
apprehend the act at the moment it occurred. Disciplinary 
observation guards against undesirable acts through the 
constant threat of the act being observed. Profiling, on the 
other hand, looks at the information code that 
(statistically) establishes the parameters of a system's 
processes - its behavior. Choices, or any system behavior for 
that matter, are understood in the discourse of control as 
permutations and combinations of predefined sets of code - 
the program - underlying every (rationally understood) 
system. Profiling simply seeks to now in advance what the 
most statistically likely choice or behavior will be. Through 
reproducing the code of a system and constructing a profile 
probable system behavior is deduced in advance of its 
occurring. In societies of control it no longer matters 
whether the disobedient act is performs or not. The profile 
reveals its potentialities before hand.263
The quintessential example of such profiling is surely
262 See William Bogard, The Simulation of Survailance: Hvpercontrol in 
Telematic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1996), 
especialy chapter 3.
263 The dream of realtime is thus unapproachable. The effort to 
realize this dream however may turn out to be an important form of 
normalization in the information age. We are not compelled to seek 
realtime by an outside political force. We demand it for our 
competativeness, for our very survival. Realtime is always better than 
old time but it is always already old. What we are left with is the 
irony of realtime profiles. This does not deter the desire for realtime 
however. Witness the amount of money to be spent, in a time of tight 
budgets and "necessary cutbacks," of database terminals for Missoula's 
police cruisers just passed in the recent bond issue vote.
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the Human Genome Project in the U.S. or the international 
Human Genome Organization. "The ultimate purpose of [these] 
programs is to write down the complete ordered sequence of 
As, Ts, Cs, and Gs - the four nucleotides - that make up all 
the genes in the human genome."264 Such knowledge "promises" 
greater control over our fate. "Genes tell the cells in our 
body how to act; when a mutation or alteration in a gene 
changes the information, a cell may function improperly. 
Identifying the genes and their mutations will provide clues 
as to which gene causes which negative result. When we know 
which gene leads to an abnormal condition, we can screen for 
disease before it occurs - remove a tissue at risk for 
cancer, treat a patient with drugs, change a diet, or maybe 
eventually put a corrective gene into a cell."265
Gene therapy, like all control technologies, confronts a 
fearsome opponent - the environment. Cybernetic information 
processing systems interact with their environment in a 
symbiotic and mutually constitutive relationship. They 
require their environment for survival. But the environment 
is teeming with noise, the potential for errors in coding and 
signal distortion. The domain of the biological sciences 
provide a response to the threats posed by the environment 
that are proving compelling to other disciplines (if that is 
what we are to continue to call them). "[A] whole new school 
of thought on cyber-security is emerging. This seeks to mimic
264 R. C. Lewontin, "The Dream of the Human Genome," in Druckery and 
Bender eds. Culture on the Brink. 107.
265 Joan Marks, "The Human Genome Project: A Chalenge in Biological 
Technology," in Druckery and Bender eds. Culture on the Brink. 99.
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the a biological immune system. Like a living organism, a 
public network is made up of lots of complex, diverse and 
highly interdependent components. Like such an organism, it 
cannot predict what kind of attack it might suffer next, nor 
how the infection might evolve. Because the organism cannot 
simply disconnect itself from the world, it protects itself 
with a combination of semi-permiable firewalls (a skin and 
cell membranes), sensors (antigens) and circulating killer 
agents (antibodies and white blood corpuscles)."266
RAND researchers speculate that this may be the only 
viable approach to the problem of computer security since 
about 95% of the Pentagons communications travel on the 
public network.26? Rand and Pentagon researchers are no 
strangers to this sort of panic however. The corollary 
principle that arises with the discovery and invention of 
profiling is deterrence.
Deterrence, in its modern form, emerged from the 
military's desire to build profiles of and control over 
warfare. RAND's invention of computer simulations, first to 
analyze human-machine interaction in military systems at the 
McCord Field Air Defense Direction Center in Tacoma, 
Washington in 1950 and later to develop nuclear warfare 
strategies, arose in part because of the difficulty of
266 "Cyber Wars," The Economist 338 no. 7948 (January 13th-19th, 
1996), 78.
267 Ibid., 77.
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planning for something that had never happened before.268 How 
could one plan for nuclear war when no one knew what is was 
like? Preparations for nuclear war, no matter the form it 
took, were tremendously complex. Coordinating in-flight 
refueling and equipment propositioning required intricate 
planning. Such planning could not take place in the dark with 
no sense of what the process was. Planners need to see the 
nuclear battle field. The only way to do this was through 
simulating it.
Control presents the possibility not for perfect order, 
the dream of disciplinary power, but rather perfect 
deterrence against disorder, which is to say constant 
vigilance and, where possible, preemptive intervention. But 
this is only possible if the code is known. Thus in the 
modern art of government a premium is placed on the 
production of knowledge of system coding and programing. In 
societies of control this technique of knowledge and strategy 
of government goes by the name information.
268 Edwards, Closed World. 122. The best tools for such analysese are 
digital computers. The industry, however, was heavily invested in 
analogue technology and was reluctant to pursue what was then a very 
unreliable technology. George Brown, a RAND consultant believed RAND's 
decision to build the Johnniac in 1950 was "the key spur to IBM's 
decision to commit to digital computer develppment."
Chapter 6; Conclusion
Deleuze notes that "the disciplines underwent a crisis 
to the benefit of new forces that were gradually instituted 
and which accelerated after World War II; a disciplinary 
society was what we already no longer were, that we had 
ceased to be."169 The "socio-technological study of the 
mechanisms of control, grasped at their inception, would have 
to be categorical and to describe what is already in the 
process of substitution for the disciplinary sites of 
enclosure, whose crisis is everywhere proclaimed."!70 This is 
what I have attempted here, in a small way, through a tracing 
of the history of statistical reason.
The goal of this paper was to trace the transformation 
of statistical reason with attention to their mutually 
constitutive relationship with the arts of government 
especially the epistemological aspect of this art. For 
Foucault, observation (or surveillance) is both a technique 
of supervision but also, and at the same time, a strategy for 
obtaining the truth. Governmentality illustrates how the 
practices of governing were also involved in the 
transformation of the epistemological conception of the 
object of government.
The first of the arts of government - raison d'etat and 
its object the population - gave way to a liberal art of 
government and society by way of the Physiocrats and their 
illustration of the economy separate from the will of the
169 Deleuze, "Postscripts," 7.
170 Ibid.
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sovereign. These forms of government and their objects are 
drastically different things. The development and growth of 
the various disciplines producing knowledge about society 
lead to yet further transformations of the object of 
government.
The classical economists mark the emergence of a wholly 
new object of government - that of society - accompanied by a 
new art of governing this object- liberalism. Liberal 
governance constituted an unprecedented degree of freedom of 
activity for its object - as long as such activity conformed 
to the norm. This freedom was predicated on a very close 
relationship between the norm, revealed by statistical 
methods, and the ability of government to induce normal 
behavior, often through non-direct interventionary measures 
such as infrastructural development. Foucault called this 
form of government disciplinary. The search for more accurate 
counting procedures and techniques for knowing and 
intervening in society to assure its proper functioning soon 
lead to the overturning of determinist epistemology. 
Determinism had played a fundamental role in legitimizing 
rationality. Determinism and natural law had actually been 
the very basis of reason itself.
By the end of the nineteenth century determinism was 
under intense scrutiny. Simply put, determinist epistemology 
was no longer producing useful and affective knowledge. The 
crisis of determinism was not an isolated phenomena. This 
state of affairs was brought about in all rational knowledge 
producing disciplines; the physical, natural and social
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sciences. This crisis of determinism made the epistemological 
basis of the disciplinary form of government problematic for 
the norm was a deterministic principle.
The norm as a determining force sounds ludicrous today. 
But such was the conception of how the normal worked. The 
process of rendering the norm rational in terms we recognize 
today is the same process that produced the replacement 
epistemological for the norm. This epistemological aspect of 
government is called control.
These transformations have never ceased, they have 
continued into our present time leading to the current state 
of transition from disciplinary government knowledge to a 
government and knowledge of control. In the emerging art of 
government of control, the strategy of truth appears to be 
the strategy of information. It should be pointed out that 
this emerging epistemology holds within it its own form of 
analysis. Essentialist or neo-essentialist modes of knowing a 
system such as the prevailing structural-functional accounts 
of social change will not elaborate and will most likely 
obscure modern forms of control.
Control is based upon a new formulation of system and 
process that is non-essentialist. A modern complex system is 
understood as a set of variables selected by an observer 
together with a set of constraints effecting these variable. 
These variables themselves are relationships depicting an 
organization, a particular organization may take the form of 
many different kinds of structures generally delineated as 
complex (energetically and informationaly open) systems such
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as biological, technological or social or simple 
(energetically and informationaly closed) systems such as 
gases in a closed container. A simple system, the classic 
mechanical system first analyzed by thermodynamics, contains 
unites (molecules in the case of gases) whose arrangement is 
independent of the other units in the system. Complex 
systems, on the other hand, are constituted by units (which 
are themselves understood to be subsystems) whose arrangement 
is heavily dependent on the position of other units in the 
system such as a crystal or an organism. The interconnection 
and interdependence of the units in a complex system limits 
the ppssible states a system may occupy. This limitation also 
provides the negatively entropic effects observed in living 
phenomena. In both kinds of systems statistical rationality 
is the key component analysis. Simple systems are approached 
by ascertaining the randomness of the spread of units while 
complex systems are approached by ascertaining the 
probability distribution of possible future states defined by 
the relationships between system components. That is, the 
systems degree of freedom of the system defined in terms of 
the possible future states or arrangements the system may 
occupy.
In governmental terms control is not yet exercised upon 
society as a whole, at least not consciously. Narrow slices 
of society such as work performance or the construction of 
infrastructures which enhance specific forms of activity and 
behavior, especially as concerns business and government. In 
this sense information is collected and control is exercised
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through parameter or frequency modulation, the production of 
profiles and the techniques or tactics of deterrence. Avenues 
of communication are established in certain areas while 
hindered in others.
An example of this narrow application, which nonetheless 
has far reaching effects and implications, is exhibited in a 
recent issue of the Institute of Electronic And Electrical 
Engineers (IEEE) journal IEEE Transactions On Systems, Man. 
And Cybernetics of May 1997. The lead article in this special 
issue titled "Human Interaction with Complex Systems: Design 
Issues and Research Approaches" notes that "design, which 
consciously and purposefully supports human interaction with 
complex systems, rather than simply the use of new technology 
at the human-system interface, is a critical issue for the 
research community."271 jn other words, the new object of 
government - complex systems - need to be understood in order 
to govern them properly, to bring out the right order of 
things and to enhance prosperity.
Perhaps the most well known promoter of the new
technologies of government was Robert S. McNamara appointed
Secretary of Defense by president John Kennedy. During World
War II McNamara worked in the Statistical Control Office of
the Army Air Corps planning the logistics of bombing raids in
Germany and later the Far East. He increased the flying time
of bombers by 30% using statistical systems analysis. He
joined Ford Motor Company bringing with him a troop of "whiz
kids" from the Statistical Control Office. McNamara appointed
271 Christine Mitchel, and Gunilla A. Sundstrom, "Human Interaction 
with Complex Systems: Design Issues and Research Approaches," IEEE 
Transactions On Systems, Man. And Cybernetics 27 no. 3 (May 1997): 265.
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the RAND economist Charles Hitch to be the Pentagons 
comptroller. Together they set up the Office of Systems 
Analysis and instituted the the Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System (PPBS) introducing modern budgeting and 
cost-benefit analysis to the defense establishment. 272 Lyndon 
Johnson considered the PPBS so successful that he ordered all 
federal agencies to adopt it in 1965.273
This reform of the federal bureaucracy seems to have had 
the desired effect, to illustrate this success we can choose 
a (unwittingly) postmodern interpretation of the effects of 
these budgetary reforms. Daniel Carpenter, an Assistant 
Professor of Politics at Princeton University writes in a 
recent issue of American Political Science Review that "the 
magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased 
for executive-branch agencies after 1970 due to executive
272 Command and management became nearly identical procedures. "Every
professional military man" according to Lieutenant Colonel David Ramsey 
Jr., "has heard the theory expressed that management and command are 
essentially the same thing. Chances are better than even, in fact, that 
he has never heard any serious dissent from the proposition that the 
terms command and management are synonymous, or nearly so." Lieut. Col. 
David Ramsey Jr., U.S. Army, "Management or Command?," Military Review. 
V. 41, N. 10 (1961), 31. Quoted in Edwards, Closed World. 130. The 
military did not simply adopt a corporate management technique, however. 
Rather, corporate management and military command have both felt the 
effects of the general epistemological transformation in their 
respective objects of interest, in theory and practice, the new 
epistemological a-priori of cybernetic information systems, has 
permeated all rational thought to one degree or another. The object of 
this rational thought brings with it a new form of government 
characterized by control.
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oversight reforms."274 He notes "[c]control over agency 
budgets is a critical tool of political influence in 
regulatory decision making, yet the causal mechanism of 
budgetary control is unclear."275 To discover this "causal 
mechanism" Carpenter advances a "stochastic process model of 
adaptive signal processing."276
Carpenter found that manipulation of aggregate resources 
in themselves did not account for agency control. Rather, the 
causal mechanism was the "powerful signals" sent via 
budgetary shifts. The responsiveness to such signaling, 
furthermore, was enhanced by the hierarchy of the agency. The 
greater the hierarchy and consolidation, in other words, the 
greater the responsiveness to budgetary signals from message 
senders in congress and the administration. What is most 
interesting about Carpenter's study, however, is not just his 
findings but his methodology. Information 
processing and systems theory used to analyze information 
processing systems would, it seems be appropriate.
Statistics has been intimately involved in these 
transformations in the art of government and its object and 
the transition from an epistemology of discipline to one of 
control. Statistical methods and statistical reason, however, 
have never had a distinct form, an essence as it were. Their 
history is a history of transformation of both thought and
274 Daniel Carpenter, "Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and 
Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation," American Political Science 
Review 90, no. 2 (June 1996): 283.
275 Ibid.
276 Ibid.
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practice. No doubt they will continue to change. But the 
current form of the art of government and its object and the 
role played by statistical reason and practices in this new 
form can be apprehended, at least in a general way. But only 
if we look past surface effects.
Statistics plays a fundamental role in technologies of
control. Besides being fundamental to the specific theory of
control illustrated above, statistical techniques are vital
for simulations and forecasting of every kind - such as
financial forecasting in the global market to forecasting the
needs of future communications systems, both permanent and
t e m p o r a r y .277 Ergonomics, also known as human factors
engineering, is the extension of wartime discoveries of human
performance and machine interaction understood in terms of
probability and optimalization. As a distinct discipline it
began as the adaptation of humans and mechanical devices in
the workplace. It has become familiar to most people as an
aspect of health, especially in terms repetitive tasks
associated with computer monitors and keyboards. But
Ergonomics has a much broader scope than comfortable desks,
chairs and keyboards. A recent article in Ergonomics, the
publication of record for the discipline, notes that "the
history of ergonomics Can be described as military ergonomics
in the 1950s, industrial ergonomics in the 1960s ergonomics
of consumer goods and services in the 1970s and computer
ergonomics in the 1980s. It is expected that the 1990s and
277 The military, for example, is experimenting with genetic 
algorithms to determine optimum battlefield communications 
configurations. Tony Chang, "Genetic Algorithms in Battlefield 
Communications," PCAI, (September-October): 28.
195
early 2000s will be the phase of both macroergonomics and 
cognitive ergonomics"278 There are many other instances of 
statistical techniques operating in the background of every 
day life subtly altering our ways of behaving.
The current period has been variously described as a 
post-industrial society, an information revolution or simply 
the information age. Most of these discussions tend to focus 
on the production of information as simply another commodity. 
A commodity that sometimes helps, and sometimes hinders, an 
otherwise familiar economy of production and society composed 
of individuals with an essential and universal human nature. 
Indeed there are many businesses making fortunes marketing 
information on these premises. Because of the expansion of 
the amount and availability of stored data a new sector has 
been added to the economy - the information economy. But 
these descriptions of information and an information based 
society do not adequately explain what is new in modern 
society or how the two are related or the effect of this 
relationship. It certainly does not provide a basis for 
critiqiie or active (ethical) participation in modern life.
I believe the information age is not adequately 
characterized simply by an increase in some "thing" called 
information. The information age must be seen as the 
emergence of a new way of conceiving of and governing complex 
systems, whether human society or individual genetic traits. 
The epistemology of essentialism and its principles of 
identity and determinism collectively manifested in terms of,
278 Hal Hendrich, "Future Directions in Macroergonomics," Ergonomics 
38 no. 8 (August 1995): 1617.
and thereby governed through, the norm has given way to the 
epistemology of probability with its principle of contingency 
manifested in and governed through information and control 
and the tactics of profiling and deterrence. This is not to 
say that attention to remaining essentialist epistemology and 
practices should be ignored. Abhorrent ethico-political 
effects continue to arise from essentialist distinctions such 
as the exclusion and marginalization well documented in 
feminist and "postmodern" literature. However many abhorrent 
effects are arising from the new practices of control which 
cannot be understood and resisted if these are analyzed as if 
they too emerge form essentialist epistemology. They do not. 
What we are witnessing in this transition from an 
epistemology of essentialism to information, I suggest, is 
the emergence of a new object of government - a cybernetic 
information processing system - and a new art of government 
ruling this object - a government of information and control. 
This form of government does not seek exclusion but 
inclusion. The question is what form and what purpose this 
inclusion supports.
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